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CALIFORNIA'S RACIAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RATIONALES FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS DECISION
MAKING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Richard Delgado
Jean Stefancic**
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic examine the history of racial mistreat-
ment of citizens of color in California. Beginning with incidents of racial brutality
during the early Spanish colonial period and proceeding into the present, Delgado
and Stefancic reveal that California has not been the egalitarian paradise many
suppose. The authors write against a background of recent attacks on affirmative
action in higher education which raise the prospect that the diversity rationale
that universities had relied on to justify race-conscious admissions policies
may no longer be constitutional. Recognizing this possibility, the authors offer
remediation-making amends for past misbehavior--as an alternative basis for
maintaining race-conscious programs in higher education. In particular, the authors
argue that historical and recent racial discrimination in states such as California
provides sufficient justification for adjusting admissions and hiring practices so that
affected minority groups are placed in the status quo ante, that is, the position they
would have been in had the discrimination not taken place.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 1848, only a short time before Mexico signed the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, two Anglo settlers found gold at Coloma on the south
fork of the American River. The two men attempted to suppress word of
their discovery, but it soon spread to a world anxious to hear news about the
rich western territory of California. Over the next few years, a trickle of miners
became a flood. The newcomers encountered, however, a native and Mexican
population, some of whom had the effrontery to be occupying the most
coveted lands. The anarchy and vigilantism that followed included the infa-
mous case of Juanita, a young Mexican woman who killed an Anglo miner
attempting to break into her cabin in Downieville, a small mining town.
She pleaded self-defense; the state charged murder. Tried before an impromptu
court consisting of the dead man's friends, Juanita was pronounced guilty and
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hanged, the first woman lynched in California. Other Mexicans who got in
the way of miners or their appetites met similar fates. To ensure that Mexican
and Chinese prospectors received the message, the California legislature
passed the Foreign Miners' License Tax,' imposing a fee of twenty dollars
per month on Mexicans and Asians who wanted to mine gold-a penalty
never enforced against Europeans Despite this and many other incidents
of raw racism, California's current population of nearly thirty-three million
includes almost one-half people of color, including over nine million Latinos,
more than two million blacks, and almost four million Asians.3
This Article documents California's ambivalent treatment of citizens
of color beginning in its early days and continuing into the present, focusing
particularly on events that limit minorities' ability to obtain an education.
As we wrote on another occasion, diversity and affirmative action in higher
education today are under sharp attack.4 The diversity rationale for race-
conscious decision making in higher education that was articulated by the
Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke5 may well be repudi-
ated, either through judicial decision6 or, as in California7 and Washington,'
by popular referendum. If this happens, remediation-making amends for
past sins-may be the only basis remaining for institutions of higher learning
to operate race-conscious programs.9 Although diversity's status as a compelling
1. Act of Apr. 13, 1850, ch. 97, §§ 1, 5, 1850 Cal. Stat. 221, 221-22. The constitutional-
ity of the act was upheld by People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232 (1850). The act was repealed by the Act of
Mar. 14, 1851, ch. 108, 1851 Cal. Stat. 424.
2. See MANUEL G. GONZALES, MEXiCANOS: A HISTORY OF MEXICANS IN THE UNITED
STATES 85-86 (1999). A year later, in 1851, when the act was repealed,
over two-thirds of the fifteen thousand Mexican miners in Calaveras, Tuolumne, and
Mariposa counties-the "southern mines" which they had dominated-were driven away,
most returning to their homes south of the border. Among [them] were many Californios,
whose rights were denied in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
id.
3. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 34 (1999). Of a total population of 32,667,000 as of July 1, 1998, Hispanics
comprise 9,454,000; blacks, 2,456,000; Asian or Pacific Islanders, 3,938,000; and American Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts, 309,000. See id.
4. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado's Historic
Embrace--and Denial-of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703, 705 (1999).
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a discussion of affirmative action in higher education, see infra
Part I.
6. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).
7. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31; see also Amy Wallace, Prop. 209 to Have Immediate Effect
on UC Applicants Education, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996, at Al.
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998); Tom Brune, Now That 1-200 Is Law,
What's Next? UW Alters Admission Policy, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at Al.
9. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 4, at 705. On the likelihood that this will happen, see
Race-Sensitive Admissions in Higher Education: Commentary on How the Supreme Court Is Likely to
Rule, 26 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 97 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Commentary] (noting how five
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state interest is in question, our premise is that the Fourteenth Amendment
will always permit, if not require, remediation.'0 If so, institutions that have
demonstrably discriminated against minority groups will be able to maintain
admissions and hiring policies designed to place these groups in status quo
ante-the position they would have been in had the discrimination not taken
place-into the foreseeable future."
The scope of our inquiry is broad. We include, of course, discrimination
that California has visited on minorities in schools and the state's universi-
ties." We are also interested in a broader range of mistreatment that logic
and everyday experience suggest would impair the educational prospects of
families and children of color and dampen their aspirations in this vital area.'3
Why California? First, on a personal level, the two of us hail from that
state. Before assuming our current positions, both of us spent lengthy periods
in the Golden State. One of us went to law school there; the other obtained
a master's degree. We both worked for universities in California and still have
children and friends in that state. More than any other state, California is
home to us.
A second reason is that California, for complex reasons, has turned its
face against minorities in recent years. 4 Its universities, once hospitable to
students and faculty of color, have turned cold. 5 Its public schools, once
the envy of the nation, have deteriorated alarmingly. 6 A recent measure,
legal commentators, interviewed independently, each predicted that the Court would narrow or
jettison the diversity rationale when next presented with the opportunity to do so). On its desirability,
see Randall Kennedy, Is Affirmative Action on the Way Out? COMMENTARY, Mar. 1998, at 35
("[Rleparative justice is the best rationale for affirmative action.").
10. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 4, at 705.
11. Otherwise, the Fourteenth Amendment would seem to have little in the way of practi-
cal enforcement. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Parts II, IV. This is so because a host of factors, such as access to housing, fair
treatment by the police, and occupational mobility, affect a family's ability to send their children
to college. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (pointing out how a host
of conditions, such as having a parent in jail or out of work, hunger, and crowded living condi-
tions, diminish the academic performance of young children). Accordingly, the scope of causation
should be broad. The level of educational aspiration is fragile; dampen it and the effects on a family
are apt to last a long time. In a corporation, by contrast, the consequences of a policy of discrimi-
nation are not as long lasting; a company that stops discriminating-and announces it-may
return to normalcy in short order. See Kenneth Labich, No More Crude at Texaco, FORTUNE,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 206 (noting that a company once seen as a "chamber of horrors for minorities" is
now well on its way toward being a "bastion of equal opportunity").
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. See generally RUBtN DONATO, THE OTHER STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL SCHOOLS: MEXICAN
AMERICANS DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (1997); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:
CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE (1998).
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enacted by the people, would eliminate access to K-12 schools for children
of undocumented aliens. 7
Finally, as California goes, so goes the nation. Other states have copied
California's disavowal of race-conscious decision making in higher educa-
tion, as once they tried to emulate its enviable schools and its open embrace
of newcomers."
We are not the only ones working in this vein. As we write, research-
ers at other institutions have been investigating the histories of their own
schools and regions for evidence of lingering discrimination.' 9 One researcher
at the University of Texas School of Law teaches an annual seminar about
his own school's history, in connection with which he has compiled a website
containing thousands of pages of documents that has received over 8000
hits.20 On a governmental level, the U.S. Department of Education has
been investigating vestiges of discrimination in the Fifth Circuit,2' while the
U.S. Department of Justice" and a commission established by former Colorado
governor Roy Romer have been documenting discrimination in various indus-
tries, with a view toward meeting the standards the U.S. Supreme Court
seemingly requires for remedial affirmative action.23 The rationale of reme-
diation seems to be emerging, then, simultaneously with the increasingly fero-
cious, broad attack on affirmative action led by conservative think tanks and
litigation centers.
This Article begins with a brief review of the case law of affirmative
action in higher education, paying particular attention to its various ration-
ales and standards of proof. It then turns to California's historic treatment
17. See infra notes 245-253 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Thomas D. Russell, History of Racial Discrimination at the University of Texas
(visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.ccwf.cc.utexas.edu/-russell/seminar/smnr.html>; Letter from
a University of California at Davis professor to Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Oct. 15,
1997) (on file with authors); see also David J. Garrow, Mississippi's Spy Secrets, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
30, 1998, at 15 (explaining how investigators revealed that Mississippi had maintained a secret state
agency aimed at discrediting the civil rights movement).
20. See Russell, supra note 19.
21. See Patrick Healy, A Lightning Rod on Civil Rights: Norma Canti Changes the Debate on
Affirmative Action, Desegregation, and Athletics, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 1999, at A42;
Telephone Interview with Tom Russell, Professor of Law, University of Texas, (Nov. 13, 1999).
22. See Michael Higgins, Plan of Action, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1998, at 68.
23. See Colorado Governor Roy Romer, Exec. Order No. D00798, Apr. 7, 1998 (creating
the 13-member Disparity Resolution Task Force to respond to the Disparity Study Final Report);
COLORADO DEP'T OF TRANSP., STATE OF COLO., DISPARITY STUDY: FINAL REPORT (1998)
(unveiling a two year independent study on state spending, ordered by the Colorado legislature in
response to legal challenges to affirmative action, that addresses the disparity between the number
of Minority/Women/Disadvantaged Business Enterprise firms that are qualified to perform contracts
with the State of Colorado and the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) and the utili-
zation by the state and CDOT of these firms in contracting and purchasing).
1525
47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1521 (2000)
of Asians, Mexicans, African Americans, and Indians, focusing on actions
that the average reader would conclude were likely to impair upward social
mobility and educational opportunity. As we mentioned, the actions of
schools and universities are of prime interest to us. But racism and prejudice
weave a complex web, with many forms and manifestations converging to deny
educational opportunity. The scope of the Article, accordingly, is relatively
broad. It includes terrorism and official brutality, of course, as well as job and
housing discrimination. It examines discrimination in social attitudes, media,
and popular culture. Our approach is both chronological and concentric. The
Article begins in the earliest times and radiates outward from an educational
core, analyzing each group in turn.
This broad treatment seems advisable for a number of reasons. First, it
is difficult to predict what the Supreme Court will do in deciding the next
higher education affirmative action case. As mentioned, it may curtail the
diversity rationale sharply or eliminate it altogether. But the remedial rationale
is apt to remain in some form. Finally, legalities aside, we believe that fair-
minded readers in California and elsewhere will want to know what events
brought California to its current situation. Does California have much or
little for which to atone? Understanding the social setting in which a problem
arises is often a necessary precondition for treating it sensibly and humanely.
How did California's main ethnic minority groups first encounter whites,
and what has their experience been like with their white neighbors and gov-
ernment? For our purposes, this history begins with the era shortly before
the Gold Rush and continues to World War I. The second era begins with
World War I and continues through the early Cold War competition with the
Soviet Union. The third era begins with the Cold War and ends with the pres-
ent. Each era has a characteristic quality; each shades off, of course, into the
next.
Beginning around 1960, a significant development took place. The
University of California system, for the first time, reorganized its admission
policies to emphasize standardized testing scores.24 This development coincided
with the increasing bureaucratization of California higher education under for-
mer president Clark Kerr and the state's strategic initiative known as the
Master Plan, which divided higher education in California into three tracks,
corresponding roughly to upper-class, high-achieving whites, who went to
campuses of the University of California; less-privileged whites and a few
minorities, who went to the California State Universities; and everyone else,
24. See infra notes 479-485 and accompanying text.
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mainly some whites, minorities, and immigrants who attended the community
colleges.25
We cover these developments in some detail, because they expose a direct
link among higher education, governmental action, and the fates of minori-
ties. In that same vein, we devote special coverage to the role of particular
university professors in California and individual campuses, such as Davis,
in maintaining a race-stratified society.
Because our main purpose is legal, namely documenting racial discrimi-
nation and its effects, we focus on the victimization, rather than the struggle,
side of the equation. We are more interested, in other words, in the barriers
minorities have had to surmount than in the gallant, often inspiring, efforts
they took to survive and advance themselves in a frequently hostile envi-
ronment. Finally, the reader should note that we are not historians. Our
purpose is not to develop a novel historical thesis or interpretation, rather it
is to bring to light events that bear on a vital legal and social question. What
follows, then, is more like a "Brandeis brief' than a work of historiography. 6
We collect and display incidents and patterns because of their connection
with the current debate about affirmative action. Policymakers and judges
are our intended audience, as well as sympathetic members of the lay public-
not historians. Finally, we cannot claim to be comprehensive. The history
of one state, especially one as vast as California, exceeds the reach of any
two researchers, no matter how diligent. We offer, at best, a beginning, in the
hope that others will fill in the many gaps and untold stories that we leave
unaddressed.
25. See infra note 483 and accompanying text.
26. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908) (employing social science data, long
excluded by most higher courts); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477-82 (1986).
Studies of this sort usually attract two separate and invalid objections which we might as well
address now. The first objection is, are we not overlooking all the good things California, and individ-
ual California citizens, have done for minorities over the years? The answer is, of course, that California
has done good things for minorities over the years, but this is completely irrelevant. The appropriate
level of discrimination is zero; a private firm that discriminates against a minority group (say, for
example, blacks) does not offset kind treatment of another minority group, or of that group on
another occasion. This is best illustrated in the case of crimes. A murderer may not plead that on other
occasions he behaved in socially useful ways in order to escape liability. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Constance Garnett trans., Bantam Books 1962) (1866) (describing the
character Raskolnikov, who murdered his landlady and then sought to escape punishment by listing
the good things he planned to do in life).
The second objection is that California is no worse than other states. But if "everyone is doing
it," the conclusion ought to be that those other states similarly owe remediation to the minorities they
treated badly, not that all should escape responsibility. Also, one should not prejudge California's record
in comparison with other states. Scholars in other states are researching their states' records now,
and California might turn out to be worse, or better, than these other states when the full record
becomes clear.
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1. RACE-CONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has set out what governmental actors, including
institutions of higher education, may do in the way of race-conscious decision
making. Among the issues it has addressed are the standard of review for
affirmative action programs,27 the amount of weight race may be afforded in21
relation to other factors, and whether admissions and hiring committees must
compare each applicant to all the rest, rather than considering minorities
and whites separately.29 In general, the scope for race-conscious decision mak-
ing has narrowed with each successive decision. Nevertheless, until recently,
most authorities believed that universities that avoided strict quotas, overt
two-track procedures, or decisive weight to race stood on solid ground.3°
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas3' cast doubt on many
of these assumptions. Giving short shrift to Bakke, but patterning itself
expressly after Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,32 the Fifth Circuit applied
strict scrutiny to strike down race-based admissions at the University of
27. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-89, 320 (1978); see also
id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing, in an opinion
joined by three other justices, for intermediate scrutiny). But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that even benign racial classifications-those intended
to help minorities-trigger strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493-94 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (same); id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (holding that the use of race is permissible, if not determinative
or decisive). But see infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (noting that the use of race is imper-
missible, even if not decisive, being merely one factor among many, under the Fifth Circuit's approach
in Hopwood v. Texas 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
29. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (holding that the use of race is permissible if all applicants
are compared). But see infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (noting that the use of race is imper-
missible under Hopwood).
30. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK CURTIS BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998); NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, HARVARD UNIV., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1993-1995 (1996);
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1772-79 (1996);
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 705, 712-15; Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 429-41 (1998); Tanya Y. Murphy,
An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
515, 539-50; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1014-15, 1022-29 (1996); Note, An Evidentiary Framework
for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360-66 (1996).
But see Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-98 (1st Cit. 1998) (holding that Bakke may still
be good law, but that "abstract" and "generalized" evidence of diversity's value will likely not
suffice); Tracy v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321-23 (S.D.
Ga. 1999) (implying that diversity does not, in itself, confer educational benefits and may not con-
stitute a compelling interest).
31. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
32. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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Texas School of Law, thus raising concerns in the minds of many other
universities outside the Fifth Circuit over whether their own procedures
would withstand scrutiny. Earlier, the district court in Hopwood, following
Justice Lewis Powell's opinion in Bakke, held that Texas's purpose-"[t]o
achieve the diversity of background and experience in its student population
essential to prepare students for the real world functioning of the law in our
diverse nation" 33-met the compelling interest standard required for such
cases, but that Texas's approach had not been narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.
34
On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit found Texas's program deficient
on even more basic grounds. Writing that "Justice Powell's view in Bakke is
not binding ... on this issue," it declared that any consideration of race,
even for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body and intellectual
climate, offended the Constitution.35 A racial criterion for admission, it
wrote, is "no more rational ... than.., choices based upon the physical size
or blood type of applicants."36 Even worse, using race "replicates the very
harm that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to eliminate." 7 For
the Hopwood court, Supreme Court case law tolerates "only one compelling
state interest [that could justify affirmative action in higher education]:
remedying past wrongs."3 Whether later courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, will rule in a similar fashion remains, of course, an open question.
Many commentators have warned-or urged-that when the Supreme
Court finally decides a case like Hopwood, it may relegate the diversity
rationale to the waste heap.39 In California, of course, it appears that the
voters who enacted Proposition 209 intended to do just that.4"
If, after a few years, the remedial rationale is the only one left standing,
how will it play out in higher education settings? Extrapolating from such
cases as Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education4' and City of Richmond v. J.A.
33. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570 (1994).
34. See id. at 569-74.
35. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
36. Id. at 945.
37. Id. at 946.
38. Id. at 944.
39. See Commentary, supra note 9 (discussing this possibility); Liu, supra note 30, at 381-82;
Ethan Bronner, Group Suing U. of Michigan Over Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A24 (describ-
ing impending lawsuit); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 1, 20 (2000) (deeming racial classifications
"corruptive of the whole legal order" and holding that a voting restriction aimed at ensuring a
Hawaiian-only vote for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs Trustee position to be unconstitutional).
40. See infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text. Proposition 209's original title, the
"California Civil Rights Initiative," may have misled some voters into thinking the measure would
advance the cause of minorities.
41. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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Croson Co.," one may hazard some informed speculations. Certainly, evi-
dence of past discrimination must be specific and particularized, not merely
societal or general.43 The findings must pertain to the specific region or insti-
tution in question-a showing that society in general or all universities main-
tained barriers against minorities will have, as one Court put it, "extremely
limited" probative value.44 Proof of past discrimination must emanate from
a fact finder with high credibility.45 Presumably, a university's confession of
guilt, standing alone, will not be enough.46 Finally, remedial measures must
be no broader and last no longer than necessary to correct the violations
shown.47
Beyond these generalizations, it is difficult to hazard much more than a
guess about the extent of remediation permissible, or required, under the
Fourteenth Amendment. A few lower court cases imply that a university may
afford race-based treatment in admissions and hiring "if [it can] show ... it
had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion"4
established by other entities operating in the region-or, better yet, allied
with it.
Of course, the Supreme Court may end up promulgating absurdly narrow
guidelines for the remedial rationale so that, for example, a university could
not engage in remedial affirmative action unless a specific subunit, such as a
department, or even a particular professorship, had acted discriminatorily
toward applicants precisely like the ones requesting consideration. 49  The
Court might shrink the time permitted for proof of causation, so that dis-
crimination that occurred a short time in the past would be deemed to have
lost its efficacy. It could also hold that universities that had undertaken
42. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43. See Liu, supra note 30, at 400-01.
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
45. See Liu, supra note 30, at 400-01.
46. See id.
47. See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke, and the Future of the Diversity Justification,
29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,50-54 (1998).
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492; see also Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916
(9th Cir. 1991).
49. See Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't
Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 583 (discussing the doctrine's mirage-like retreat in face of ever
more insistent proof). The absurdity of such an approach should be obvious. Consider that a
university has a finite number of professorships, just as a town has a finite number of homes. Once
these professorships are given out, no more remain to be disbursed. A professor of a minority race
cannot "buy in" easily, at least not without turnover and some other professor's departure, which is
a slow and tedious process. And note how two considerations discourage: (1) The minority professor
considering waiting out access knows he or she would, at the end of the line, have few other
minority professors to talk with, and (2) The professors who will judge his or her application will
be white and likely to examine the applicant's credentials and accomplishments by traditional,
white standards so that articles, books, and syllabi dealing with poverty or race may end up devalued.
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even feeble measures to redress racial imbalances had done enough. We write
in the hope that a commonsensical, middle-ground approach will prevail so
that educational institutions will be able to offer race-conscious programs
when clear-cut discrimination, which anyone would regard as impeding
upward educational mobility, is shown by a credible authority. The remain-
der of this Article suggests that this standard is amply met in California.
Recently, we visited a renowned institution of higher education located
in California, where one of us had been invited to present a paper. During
a break in the proceedings, we were walking around the attractive tree-lined
campus when we spotted an impressive building with a sign above the door
that read "Heritage Hall." It was locked, but we later learned that the
building is devoted to displays of trophies and other mementos memorializ-
ing the achievements of the school's athletic teams and of its scientists and
other academic figures. Upon inquiring, we learned that most universities
in California and elsewhere maintain comparable collections.' School pride
and tradition evidently are themes that university administrators, fundraisers,
and athletic departments feel perfectly free to exploit in fundraising and
public relations efforts. The past plainly makes a difference; common sense
and ordinary experience tell us that. But if universities may point with pride
to past accomplishments, even ones lying in the rosy penumbra of distant
history, to build solidarity and loyalty, then it should follow that those same
universities may not deny the reality and lingering effect of past racial exclu-
sion and misbehavior. If the past makes a difference, one cannot pick the
good and ignore the bad. It is because we believe that the past does indeed
make a difference-that understanding our history will enable us to grasp
what it is that we are now called upon to do-that we offer this Article and
our research into the history of a complex and rich state.
II. CALIFORNIA HISTORY: THE EARLY PERIOD
The racial history of California, like that of Washington and Oregon,
presents a unique twist in that the Pacific was the last frontier of America's
westward expansion. Minority groups who had previously been pushed west
were finally forced to assimilate into Anglo American culture or return
home. Mexican Americans, for example, were offered a harsh choice under
50. See, e.g., Steve Bisheff, Nostalgia Is All that USC Fans Have Left, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Oct. 19, 1999, at Dl; Silvia Pettem, Boulder County History: Wander Historical Treasures at
CU, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 26, 1999, at B8 (describing the University of Colorado Athletics
Gallery, the University of Colorado In Space Gallery, and the Distinguished Alumni Gallery,
among other displays of past achievements); Scott M. Reid, Minorities Not Priority at USC, UCLA
Colieges, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 19,1999, at D17.
California's Racial History
47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1521 (2000)
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: Mexicans residing in the newly conquered
land had one year to decide whether to stay or to return to the interior of
Mexico."
In addition to the theory mentioned above-that California's minori-
ties received harsh treatment because westward expansion had simply run
out of land-other historians hypothesize that additional factors played a
part in California's brutal, and sometimes bloody, treatment of minority
groups. Tomis Almaguer points out that Manifest Destiny inflated Euro-
Americans' sense of entitlement to California's land and riches, so that
Mexican miners or Asian American farmers, for example, provoked suspicion-
"Why are they in our way?"52 He also points out that free labor ideology
increased tensions between white laborers, on the one hand, and minorities
on the other, who were seen as threatening capitalism by their willingness
to work long hours for substandard wages.53
Although race seems to have been the prime factor in early California
conflict, over time labor relations and class began to play an overarching
role as well.54 Authorities disagree slightly on the mixture of motives. One
holds that most of the mistreatment stemmed from simple racism.5 Kevin
Starr, a preeminent California historian, offers disappointment as an additional
reason for California's mistreatment of foreigners and minorities.56  He
points out that California is the only state that has made a dream part of its
identity-the dream of a better life, beaches, sunshine, wealth.57 That sense
of destiny could turn cruel, as when, for example, Indians stood in the way,58
or when Mexico inconveniently turned out to own lands coveted by Euro-
Americans." A final theory holds that the presence of several minority
51. See, e.g., RODOLFO AcUiA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: THE CHICANO'S STRUGGLE TOWARD
LIBERATION 29 (1972).
52. TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 12, 32-33 (1994).
53. See id. at 12-14, 33-37.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See Daniel Cornford, "We All Live More Like Brutes Than Humans": Labor and Capital in
the Gold Rush, in A GOLDEN STATE: MINING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GOLD RUSH
CALIFORNIA 78, 86 (James J. Rawls & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1999).
56. See James J. Rawls, California: A Place, A People, A Dream, in CALIFORNIA: A PLACE,
A PEOPLE, A DREAM 140, 142, 144 (Claudia K. Jurmain & James J. Rawls eds., 1986); Kevin
Starr, California: A Dream, in CALIFORNIA: A PLACE, A PEOPLE, A DREAM, supra, at 13, 14.
57. See Starr, supra note 56, at 6.
58. See JAMES J. RAWLS & WALTON BEAN, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (7th
ed. 1998).
59. See id. at 130-34.
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groups within California afforded Anglo settlers the opportunity to manipu-
late one group against another as social attitudes or labor needs shifted.6"
The following parts show all of these forces in operation.
A. The Settlement Period
California was originally inhabited by more than one hundred Native
American tribes. In 1533, Cortes arrived in lower California, and by 1769,
the first significant Spanish settlement was in place. Unlike the English
colonists, the Spaniards considered Indians subjects of the Spanish monarch
in need of Christianization and training in European ways, language, and
the domestic arts. Carried out by a string of missions, the central purpose of
this training was to civilize the Indians and make them "Spanish," as well as
to make use of their labor. Unsurprisingly, the Indians did not thrive in the
regime of corporal punishment, unsanitary conditions, altered diet, hard labor,
and terrifying sermons about hell and the afterlife. At the end of the mission
era, 75 percent of the native population had been eliminated.6'
After a long and bloody revolution that lasted from 1810-1822, Mexico
gained independence from Spain. Mexico's new constitution, unlike the
American version, provided for complete political and racial equality. It also
granted Indians the right to vote and to hold office and property. By 1845,
the last missions were privatized and replaced by ranchos, large private land
grants, and cattle raising. Despite the noble aspirations of the Mexican Consti-
tution, the California ranchos each employed thousands of Indians who did
all of the work.62
American settlers began arriving in California around 1818, during the
height of the Mexican Revolution.63 Larger numbers, including families,
arrived by covered wagon starting in 1841. A few years later, the United
States concocted a pretext to declare war against the fledgling Republic.
After two years, the United States decisively defeated Mexico and forced it
to cede California and other territories in what is now the Southwest to the
United States.64
60. See ALMAGUER, supra note 52, at 4-7.
61. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 13, 15, 20, 26, 44, 46-47. On the Indians' fate,
see generally ALBERT L. HURTADO, INDIAN SURVIVAL ON THE CALIFORNIA FRONTIER (1988).
62. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 51, 54, 60-62, 63.
63. See id. at 71. Many of the early arrivals were Yankee traders. See id. For other states of
origin, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
64. See id. at 74-76, 85-89.
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B. The Gold Rush
Americans discovered gold in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada in early
1848, a few days before signing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico
that ended the war with that nation.65 The treaty signers appear to have been
aware of this discovery, rumors of gold having circulated as early as 1843.66 Dur-
ing the summer, the lure of gold drew prospectors from Hawaii, Oregon, Utah,
and the rest of the United States, as well as from Mexico, Peru, and Chile.67
In the early period, over half of the miners were Indians; many worked for
the white miners just as they had worked for the missionaries and rancheros,
while others worked for themselves. In 1848, about six thousand miners
had found gold, a figure that rose to forty thousand by 1849. By the peak year
of the rush, 1852, California fields swarmed with more than one hundred thou-
sand miners who raked in about eighty million dollars worth of gold. The lure
of sudden wealth attracted adventurers from all economic classes, but most of the
miners were young, footloose, and male. Needless to say, white miners did not
want foreign or nonwhite competition. Many local mining codes forbade mining
by Mexicans, Asians, or foreigners. The codes, whether formal or merely implicit,
were enforced by rough and sudden action, including lynching and vigilantism."
In addition to mining codes that excluded Mexicans entirely, an 1850
Foreign Miners' License Tax required noncitizen miners to pay the hefty fee
of twenty dollars per month.69 Anglo American miners enthusiastically
enforced the new tax, many of them making the rounds of mines and mining
camps, dressed in their old Mexican American war uniforms, in search of Mexi-
cans. The visits struck terror in the hearts of many Mexican American miners,
including some Californios who had become American citizens under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and whose family histories in California consid-
erably predated those of their enforcers. Many returned to Mexico fearing
for their lives. Mexico protested this treatment, but California turned a deaf
ear until enough local merchants complained that they were losing business.
The tax was repealed in 1851, only to be reenacted in a somewhat more mod-
erate form against the Chinese a short time later.70
65. See id. at 91; see also GRAY BRECHIN, IMPERIAL SAN FRANCISCO: URBAN POWER,
EARTHLY RuIN 29 (1999).
66. See BRECHIN, supra note 65, at 30 (noting that the California Star in 1847 "predicted, 'ITihe
town of Yerba Buena [San Francisco] is no doubt destined to be the Liverpool or New York of the
Pacific Ocean,' since 'all the products of the gold.., mines, with which the country abounds, must
be concentrated here."').
67. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 94.
68. See id. at 94, 101-02.
69. See id. at 129; see also ACul&A, supra note 51, at 106-09, 118.
70. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 130, 135.
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By 1852, following the departure of many Mexicans, the Chinese were the
largest foreign group in California mining. Before then, few Chinese had come
to the state; however, in 1851, China erupted in civil war and the ensuing
economic disorder, coupled with news of easy wealth in the golden mountains
of California, attracted many would-be miners. Unlike the Mexican miners,
many Chinese planned to return home after making their fortunes."
Californians visited many forms of mistreatment on the Chinese miners.
Many Chinese were also oppressed by their own countrymen, who estab-
lished a system of indentured servitude reminiscent of that which the English
installed in the original thirteen colonies. California even attempted to legalize
these labor contracts, presumably to increase the flow of Chinese, but mass
meetings and opposition in the mining camps against the "coolie bill" defeated
the measure." During the same session, California legislators voted for the
Foreign Miners' License Tax with the understanding that it would be enforced
mainly against the Chinese. 3 Unlike the Mexican miners, however, the Chi-
nese were not daunted by the tax and paid it uncomplainingly until 1862 when
the California Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional. 4
The early Chinese contended with other indignities, as well. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Hall" ruled that the Chinese were
legally included in the category "Indian" and thus fell under the scope of an
1850 law prohibiting blacks and Indians from testifying either for or against
white men. 6 This ruling was not reversed until later in the century.
Early consideration of African Americans under California law began
in June 1849, in the middle of the gold rush when the California Constitu-
tional Convention opened. The majority of the delegates had lived in California
for three or more years and were miners, not ranchers.7 About half were under
the age of thirty-five. A major issue the delegates had to address was whether
the state would allow slavery. Some of the early miners had brought slaves
with them, but the convention voted unanimously to prohibit slavery. 9 It did
so not for any humanitarian reasons, however. As Tomds Almaguer explains,
71. See id. at 135.
72. See id.
73. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 135; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 535 (1862); RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 135.
75. 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
76. The inability to testify against whites, of course, deprived Chinese of redress for mistreat-
ment at the hands of members of this group.
77. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 107.
78. See id.
79. See ALMAGUER, supra note 52, at 35-36 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, unless
for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this state." (citing J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT
OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 44 (1850))).
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opposition to slavery "was not a sign of an enlightened social attitude
toward black people."8 Quite the contrary, it reflected fears that blacks or any
nonwhite group posed a threat to free white labor. As one delegate put it:
If there is just reason why slavery should not exist.., there is
[nevertheless] reason why that part of the family of man, who are so
well adapted for servitude [for example blacks], should be excluded from
amongst us.... I wish to cast my vote against the admission of blacks
into this country, in order that I may thereby protect the citizens of
California in ... the right to labor .... I would make [the laboring
man] worthy of his high prerogative, and not degrade him by placing
him upon a level with the lowest in the scale of the family of man.81
Around the time the delegates were considering the "Negro question," a mass
meeting of mine owners passed a resolution "that no slave or Negro should
own claims or even work in the mines." 2 They served notice that the slaves
who were then working in the mines had to leave the district by sunrise."
The delegates also considered excluding free blacks from the state. Some
voiced the fear that if freed slaves were permitted, slave owners would bring
slaves, then free them, in accord with local law, only upon the condition
that they perform indentured servitude. 4 One delegate supported the pro-
posal to exclude free blacks on the ground that all blacks, free or not, were
so "idle in their habits, difficult to... governo ..., thriftless, and unedu-
cated"85 that their presence in California would be even worse for the state
than the institution of slavery itself. The exclusion clause attracted consider-
able support, but was eventually voted down because the delegates feared
that Congress would never admit California to the Union with it on the
books.8 6
California's agonizing over what to do about blacks was largely hypo-
thetical because relatively few blacks resided in the state before World War
II and the postwar boom. Some of the earliest Spanish conquerors were
mulattos, but the Gold Rush, as mentioned above, brought blacks to the state
in relatively small numbers. By the 1850s, African Americans in California
were holding meetings to demand the right to vote, to testify in court, and
to hold political office. They also protested the Fugitive Slave Act. Despite
this early activism, blacks suffered severe discrimination in housing, jobs,
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 36-37 (citing BROWNE, supra note 79, at 49).




86. See id. Blacks were also seemingly denied homestead rights. See DELILAH L. BEASLEY, THE
NEGRO TRAIL-BLAZERS OF CALIFORNIA 60-61 (1919). On slave auctions in California, see id. at 72.
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schools, and unions. According to one leading authority, blacks, although
oppressed, enjoyed a significant advantage over other groups: They came to
California with centuries of experience of living with whites. Although this
experience was often brutal, it nevertheless familiarized them with Euro-
American culture. All spoke English; many attended Protestant churches.
After emancipation, they were not excluded from legal citizenship, unlike
Asians who could not naturalize because they did not satisfy a congressional
statute's definition of whiteness as a prerequisite for citizenship.87
Of all the early minority groups of color in California, the Indians proba-
bly suffered "the most unique and devastating experience."88 As the original
inhabitants, they had to be tamed, pacified, and colonized. Their hunting-
gathering ways and spiritual approach to life and nature placed them radi-
cally at odds with Anglo settlers and made their adjustment to western ways
extraordinarily difficult. Early Franciscan missionaries tried to train the Indians
as agricultural workers, but without much success.89 Diseases took a terrible
toll; "whole cultures were destroyed or drastically altered."'9 In 1833, the Mexi-
can government stripped the friars of much of their power over the Indians
by making the latter free citizens of the new nation of Mexico. Some Indians
went to work for the newly secular rancheros; others returned to pre-European
life. Still others intermarried or became vaqueros, spoke Spanish, and wore
European clothes."
The Indians' improved condition did not last long; the American con-
quest and Gold Rush precipitated a sharp turn for the worse. After an initial
period, the gold seekers not only had little use for Indian labor, they brought
prejudices ingrained from contact with Indians on the Western frontier. When
the federal government made only feeble efforts to protect them or to set aside
land for reservations," there ensued "one of the last human hunts of civilization,
and the basest and most brutal of them all."' Marauding Californian settlers
quickly cut the Indian population to one-tenth.94
87. See Charles Wollenberg, Ethnic Experiences in California History [hereinafter Ethnic Expe-
riences], in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA 3, 8 (Roger Olmsted
& Charles Wollenberg eds., 1971). On the white-prerequisite cases, see IAN F. HANEY LbPEZ, WHITE
BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
88. Wollenberg, Ethnic Experiences, supra note 87, at 3.
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The settlers widely agreed that Indian extermination was a necessary
and sensible policy.95 In a vain effort to enlist federal support for it, Governor
John McDougal sent a letter to President Millard Fillmore, warning that
"100,000 Indian warriors were in a state of armed rebellion."'96 The following
year, Senator John B. Weller claimed that the tribes were ready to launch a
"bloody and devastating war."97 The federal government apparently refused
to believe the lies; it declined to fund a campaign against the California
Indians.9" Instead, it sent three agents to negotiate treaties to provide a system
of segregation that would remove the Indians from the white mining
districts and settlements.99 An early attempt to create very large reservations
failed because the Indians refused to move."' Then, the federal government
changed its policy to promote small reservations. Although almost equally
unsuccessful, this program became the model for much of the West. 10'
The initial strategy of extermination took the form of endless and
unforgiving war on the Indians, including women and children, and featured
some of the most shocking massacres in United States history. Because of
the relentless press of westward migration by whites, many Indians were
forced from their traditional areas and sources of food and forced to survive
by seizing the white settlers' horses and livestock, prompting instant violent
retaliation.'
Whipped up by local newspapers such as the Chico Courant, 3 the exter-
mination policy proved highly successful. By 1845, the Indian population had
dropped from over three hundred thousand to about half that figure. By 1870,
the number had dropped to thirty thousand, and by 1900, fewer than sixteen
thousand Indians were left in California. Indians who were not killed were
required to perform work. An 1847 military order, later incorporated into
law by the state legislature, declared that any unemployed Indian was a vagrant
95. See WALTON BEAN & JAMES J. RAWLS, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 137
(4th ed. 1968).
96. RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 139.
97. Id.
98. See BEAN & RAWLS, supra note 95, at 137.
99. See id. at 137-38.
100. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 137.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 138, 139.
103. See id. at 139. In 1866, The Chico Courant proclaimed that
[i]t has become a question of extermination now.... The man who takes a prisoner should
himself be shot. It is a mercy to the red devils to exterminate them, and a saving of many
white lives. Treaties are played out. There is only one kind of treaty that is effective-
cold lead.
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who could be forced into working for the public or auctioned off as an inden-
tured servant.
04
Because most early Anglo settlers were Christian, they had to demonize
the Indians before treating them so cruelly. Thus, "throughout recorded
history the California Indians have suffered from ... a negative stereotype."'
0 5
Early settlers quickly deemed them "primitive," "repulsive," and "expendable."'
' 6
Early trappers coined the pejorative term "digger" and applied it to Indians
even before the era of intense competition and extermination began.'
7 Indians
were said to be dirty, to eat a "filthy" diet, and to be "exceedingly ugly."'
' Their
complexion was black; their faces radiated no intelligence."
° Settlers com-
pared them to pigs and monkeys." California was the only state to recognize
formal, de jure Indian slavery."' An 1850s era California law "for the govern-
ment and protection of Indians" paralleled the black codes, punishing
vagrancy and other unremunerative activities not favored by the white over-
lords."' Indians were widely regarded as "obstacles to progress""
' and at cross
purposes with advancing white civilization. When the Indians fought-back,
whites' fury increased. Bret Harte and a few others protested, but to little
avail."'
When the Indians did not react quickly enough to satisfy the land lust
of whites, bands of miners and ranchers armed with rifles simply shot and killed
them. Entire frontier communities supported volunteer militia into the
1870s, as a sort of patriotic duty. Some localities paid bounties for Indian
scalps." 5
104. See id. at 140.
105. JAMES J. RAWLS, INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA: THE CHANGING IMAGE, at xiii (1984).
106. See id. at xiv.
107. See id. at 49.
108. Id. at 195.
109. See id. at 196.
110. See id. at 195, 198. John Woodhouse Audubon wrote that he saw an Indian eating a nut,
looking exactly like a monkey. See id. at 199. Oddly, the plight of the Indians as an exploited
people later provided a template to oust the Mexicanos, who were likewise deemed to be an undevel-
oped and long-suffering people whose removal was required by Manifest Destiny. See HURTADO,
supra note 61, at 30, 72; RAWLS, supra note 105, at 64.
111. See RAWLS, supra note 105, at 108.
112. See id. For a description of the black codes which punished African Americans for
loitering or being out of work, see DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 111-12
(3d ed. 1992).
113. RAWLS, supra note 105, at 173.
114. See id. at 183-87.
115. See id. at 171.
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C. From the End of the Gold Rush to the Post-World War I Period
1. Discrimination in the Labor Market
After about 1870, Anglo Americans had the upper hand; California's
ethnic minority groups had either been defeated or firmly shown their
places. The interval between then and about 1920 was one of consolida-
tion. Its story-indeed the story of much of the twentieth century-centers
around the history of labor relations, which sets the stage for many of the
shifts of fortune for groups of color.
Early settlers, including John Sutter, held great hopes for the Indians
as sources of labor. Indeed, Sutter established a permanent colony on the
Sacramento River to which he tried to entice Indians by promises of beads,
blankets, clothing, and sugar."' By controlling wages, prices, and credit,
Sutter was able to set up'substantial Indian trade and a primitive cash
economy. "7 Although his colony was based primarily on Indian labor, employ-
ing up to six hundred Indians during the wheat harvest,' s the Indians seem
not to have been ideal laborers, for Sutter found it necessary to employ an
army of one hundred fifty Indian infantrymen and fifty Indian cavalry,
overseen by white officers, to guard their fellow Indians and maintain
discipline. Sutter's success in domesticating the Indians by sheer force provided
a model for later white settlers." 9 But just as Sutter recognized that his
Indians were "not only potential laborers but a threat to white life and
property,"'"2 later white settlers remained wary about them, as well. As
mentioned earlier, the settlers soon adopted a different, more final, approach
to the treatment of Indians.
Mexican Americans, too, encountered both acceptance and resistance
in California's labor force. Early California Anglos found them an "idle,
indolent, sleepy set" and "illiterate, wasteful people."'2' Nevertheless, they played
key roles in supporting California's mining and agricultural industries as
116. See HURTADO, supra note 61, at 49 (citing WILLIAM HEATH DAVIS, SIXTY YEARS IN
CALIFORNIA (1889); JOHANN AUGUST SUTrER, THE DIARY OFJOHANN AUGUST SUTTER (1932)).
117. See HURTADO, supra note 61, at 49 (citing A PIONEER AT SUTTER'S FORT, 1846-1850:
THE ADVENTURES OF HEINRICH LIENHARD (M. Wilbur ed. & trans., 1941); JOHN SUTTER ET
AL., NEW HELVETIA DIARY: A RECORD KEPT BY JOHN A. SUTTER AND HIS CLERKS AT NEW
HELVETIA, CALIFORNIA, FROM SEPTEMBER 9, 1845, TO MAY 25, 1848 (1939); John Sutter,
Personal Reminiscences of General John Augustus Sutter, MS, Bancroft Library).
118. See HURTADO, supra 61, at 49.
119. See id. at 50, 55.
120. Id.
121. Mario T. Garcfa, Americanization and the Mexican Immigrant, 1880-1930, in FROM
DIFFERENT SHORES: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 69 (Ronald Takaki
ed., 1987) [hereinafter FROM DIFFERENT SHORES] (internal quotation marks omitted).
migrant workers.'22 California's first major industry, mining, imposed a dual
wage system in which Mexican workers received lower pay than Anglo workers
for carrying out the same work.'
Mexican laborers also dominated the agricultural industry, comprising
90 percent of the field workers in the Imperial Valley by 1928. Although
about three-fourths were undocumented immigrants, many growers winked
at their status and benefited from it, secure in the knowledge that the workers
would not complain for fear of deportation. For their part, Mexican
workers benefited from a labor vacuum that resulted from the anti-Chinese
hysteria that swept California and culminated in the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882. Many of the Chinese had come to work on the railroads;
when they were sent packing, Mexicans moved right in.121 When Mexicans
finally moved into urban industrial jobs during the 1920s, they continued to
encounter negative stereotypes.125 Economist Paul S. Taylor found that
close to one-third of employers in Los Angeles during the 1920s considered
the Mexican woman to be a poor worker-"undependable, irregular, slow,
and unintelligent.'
' 21
The Chinese, in addition to work on the railroads, also found employ-
ment in other industries in California. In 1870, they constituted 8.6 percent
of the California population, but 25 percent of the work force. In San
Francisco, they represented 46 percent of the labor force in four key industries:
shoes, woolens, tobacco, and sewing. At times, employers used their industri-
ousness against them, deploying Chinese workers against white ones as strike
breakers. For example, when Irish workers earned three dollars a day in the
factories of San Francisco, they went on strike and were immediately
replaced by Chinese workers at one dollar a day.'27 When they were finally
forced out of mining, railroads, factories, and agriculture by virulent racist
sentiment, some Chinese opened laundries in which they constituted 72
percent of all laborers by the mid-1870s.'
28
Both Mexican and Chinese laborers were considered migrant workers
by the majority culture, which viewed the possibility of permanent settlement
122. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; infra note 124 and accompanying text.
123. See RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 163 (1979). In the silver mines in the 1870s, Mexican workers received between twelve
dollars and thirty dollars a month plus a ration of flour, while Euro-American workers were paid
thirty to seventy dollars a month plus free board. See id.
124. See ACURqA, supra note 51, at 125, 157-58.
125. See Garcfa, supra note 121, at 72.
126. Id.
127. See TAKAKI, supra note 123, at 216, 232, 239.
128. On society's resistance to these laundries, see JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES 377
(2000) ("[Bly 1870 they were dominant in the laundry industry."); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS
FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (rev. ed. 1998).
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as odious and threatening.' 29  The threat of permanence fueled intense
resentment, which jingoists seized on to justify antiminority campaigns and
exclusionary legislation. "' Judicial decisions holding that Chinese, Japanese,
and Asian Indians (even if Aryans) were nonwhite fed this sentiment.'3 1
Although California's state constitution provided that Mexicans were
white and thus eligible for citizenship, other minority groups such as Indians
did not receive this protection.'32 Businessman Charles Crocker, superinten-
dent of the Central Pacific Railroad, reported to a legislative committee that
the Chinese were not "going to remain here long enough to become good
citizens."'33 The Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1920 prohibited the ownership
and lease of California land by "aliens ineligible for citizenship," a prohibition
that fell especially harshly on the Japanese, many of whom earned their liveli-
hood by farming."'
Mexican migrant farmers fared little better. Although they were essential
to the agribusiness industry that grew up in the early years of the twentieth
century, social attitudes toward them rarely rose above those we described
in early California history. "5 The Santa Barbara Gazette, in 1856, wrote that
the native Mexicans "are habitually and universally opposed to all progress
whatsoever.' 36 In 1920, The Survey wrote: "'[Ilt is not surprising that the
poor Mexican immigrant is content ... with one toilet and one hydrant for
fifteen families, four and five of these families living in one or two rooms."""
Social workers found Mexicans a fascinating object of study. In Americanization
Through Homemaking,3' Pearl I. Ellis wrote that "the daily bath was important
in prevention of skin diseases, but Mexicans seemed ... lax in this respect,
giving rise to the term 'dirty Mexicans.""39 New England aristocrat Richard
129. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 68-70, 72-73, 75-76 and accompanying text.
131. The Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), had specified that only free white
males were eligible for citizenship; later Supreme Court cases determined further that the prerequisite
for citizenship was whiteness. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that though
Thind was racially classified as Caucasian, that did not make him a white person); Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that Japanese were Mongolians and therefore not white); In
re Saito, 62 F. 126 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (same); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (holding that the
Chinese were either generically Negroes or Indians).
132. See Ronald Takaki, Reflections on Racial Patterns in America, in FROM DIFFERENT SHORES,
supra note 121; ALMAGUER, supra note 52, at 9.
133. Takaki, supra note 132, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Alien Land Law, Stats. 1921, § 10, 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxiii, lxxxv, repealed by Stats. 1956,
ch. 316, 1956 Cal. Stat. 767; see also ALMAGUER, supra note 52, at 10; Takaki, supra note 132, at 28.
135. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
136. Garcia, supra note 121, at 69.
137. Id. at 73.
138. PEARL 1. ELLIS, AMERICANIZATION THROUGH HOMEMAKING (1929).
139. Id. at 74.
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Henry Dana, author of Two Years Before the Mast, found California Mexi-
cans lacking "the enterprise and ... mentality which characterized
Yankees... inefficient in enterprise, they spent themselves in pleasure-giving
activities.' 41 Not to be outdone, University of Southern California sociologist
Emory Bogardus lamented, "Mexican adults do not change their food habits
easily, and hence progress is slow in improving the Mexican immigrant's
diet.''. Moreover, Mexicans have little sense of time, the social scientist
wrote, and so require constant supervision in order to achieve regular work.'
42
2. Discrimination in Other Areas
Other forms of social and economic discrimination visited on urban
Mexicans mirrored that experienced by their countrymen in the fields. Mexi-
can Americans were segregated into barrios, with their own schools and
institutions.' Within those settlements, late nineteenth century Mexicans
formed political organizations and organized Spanish language newspapers,
which provided news of Mexico and the struggles of the Mexican American
community. 44 In the early 1900s, many Mexicans migrated to California,
fleeing the regime of the dictator Porfirio Diaz and the fighting accompany-
ing the Mexican Revolution of 1910. 41 Migration from Mexico continued
in the 1920s, making the Mexican presence more noticeable. Social workers
and educators attempted to "Americanize" the Mexicans. But as the number
of Mexican children in California schools rose, a new strategy-segregation-
was put into place. School authorities created separate schools for them.
46
140. TAKAKI, supra note 123, at 157.
141. Garcfa, supra note 121, at 74; see also EMORY S. BOGARDUS, ESSENTIALS OF
AMERICANIZATION 29 (3d ed. 1923) (noting that Mexican immigration "has developed a sinister
aspect"); id. at 30 (noting that Mexicans lack understanding of American values); id. at 268
(noting Mexicans' love of art and music); id. at 269 (noting how the United States needs to give
Mexicans "a democratic industrial program" of education); id. at 318 ("[W]ithin limits, race does
tell."); id. at 322 (deploring "race prejudice [as] the subtlest enemy of Americanization").
142. See Garcfa, supra note 121, at 74. Some California academics seem to have been equal
opportunity stereotypes, issuing broad generalizations about which groups were desirable and which
were not. See, e.g., ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION 14-15
(1909) (decrying that while early immigrants, before about 1882, came from thrifty Northern
Europe and blended in easily, newer immigrants-Slovenians, Rutherians, Italians, "Poles," and
Greeks were "[illliterate, docile, lacking in self-reliance ... [and devoid ofl the Anglo-Teutonic con-
ceptions of law, order, and government").
143. See ALBERT CAMARILLO, CHICANOS IN CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY OF MEXICAN AMERICANS
IN CALIFORNIA 14, 16 (1984); RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 420-21.
144. See CAMARILLO, supra note 143, at 27; see, e.g., ACUIA, supra note 51, at 213.
145. See CAMARILLO, supra note 143, at 32-33; ACURJA, supra note 51, at 126-27.
146. See CAMARILLO, supra note 143, at 43, 44.
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Signs on house porches and government agencies warned them that they
were not welcome. 147 When written signals were missing, "the silent language
of the doorman, the foreman, the school principal" said the same.' 41
The Depression brought greater public outcry against the Mexicans,
who were thought to be consuming welfare resources and depleting an already
scarce job market. American authorities instituted "a policy of mass depor-
tation," under which more than four hundred thousand Mexicans and U.S.
citizens of Mexican descent were rounded up and sent back to Mexico. Between
seventy-five thousand and one hundred thousand of these deportations origi-
nated in California. Whole barrios and families were devastated.' 49
Indians in California fared little better during this period. Even after
being violently conquered, Indians continued tenaciously to oppose their own
oppression, burning government schools in 1883, 1912, and 1914. By 1917,
Indians used the courts to gain the vote, and by 1924, obtained the right to
attend public school.'
California experienced no significant Japanese immigration until the
1890s.151 While California had been violently anti-Chinese during this
period , Japanese immigrants were received, for a time, with favor.' The
honeymoon period did not last long. As the Chinese had been earlier, Japa-
nese workers came to be viewed as threats to white workers because they
were willing to work twelve to fourteen hours per day and on weekends. 4
In 1905, the San Francisco Chronicle editorialized against them, and the next
year four Japanese scientists were targeted for violence, while the Asiatic
Exclusion League led a boycott of Japanese restaurants.'55 White laborers
joined the fervor against "Mongolian" and cheap coolie labor.'56 By March
147. See Wollenberg, Ethnic Experiences, supra note 87, at 111.
148. Id. On society's treatment of this minority group, see THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
149. SeeCAMARILLO, supra 143, note at 44, 48-50.
150. Jack D. Forbes, The Native American Experience in California History, in NEITHER SEPARATE
NOR EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 87, at 21.
151. See ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 6-8 (1962).
152. Earlier, intense opposition to the Chinese and new treaties with China in 1882 and the
Chinese Exclusion Act put an end to Chinese immigration. See id. at 16-19.
153. See id. at 3.
154. See Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market, in FROM
DIFFERENT SHORES, supra note 121, at 142. Moreover, unlike the Chinese, many Japanese men
brought their families and showed signs of intending to settle in California permanently. See
Wollenberg, Ethnic Experiences, supra note 87, at 5.
155. See DANIELS, supra note 151, at 33.
156. See id. at 19, 22-25.
1544
of 1905, the Chronicle's campaign led to the passage of an anti-Japanese
resolution by the California legislature that limited Japanese immigration."
5 7
When Japanese children suffered discriminatory treatment in the San
Francisco schools, the Japanese community, unlike the Chinese, did not
accept their treatment passively. They organized demonstrations, published
books and pamphlets, and sought intervention from President Theodore
Roosevelt and the Japanese government, which led to the Gentlemen's
Agreement of 1907-1908.' Although the two governments caused California
to temper some of its most extreme forms of mistreatment of Japanese, resent-
ment continued to simmer."59
The Japanese experience in California, then, was unique in a number
of respects. First, "they rapidly began to challenge whites in many businesses
and professions."'60 Second, many Californians, like Americans elsewhere, were
suspicious of Japan as a growing world power.' 6' Finally, most Japanese settled
in California, a state that "had a lower boiling point than did the country at
large."'62
II. FROM THE DEPRESSION TO THE COLD WAR
If the immediately preceding era was marked by labor concerns, as new
markets in California decided what kind of workers they wanted and on
what terms, the years between the Depression and the Cold War featured
the early awakenings of minority activism and discontent. All of the minority
groups had rebelled against their oppression, even from the early days, particu-
larly the Japanese and Indians.' Now rebellion began breaking out more
overtly, and repression took even more forceful forms.
During World War I, a number of Indians served in the army. In 1924,
partly in recognition of their service, Congress awarded American Indians
citizenship in both the United States and in their states of residence.
Congress also accepted fault for failing to ratify the reservation treaties of
the early 1850s, which had promised California Indians more than seven
million acres of land. In 1928, Congress directed California's attorney
general to sue the United States on behalf of California Indians to determine
157. See id. at 24-25, 27 (reporting that a headline on February 23, 1905 read "The Japanese
Invasion, The Problem of the Hour" with the article charging that "at least 100,000 of'the little brown
men' were 'no more assimilable than the Chinese' and 'undercut white labor').
158. See id. at 9, 23, 33.
159. See infra notes 180-192 and accompanying text.
160. DANIELS, supra note 151, at 106.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 150-158 and accompanying text.
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the amount of damages. The case dragged on until 1944, when the Federal
Court of Claims awarded Indians a mere two hundred dollars per person."'
Other Indian litigation produced better results. The survivors of the Palm
Springs Indians sued for rental income from individually allotted tribal land
in that booming resort town.6 Aided by John W. Preston, former justice of
the California Supreme Court, the Indians won a substantial judgment."'
The Palm Springs litigation persuaded Congress to pass the Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946. California Indians voted to accept an award of
29 million dollars under the act, about forty-five cents an acre for the lands
their ancestors had originally occupied.'67
By midcentury, increased births and migrations of Indians to California
had reversed the "long and tragic decline" in Indian population.' At the
same time, society's conscience was awakening over the earlier mistreatment
of the Indian people. California abolished all legal distinction between
Indian persons and other citizens and made Indians eligible to attend public
schools and receive other public services. Median income and well-being of
California Indians, especially on reservations, however, remained abysmal.
During the 1960s, California Indians increased their political activism and
organized several intertribal organizations. They also occupied Alcatraz Island,
staged sit-ins, and took legal action to regain lands owned by Pacific Gas
and Electric Company in northern California.'69
African Americans, too, began airing grievances during this period.
By 1940, blacks constituted about 11 percent of the U.S. population, but
their representation in California was much smaller, only about 1 percent.
With the war and increased demand for labor in the shipyards and other
industries, the percentage rose rapidly; many blacks became concentrated in
164. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 388.
165. The litigants, survivors of the Cahuilla tribe (also known as the Palm Springs Indians),
received even-numbered sections of desert land in the Palm Springs area. The Southern Pacific
Railroad owned the odd-numbered sections. In the 1920s, when Palm Springs became a thriving
resort community, the Cahuilla petitioned the federal government to let them lease part of their
lands to hotel operators. The government refused. See id.
166. "In 1944 the Court ruled that each of the Cahuilla should receive the rental from
$350,000 worth of individually allotted tribal land, as well as a share of the income from 30,000
acres of communal tribal land." Id.
167. See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 959, 60 Stat. 1049
(1947) (omitted from 25 U.S.C. 70 upon termination of Commission on Sept. 30, 1978).
168. As two historians put it:
In 1965 the number of Indians living in California had risen to 75,000, less than 10
percent of whom were living on the 82 federal reservations .... During the 1970s the
Indian population.., more than doubled, and in 1981 ... California, with more than
198,000 Indians, had the largest Indian population of any state in the nation.
RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 412.
169. See id.
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all-black neighborhoods in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley,
and Richmond. 7 Their presence was immediately noted: servicemen on
leave, with time on their hands, rioted protesting their presence.1
7' Restrictive
covenants enforced residential segregation with the enthusiastic support of
California realtors, who launched a campaign to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,"7 which had declared racially restrictive
covenants unconstitutional. Blacks won another significant court victory
when the California Supreme Court, in Perez v. Sharp,'
73 declared a California
law against miscegenation unconstitutional-nearly twenty years before the
Supreme Court did so nationally in Loving v. Virginia.' Nevertheless, the
plight of black Americans in California was acute. In 1960, more than
40 percent had not completed more than the eighth grade and only 58 percent
of black teenagers were functionally literate by the late 1970s.' To make
matters worse, soon after passage of the Rumford "fair housing" law, the
California Real Estate Association launched an energetic campaign against
"forced housing."'76 Its effort culminated in the November 1964 approval




Until struck down, it gave property owners the right to exclude anyone for
any reason.' The passage of Proposition 14 was among the many grievances
that contributed to the Watts riot and other disturbances in California in
the mid- 1960s.'79
California Japanese, after vigorously opposing their mistreatment,
suffered another blow when the threat of Japanese labor led to Japanese
exclusion in the Immigration Act of 1924."8 They were to be punished yet
again with the advent of World War II. In January 1942, John B. Hughes
170. See id. at 416.
171. See Charles Wollenberg, California: The People, in CALIFORNIA: A PLACE, A PEOPLE,
A DREAM, supra note 56, at 79, 86.
172. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
173. 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948).
174. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
175. See BEAN & RAWLS, supra note 95, at 394.
176. RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 394, see also Fair Housing Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1963).
177. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964) (incorporating into the California Constitution,
Proposition 14: Anti-Fair Housing Initiative (1964)) (repealed 1974); see also RAWLS & BEAN,
supra note 58, at 394.
178. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 394. The proposition invalidated every state law
or local ordinance that limited a person's right to refuse "to sell, lease, or rent any part or all of his
real property... to such person or persons as he in his absolute discretion chooses." BEAN & RAWLS,
supra note 95, at 417.
179. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 394.
180. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 201-204 (repealed 1952)); see also DANIELS, supra note 151, at 1; ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION
AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1943 at vii-viii (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
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of the Mutual Broadcasting Company launched a month-long campaign
against the Japanese in California, arguing that they represented a threat to
the war effort and might engage in espionage. 8' The San Diego Union
followed suit, urging that "every Japanese ... should be moved out of the
coastal area ... far enough to nullify any inclination they may have to tam-
per with our safety here."'82 The Los Angeles Times did likewise, declaring
that "a Japanese American born of Japanese parents-grows up to be a
Japanese, not an American."'83 Soon the California branch of the American
Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the Grower-
Shipper Vegetable Association, the Western Growers Protective Association,
and the California Farm Bureau Federation were all campaigning for Japanese
removal."4
California politicians were not far behind. The boards of supervisors of
sixteen California counties urged internment,, while California Attorney
General Earl Warren pressed federal authorities to remove Japanese from the
West Coast.'85 Against Attorney General Francis Biddle's recommendation,
President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 shortly thereafter.88 Within
a relatively short time, one hundred twenty thousand Japanese, two-thirds of
them U.S. citizens by birth, were interned. 7 Most of them were from
California.88 One hundred fifty seniors from the University of California at
Berkeley were ordered to the camps and not allowed to attend their graduation189 w
ceremony. Some who had completed their course work received their
diplomas while in internment camps, while others never finished their
degrees.9 Decades after the war, it came to light that much of the evidence
for Japanese disloyalty and threat of espionage had been fabricated,8 ' yet
reparations were long and slow in coming. By the time Congress voted finan-
cial reparations for the internees, it was too late for many of the Issei (first
generation), because many had died.' 92
181. See TAKAKI, supra note 128, at 388.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 388-89.
185. See id. at 389.
186. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 97a (Supp. 1943).
187. See TAKAKI, supra note 128, at 379.
188. See id. Over 95,000 came from California; about 25,000 had been living in Washington
and Oregon.
189. See Chizu Iiyama & Lisa S. Hirai Tsuchitani, Speaking Out: Memories of a Nisei Activist,
in MAKING MORE WAVES: NEW WRITING BY ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN 229, 229 (Elaine H.
Kim et al. eds., 1997).
190. See id.
191. See PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR at viii-ix (1983).
192. See Reparations Are Tardy, 'Sulu' Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 14, 1991, at 32.
"Issei" refers to first-generation Japanese Americans-those born in Japan.
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Koreans also experienced widespread discrimination in California. When
realtors and boards of education were enforcing segregation policies for
Japanese, they included Koreans in those measures as well.'
93 Just as labor
competition sparked violent attacks from whites angered by Japanese
competition, Koreans hired to pick oranges in 1910 were violently attacked
by white farm workers and told to leave or be killed.' The Asiatic
Exclusion League condemned Koreans and Japanese alike; when the Japanese
were interned during the war years, Koreans who moved to take advantage
of the abandoned land were confronted by whites shouting "Japs, go home."'
95
After the declaration of war against Japan, Koreans, remarkably, were classi-
fied in the United States as enemy aliens, despite Korean interest in a United
States victory. 96
Mexicans and Filipinos fared little better than blacks or Asian Americans
during the period between the world wars. In a form of what one author
calls "farm fascism," California capitalized much of its farm land on the basis
of cheap, unorganized, migratory labor-first Chinese, then Japanese, then
Mexican and Filipino.'97 The state's historic labor surplus, which helped
keep land prices high and farm mortgages heavy, also disadvantaged small
farmers at the expense of their larger competitors.' In the mid-1930s, leftist
forces made determined efforts to unionize migratory farm labor, prompting
agribusiness to launch an all-out countercampaign, funded by the Southern
Pacific Railroad, Holly Sugar Corporation, Spreckles Investment Company,
Pacific Gas and Electric, and the California Packing Corporation.'
99 An
umbrella organization called Associated Farmers of California worked in close
cooperation with local law enforcement officials to harass agitators and
dangerous radicals."° The Associated Farmers aided in state prosecutions of
communists, unionists, and ordinary strike leaders under the state criminal
syndicalism law.
20'
193. See TAKAKI, supra note 128, at 271.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 272.
196. See id. at 364. Korea had long been warring with Japan. "Korean nationalists welcomed
the war, hopeful that it would lead to the military destruction of Japan and the restoration of Korean
independence." Id.
197. RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 376.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 376-77.
200. See id. at 377.
201. See id. Social workers and city housing officials in Los Angeles also took sides against
them. In 1924, Los Angeles destroyed 2500 homes "housing Mexican wage earners and rats," William
Deverell, Plague in Los Angeles, 1924: Ethnicity and Typicality, in OVER THE EDGE: REMAPPING
THE AMERICAN WEST 172, 184 (Valerie L. Matsumoto & Blake Allmendinger eds., 1999), when
an outbreak of plague was discovered in a poor Mexican district near downtown. The epidemic was
seen as a failure to Americanize, one of the prime tenets of which was cleanliness. The fire department
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In the middle and late 1930s, unemployed whites from the dust bowl
region of Oklahoma swarmed into California, many seeking work as migrant
farm laborers. Most were of Anglo American stock, and as a result, the
public interest in the plight of farm laborers heightened. 2 Carey McWilliams's
Factories in the Field.. and John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath,"4 both
published in 1939, awakened many readers' sympathies. McWilliams, appointed
by Governor Culbert L. Olson as chief of the state division of immigration
and housing, sided decisively with the farm workers, inspecting farm labor
camps and denouncing the conditions he found there. For his pains, the
Associated Farmers passed a resolution describing McWilliams as California's
worst agricultural pest, outranking the boll weevil. Agribusiness also succeeded
in getting the state legislature to pass a bill abolishing McWilliams's
position, but Governor Olson vetoed it. With the advent of World War II,
the "Okies" left farm work for the shipyards, leaving Mexicans and Mexican
Americans virtually the sole groups in the farm labor force. The public
promptly lost interest in their plight.05
California growers, however, became quite interested in Mexicans when
the shortage of farm labor became acute with the onset of World War II.206
Thus, in 1942, Congress entered into an agreement with Mexico under
which the U.S. Department of Agriculture assumed responsibility for the
contracting, recruiting, transporting, housing, and feeding of temporary immi-
grant farm workers, or braceros.27 Twenty-five years earlier, private labor con-
tractors set up an informal bracero program during World War I, when thousands
of peons, anxious to escape the Mexican Revolution, came to California to
work in the fields. 28 The Depression years slowed Mexican immigration;
indeed, California cooperated in rounding up and deporting tens of thousands
of Mexicans during this period to minimize welfare costs. In 1942, the Mexi-
cordoned off the entire area, and trolley drivers would not let passengers on or off. Guards shot
cats, dogs, chickens, and "a donkey or two." Workers sprayed houses with petroleum and sulfur, and
scattered rat poison everywhere. City health authorities destroyed buildings, but only after declaring
them nuisances so that the city would not need to pay compensation. The Biltmore Hotel fired its
entire Mexican staff. Rhetoric blended Mexicans and rats, with most of the blame going to
Mexican-ness for hosting and introducing the disease into sunny California. See id. at 179, 180-182,
184-185, 188-190.
202. RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 377.
203. CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELDS: THE STORY OF MIGRATORY FARM
LABOR IN CALIFORNIA (1939).
204. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
205. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 378.
206. See id.; see also ERNESTO GALARZA, BARRIO BOY (1971); ERNESTO GALARZA,
MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY (1964); ERNESTO GALARZA, SPIDERS
IN THE HOUSE AND WORKERS IN THE FIELD (1970).
207. See ACURIA, supra note 51, at 168-72.
208. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 378.
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can government was concerned that California might do the same thing when
World War II ended and, therefore, demanded that the U.S. government,
rather than private contractors, take responsibility for the program. Congress
granted periodic extensions of the bracero program until 1964. The end of
that program ushered in a second period of intense labor activism over the
right to unionize."9
Meanwhile, Mexican Americans living in California cities contended
with difficulties of their own. On an evening in August 1942, two juvenile
gangs clashed in East Los Angeles.1 The next morning, a young Mexican
American boy was discovered dead next to an old reservoir known as Sleepy
Lagoon. Police suspected that he had been murdered by gang members.
Immediately afterward, over three hundred Mexican American youths were
rounded up and jailed, where they were brutally treated. In a trial riddled
with racial bias, seventeen were convicted. In response to allegations of
racial stereotyping, the Second District Court of Appeals, aided by the
Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee that was headed by Carey McWilliams,
reversed the convictions." ' Unfortunately, public opinion was not so easily
changed. In June 1943, American servicemen from nearby bases, along
with civilians, attacked young Mexican Americans in what came to be known
as the "zoot suit" riots, acting on a rumor that Chicanos had attacked sailors
who insulted a Mexican woman."' The resulting Los Angeles riots lasted for
six days until the Navy declared downtown Los Angeles off limits.
2"3
Conditions for Mexicans improved slightly during the later war and
the postwar years. Mexican American servicemen and women were not
segregated, at least not overtly, in the armed forces, and many rose in the
ranks.214 Proportionately, more Mexican Americans earned medals of valor
209. See ACURqA, supra note 51, at 190-92. This chapter is covered in more detail later in
this Article. See infra notes 635-636 and accompanying text.
210. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 397; ACU&qA, supra note 51, at 202-08.
211. See BEAN & RAWLS, supra note 95, at 397-98.
212. See ACURJA, supra note 51, at 204. Zoot suits were a dandified, exaggerated costume,
with tight, cuffed trousers and a long coat with padded shoulders, popular with young Mexican
Americans, or "pachucos."
213. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 398; see also EDWARD ESCOBAR, RACE, POLICE
AND THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL IDENTITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE LOS ANGELES
POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1900-1945, at 284 (1999) (arguing that the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment's view of Mexicans as biologically predisposed to commit crime and the concerted violence
it legitimated moved the Mexican American community to organize and become aware of itself as
no other previous issue had done ).
214. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 390. But see ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ & PATRISIA
GONZALES, REBEL ARTIST'S CANVAS: MARGINALIZED BARRIO STREET YOUTH (Universal Press
Syndicate, n.d.) (noting how during World War II, state legislators schemed to open concentra-
tion camps for "pachuco" youths, who were considered un-American).
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than any other group, including whites.2"5 After the war, many attended
California colleges and universities under the G.I. Bill."6 Rising expecta-
tions collided with repressive reality, however. As often happens during
times of enhanced expectations, postwar activism broke out. Mexican Ameri-
can leaders and organizers began calling themselves "Chicano" and referred
to the Mexican American people as "La Raza,"21 demanding better schools,
bilingual and bicultural classes, and greater political representation." 8
IV. CALIFORNIA NEOPOPULISM: A REACTION TO CIVIL
RIGHTS GAINS
By 1960, California was the envy of the country, its highways, schools,
universities, and other institutions the best in the United States if not the
world.2"9 Until then, its formal values and self-image were of a polyglot, a
multicultural melting pot that welcomed immigrants and domestic minori-
ties alike. Although, as we have seen, this self-image did not always correspond
to reality,220 immigrants, minorities, and the foreign-born could generally
find housing, jobs, and schooling for their children, as well as obtain welfare
services and medical aid at a standard unavailable elsewhere. This was made
possible by a booming postwar economy and by growth in such sectors as
agribusiness, aircraft construction, the entertainment industry, and later, the
computer industry."'
As Peter Schrag, the author of Paradise Lost, observed, California's golden
age did not last much longer.222 Proposition 14, enacted by popular referen-
dum in 1964, effectively nullified all of California's fair housing laws and
allowed California property owners the right to refuse to rent, sell, or lease
on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background.223 Proposition 14 came
215. See BEAN & RAWLS, supra note 95, at 421.
216. See ACURqA, supra note 51, at 199.
217. See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 398 (noting that these terms connote racial pride
and militancy).
218. See ACURA, supra 51, at 222-63.
219. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 7.
220. See supra Parts lI.B., II.C, III.
221. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 7, 28-34. "The postwar public works boom had begun
under [Governor Pat] Brown's progressive Republican predecessors, Earl Warren and Goodwin
Knight, well before Brown was elected governor in 1958, and in considerable measure even before
that, and it would continue for some years afterward." Id. at 35.
222. See id. at 43-52.
223. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964) (incorporating into the California Constitution,
Proposition 14: Anti-Fair Housing Initiative (1964)) (repealed 1974); JOHN H. DENTON, APARTHEID
AMERICAN STYLE, Introduction (1967). The next summer, riots broke out in Watts; a year later,
Black Panthers burst onto the scene. CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION
AND EXCLUSION IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1855-1975, at 148 (1996).
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on the heels of the Rumford Act, which created and authorized a state com-
mission to enforce fair housing legislation. 24 The act angered realtors who
campaigned for homeowners' "sacred property rights" and against the evils
of "forced housing." ' 5 Proposition 14 was the first indication that Euro-
Americans in California regarded the number of minorities as having reached
a saturation point, making further increases in their numbers intolerable.26
After the proposition was enacted, seven different cases challenging its
validity were consolidated and argued together.227 On May 10, 1966, the
California Supreme Court ruled in Mulkey v. Reitman... that Proposition 14
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The California Real Estate Association appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed, reasoning that the proposition established a legal
right to discriminate privately on grounds that would be unavailable should
state action be present."' Because the proposition required state govern-
ment engagement for its enforcement, it did indeed impermissibly include
230state action.
Proposition 14 was only the first salvo in California's fusillade of neo-
nativist measures. A few years later, Assemblyman Floyd Wakefield sponsored
a state constitutional amendment on the 1972 ballot voiding all state inte-
gration guidelines and outlawing any use of race for school assignments or
busing. Although it passed by a two-to-one margin, the antibusing provision
231was soon struck down by the state supreme court.
In November 1986, three-fourths of the California voters enacted Propo-
sition 63, an official English-only statute requiring the legislature to take
affirmative measures to "preserve and enhance the use of English. '2 32 Unlike
224. See Fair Housing Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1963);
DENTON, supra note 223, at 2.
225. See DENTON, supra note 223, at 19. Immediately after the act was passed, opponents began
collecting signatures for a referenda to reject it. See id.
226. See id. On white consciousness, see CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE
MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
227. See DENTON, supra note 223, at 6.
228. 64 Cal. 2d 529 (1966).
229. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
230. See id. at 374. Like the more recent campaigns against homosexual civil rights, such as
Amendment 2 in Colorado, the California Real Estate Association argued that the act provided
"preferred" or "special rights" for minorities rather than simply providing them with equal rights.
231. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 163-64 (discussing Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v.
Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, 13 Cal. 3d 315 (1975)).
232. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6; see also SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 231; John Wildermuth, What
AIDS, English-Only Votes Will Mean, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1986, at 9 (noting that Proposition 63
passed by a three-to-one margin). Earlier, when Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974),
required California public schools to offer bilingual classes, some Anglo parents withdrew their children
from school to avoid any association with that form of instruction. See infra note 423 and accom-
panying text.
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similar laws in other states, California's statute allows citizens to file suit if
they feel that official use of the English language is threatened or diminished .
For example, the mayor of Monterey Park tried to prevent the public library
from accepting a gift of ten thousand books written in Chinese on the grounds
that "English is the law of the land.2 4 Requirements of English in the work-
place became an issue at the University of California at San Francisco's
Medical Center. In Los Angeles, court employees had to win the right to
use languages other than English in the workplace. 36 Chicano activists called
for recognition that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed language
rights, but to no avail.237
Another early measure, Proposition 13, sounded a similar theme, but
with an economic cast.23 To equalize what was perceived as an unfair tax
on property, Howard Jarvis and Harvey Gann campaigned to limit real estate
taxes to 1 percent of a residential property's assessed value upon sale of the
property and annual increases during nonsale years to a maximum of
2 percent. 29 The Jarvis-Gann measure tapped a deep vein of discontent among
California homeowners who believed they were staggering under an unfair
tax burden of educating immigrants, feeding the unemployed, and building
shelters for the homeless.24' The measure devastated California's infrastructure,
particularly its schools, and came just two years after a California Supreme
Court ruling that the California scheme of school finance, based largely on
property taxes, was unconstitutional because of disparities between the resources
available to property-rich districts in contrast to property-poor ones.24'
Howard Jarvis expressed thinly disguised scorn toward California's
concern over the imminent destruction of the state's schools, remarking
that the twenty thousand school teachers of the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Wilson Riles, were less important for homeowners than taxes.242
233. See CAL. CONST. art. Ili, § 6.
234. DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR
AMERICANS? 20 (1990).
235. See id. (noting when the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center allowed
"its departments to require that English be spoken as a legitimate 'business necessity').
236. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of S.E. Judicial Dist., L.A. County, 838 F.2d 1031,
1044-45 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); BARON, supra note 234, at 23.
237. See BARON, supra note 234, at 17-18.
238. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
239. See Hanif S.P. Hirji, Inequalities in California's Public School System: The Undermining of
Serrano v. Priest and the Need for a Minimum Standards System of Education, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
583, 600 (1999).
240. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 139.
241. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 775-77 (1976); SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 151-
57; see also Hirji, supra note 239, at 600, 604.
242. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 146.
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Proposition 13 set in motion a series of populist reforms that Schrag and
others considered no mere coincidence, as they came on the heels of the
rapid growth of the state's minority population."' Some of the rhetoric used
by the proposition backers was explicitly racist. For example, flyers prepared
for Proposition 187 urged California to "wake up and smell the refried beans."
'244
Proposition 187, overwhelmingly enacted by the voters in 1994, excluded
undocumented persons from many public services including schools and
health care.245 Originally billed as the S.O.S. (Save Our State) measure, it
would even have denied schooling to American children if their parents were
illegals. Nurses, school administrators, doctors, and public agencies were
required to report all individuals seeking social services if they believed them
to be undocumented aliens.246 Echoing themes from California history,
including denying the Japanese the right to own land,247 the Chinese in San
Francisco license laundries,248 and the Mexicans the right to speak their
language,249 the campaign for Proposition 187 bore unmistakable overtones
of xenophobia and exclusionism.25° It featured television commercials showing
a flood of foreign-looking people with a narrator's voice intoning, "They
keep coming." '251 Governor Pete Wilson even lobbied President Bill Clinton to
have legal aliens declared ineligible for federal welfare benefits."
2 Proposition
243. See id. at 10-11.
244. Id. at 231.
245. Relevant parts of Proposition 187 are codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West
1994); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (West 1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West
1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 10001.5 (West 1994). See Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop.
187 Backers Elated-Challenges Imminent, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1. The initiative was largely
drafted by Alan C. Nelson, former head of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, who at
the time was the California lobbyist for the Federation for American Immigration Reform. Other
sponsors included Harold Ezell, Western Regional Director for the Immigration and Naturalization
Services, accountant Ronald Prince, and Assemblyman Richard Mountjoy, as well as a number of
grassroots anti-immigration groups. See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: HOW
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 20-32
(1996).
246. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 229-30.
247. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; infra note 350 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 421-423 and accompanying text.
250. See Otto Santa Ana, Awash Under Brown Tide: Immigration Metaphors in California Public
and Print Media Discourse, 23 AZTLAN 137 (1998).
251. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 233. The commercials, used in Pete Wilson's bid for reelection
as governor, divided Democrats and helped defeat Kathleen Brown, sister of former Governor Jerry
Brown. See id.
252. See id. at 233-34. President Bill Clinton signed the bill. See Jeff Lustig, California Studies
and California Politics, 77 CAL. HIsT. 131, 136 (1998) (describing the incumbent governor's support
for the measure).
187 remained in place for two years until litigation finally resulted in a
settlement that eliminated its most draconian measures.
253
A few years later, two academicians, Glynn Custred, an anthropologist
at California State University at Hayward, and Tom Wood, director of the
California Association of Scholars, drafted the California Civil Rights Ini-
tiative, or Proposition 209.254 Aimed at reversing race-conscious decision
making in state employment and university admissions, the proposition first
appeared destined for defeat.2 5  Lacking adequate resources, Custred and
Wood appeared unlikely to muster the sufficient number of signatures, but
were rescued when Governor Wilson and the Republican Party saw the
proposition as a wedge issue that could siphon away blue collar voters from
the Democratic Party.256 Until then, Governor Wilson had been a deter-
mined proponent of affirmative action.257  The Republicans even linked
Proposition 209, whose implicit "majoritarian bias corrupted the decision-
making process, ''25 s with the earlier racist Proposition 187, which embarrassed
even Ward Connerly, one of its staunchest supporters."'
Proposition 209 had an immediate and devastating effect on minority
admissions throughout the University of California system, especially in
elite programs such as law and medicine, and at the more selective campuses
such as Berkeley, UCLA, and San Diego.26 Even Connerly conceded that a
gradual approach might have been better and that Proposition 209 might
make it harder to end old boy networks in state contracting. And as the
University of California struggled for minority numbers, he acknowledged
253. See United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1997).
Five lawsuits filed in state and federal courts challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 187
were consolidated. The district court enjoined sections 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the proposition holding
that these sections were preempted by federal law. The sections that the district court enjoined
denied immigrants social, health, and educational benefits. The remaining sections addressed such
issues as the manufacturing of false documentation of resident alien citizenship. See id. During these
two years, hate crimes against Latinos increased. See Report Says Latinos Are Being Targeted in
More Hate Crimes, NEW MEXICAN, July 27, 1999, at A6.
254. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE
TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1-38 (1998); SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 234; Edward W. Lempinen
& Pamela Burdman, Measure to Cut Back Affirmative Action Wins, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 1996, at
Al; Amy Wallace, Prop. 209 to Have Immediate Effect on UC Applicants, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996,
at Al.
255. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 234-35.
256. See id. at 235; CHAVEZ, supra note 254, at 245.
257. Governor Wilson supported goals and targets in contracting and employment as a U.S.
senator, previously serving as a state legislator, and later as mayor of San Diego. See SCHRAG, supra
note 16, at 235.
258. Benjamin A. Doherty, Creative Advocacy in Defense of Affirmative Action: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of Proposition 209, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 91,95.
259. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 236-37.
260. See infra notes 491-495 and accompanying text.
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that it might be necessary to amend or to construe Proposition 209 to allow
race-targeted outreach measures in minority communities.
26
1
Another measure, Proposition 140, which limited the number of terms
that politicians could serve, possibly aimed at long-serving African American
speaker of the house Willie Brown, proved to be one of the most obstructive
of all. 262 Political partisanship and mean-spirited behavior immediately increased
because politicians now realized that they need not worry about reelection.
One commentator deemed California's legislative situation as desperate because
term limits mandate a continual turnover of legislators, depriving the gov-
ernment of needed experience. In the power vacuum that ensued, spasmodic
efforts of direct democracy took over. The same commentator attributed the
entire wave of propositions, including the recent Proposition 227 eliminat-
ing bilingual education, to a neopopulist revolt fueled by white fears about
loss of control. Paradoxically, the revolt injured whites as well because of the
ensuing reduction in public services. Without drastic intervention, California
may become like Hong Kong, with a thin tier of high-income oligarchs at
the top, living behind gated walls, and the rest of the population doomed to
a fate of long hours, subsistence wages, free market schools, and no social
safety net.263 Twenty years ago, California was the best positioned of all the
states to close the immigrant gap. It invested in schools, roads, and social
services. Today it leads the nation in the opposite direction-in showing a
cold shoulder toward the unpropertied, foreign-born, or nonwhite.264
V. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Among the arenas in which race has played a decisive role in California's
history is public education. And, if diversity should fall by the wayside,
discrimination in public education is central to an assessment of whether
261. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 239. Ward Connerly's concession should not be mistaken
for contrition. He has been considering backing measures patterned after Proposition 209 in several
other states, patterned after Proposition 209. See CHAVEZ, supra note 254, at 253.
262. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5. The proposition, enacting term limits for all elected
officials-three two-year terms for assembly members, two four-year terms for senators and all
other elected officials-also reduced legislative staff and perks. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 241-
43; Robert Presley, Taking California Back to Amateur Status Term Limits: In a Time When Voters
Demand Efficient and Responsible Government, They Paradoxically Have Voted for Inexperience and
Incompetence, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at B7.
263. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 245, 264, 279-80; see also Lustig, supra note 252, at 136.
264. See SCHRAG, supra note 16, at 280, 282. On the antidemocratic potential of referen-
dums, see Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities
Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 399, 520-21 (1999). On the recent Propo-
sition 227, which banned bilingual education after an election "inflected" by race, see Nirej Sekhon, A
Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of Bilingual Education, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (1999).
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California universities may engage in affirmative action. This part examines
racism in kindergarten through twelfth grade. It then considers the relation-
ship of California's universities to minorities. Finally, it explores the way that
intellectuals and academics contributed to a structure of knowledge that
implicitly stratified society and, in turn, rendered California's recent backlash
inevitable.
A. K-12
In 1874, in Ward v. Flood,265 a black family from Oakland sued in a
California court to be permitted to send their child to a largely white
neighborhood school. Unfortunately, they lost; the California Supreme
Court ruled that separate but equal schools were all that African Americans
were entitled to.266 California, which sometimes prides itself on being ahead
of the rest of the nation, thus anticipated Plessy v. Ferguson267 by nearly
twenty years. As early as 1852, California only contained 2206 blacks, but
already forbade mixed marriages and voting by anyone with more than one-
sixth African blood. 26 ' Blacks were also prohibited from holding office or
testifying against a white person. As mentioned earlier, the legislature had
passed a tough fugitive slave law, and Governor Peter Burnett was calling
for a ban on black immigration and settlement in California.269 Only a
disagreement between the state assembly and the senate over the precise
wording of the proposal prevented the governor's ban on black immigration
from taking effect.27
Thus, when black parents in San Francisco appealed for public school-
ing for their children in 1854, the state's response was predictable. The San
Francisco Board of Education established a "colored school"-the state's
first-in the basement of a church.' Other California communities followed
suit so that by 1873 the state contained twenty-one such segregated
schools.' This led to the development of a corps of influential black teachers,
265. 48 Cal. 42 (1874).
266. "[Tlhere is certainly to be found no violation of the constitutional rights of the one race
more than of the other ... for each, though separated from the other, is to be educated upon equal
terms with that other... " Id. at 52.
267. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
268. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 9. Blacks comprised about 1 percent of the population
of the state. See id.
269. See id.; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
270. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 9.
271. The church, St. Cyprian, was located near the comer of Jackson and Virginia Streets. The
following year, Sacramento gave money to a private black school, later providing it with a new building.
See id. at 10-11.
272. See id. at 11.
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including a colleague of Frederick Douglass and a white teacher who was a
daughter of abolitionist John Brown."' One black teacher, Jeremiah Sanderson,
acquired such a legendary reputation that black parents from all over the
state sent their children to his school in Stockton."' He was paid sixty dollars
a month; white teachers, seventy-five dollars.275
In 1855, one year after the establishment of the first colored school, the
California legislature passed a law effectively denying state funds for schooling
for black children.276 Some school districts defied the law, establishing separate
schools anyway. San Francisco even allowed a light-skinned daughter of a
prominent citizen to enroll in a public school for whites.277 Parents pro-
tested so vociferously, however, that the board of education rescinded her
assignment.
In 1859, Andrew Jackson Moulder, a native of Virginia, became state
superintendent of instruction.2 79 Adamantly opposed to racial mixing and
insistent that whites not associate with "inferior races," he successfully reversed
the slight softening of racial attitudes ushered in by his predecessors. His
view soon prevailed: The legislature enacted a measure providing that no
money was to be spent on integrated education.'
By 1863, oppression had lifted somewhat. Blacks in California could
testify against whites. Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. John
Swett, a New Englander and an associate of Thomas Starr King, was now
the state superintendent of public instruction.8 ' During his election campaign,
273. Sara Brown, one of the few white teachers employed, taught at a school in Red Bluff.
Jeremiah Sanderson, born in Rhode Island, had Scottish and Negro parents. See id.
274. Sanderson arrived in California in 1854, serving first as a teacher in the Sacramento
black school, and then in San Francisco. His checkered career there included a two-year assign-
ment as principal. Then, when his black assistant was replaced by a white woman, he was transferred
to the evening division to avoid the impropriety of a black supervising a white person. In 1868,
he finally arrived in Stockton. See id. at 12.
275. See id.
276. The law, the first in the state to mention race, provided funding for schools according to
the proportion of white children attending them. See id.
277. See id. at 12-13.
278. In other California communities, some black students attended regular (white) schools.
See id.
279. In his annual report of 1859, Andrew Jackson Moulder wrote, "in several counties
attempts have been made to introduce Negroes into our public schools on an equality basis with
the whites." Id. (citing CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 14-15 (1859)).
280. See id.; see also IRVING G. HENDRICK, CALIFORNIA EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY 10
(1980) (noting that this "bright proceduralist" proposed laws to prohibit California schools from
admitting "inferior races" and ridiculed "mock philanthropists" who urged the cause of Negroes and
others).
281. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 13-14.
282. See id. at 14-15.
Swett's opponents circulated a rumor that he was an abolitionist who would
allow Negroes to be taught on "terms of equality." '83 He denied these scan-
dalous charges and won anyway. Although he never publicly supported
mixed schools, he did staunchly support separate education for blacks."'
A few years later, in 1867, black parents in San Francisco were out-
raged when the city's board of education relocated the colored school so that
a new white one would not share a city block with it. The city's super-
intendent, James Denman, told them to expect no better. After the city
closed the black school, allegedly for low numbers, a group of black parents
and educators called for an end to such shenanigans. Soon thereafter, a bill
that would have opened schools to all was defeated when it appeared that
90 percent of whites opposed racial mixing. Black parents then raised
money for a court case and engaged John D. Dwinelle, a prominent white
attorney from San Francisco, to argue on their behalf. In court, the San
Francisco school board denied that education was a basic right of citizen-
ship and argued that Mary Ward's case was moot because she lacked the
skills necessary to succeed at Broadway School.28 Writing for the California
Supreme Court, Justice C.J. Wallace agreed with the parents that education
is a fundamental interest, but held that San Francisco had not denied the
plaintiff an education; she was only deprived of schooling with whites.286
After further efforts to achieve legislative reform failed, the black
community barely survived a movement in 1874 to close all colored schools
in San Francisco when a measure to do so failed by only one vote. Then,
astonishingly, in 1875 the full board abolished separate schools and ruled
that colored people could attend any school at all. Within a year, Oakland,
Sacramento, and Vallejo followed suit. By 1880, the state legislature removed
all mention of race from its statutes and required schools to be open to
everyone. A black newspaper editorialized that the white establishment was
not doing this out of the kindness of its heart, but as a cost-cutting device:
An economic depression had settled on California and thus maintaining a
system of dual schools was costly.282 What the editor failed to mention was
that California was now inflamed with a massive campaign against Chinese
immigration; moreover, the state school law was soon amended to establish
283. Id. at 15.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 16-22.
286. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 50-52 (1874).
287. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 22-26.; see also BOGARDUS, supra note 141, at 145-65
(proposing, astonishingly, a campaign for educators to Americanize the Negro, because Africa's climate
favors indolence and suppresses ambition).
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separate Indian schools.28s Eventually, residential segregation led to de facto
school segregation, reversing black gains.
In 1885, 722 Chinese children lived in San Francisco's Chinatown,
among such "immorality and debauchery," according to a report by that
city's board of supervisors, that their mere presence in white schools would
be a disaster.2 9 The report ended with the exhortation: "Guard well the doors
of our public schools that they do not enter... [I]t is but the enforcement
of the law of self-preservation . . . and an integral part of the iron rule of
right.., to defend ourselves from this invasion of Mongolian barbarian-
ism."90 The outburst was prompted by an attempt by Joseph and Mary Tape
to enroll their eight-year-old daughter, Mamie, in Spring Valley School.'
When rejected, they complained to the Chinese consulate to no avail. 92 Since
1880, the legislature had formally denied school districts the right to practice
segregation. But San Francisco ignored the law, fearing Mongolian
barbarism, and so denied public education altogether to Chinese children.293
By the early 1880s, more than seventy-five thousand Chinese lived in
California, constituting the largest foreign-born group and the second largest
minority. 94  Initially, they came to work in the mines, then railroads and
farms, and later still, urban shops, factories, and laundries. Industrious and
quiet, they were initially well received, but within a few decades began to
be considered economic rivals.29 ' As was mentioned earlier, the legislature
288. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 26.
289. Id. at 28 (citing SAN FRANCISCO BD. OF SUPERVISORS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDITION OF THE CHINESE QUARTER AND THE CHINESE IN SAN
FRANCISCO 59-62 (1885)). Though the supervisors acknowledged that the children were American
citizens by birth, they believed them to be as Chinese "'as if they had been born in the province of
Canton,' speaking little or no English and rarely having contact with white people" and pointed
out that the children lived side by side with "'the painted harlots of the slums and alleys, the women
who are bought and sold to the slavery of prostitution."' Id.
290. Id. at 28-29.
291. Though the Tapes were self-described "Christian, Americanized" Chinese, and their
daughter, Mamie, had been born in the United States and spoke English better than she did Chinese,
the principal of the school explained that the San Francisco Board of Education's policy barred the
Chinese from the public schools. See id. at 29.
292. At this time Andrew Moulder, formerly state superintendent of Public Instruction, had
become superintendent of the San Francisco public schools. He applied the same policy he had
used 25 years earlier when he had recommended that "Negroes, Mongolians and Indians" not be
allowed to attend public schools with white children. See id. at 29-30.
293. See id. at 30.
294. Most of the immigrants came from the region of Canton, which was experiencing economic
hardship. See id.
295. See id. During the 1850s, the Chinese population in California increased from 800 to
about 35,000. San Francisco, an outpost of Chinese culture, had a Chinese-language newspaper
by 1854, Cantonese opera performances, Chinese merchant and labor contractors, and social and
economic associations. See id. at 30-31.
levied a foreign miners tax,296 state and national law deemed them nonwhite
and thus ineligible for various incidents of citizenship;297 in 1854, the state
supreme court ruled that they, like blacks and Indians, could not testify
against whites.9 And, in a flight of unscientific fantasy, the court reasoned
that Indians, like Chinese, were "Mongolians" and thus excluded from
naturalization.299
Because most early Chinese settlers were single men hoping to strike it
rich and return to their country of origin, the issue of schooling did not
arise. Then, a few wealthy Chinese families settled in San Francisco. Within
a few years, they were clamoring for the board of education to provide
schooling for their children. In 1859, the board agreed and established the
first Chinese school at Stockton and Sacramento Streets. But superintendent
of schools James Denman visited the school and did not like what he saw.
Declaring it a waste of taxpayers' money because the children he saw were
stamped glaringly with caste, idolatry, and bad character, he closed it down.
The school did not reopen until the Tape family's case, fifteen years later.3"
The Chinese community went without public schools in the interim, making
do with Chinese language schools organized by Chinese scholars."'
By 1877, the campaign to end Chinese immigration was at its height.3 2
Railroad construction and mining were declining, forcing the Chinese to
move into urban jobs, which brought them into even more sharp competition
with whites. A national depression was settling in; conditions were ripe for
conflict.3 °3 In 1876, nativist clubs and labor organizations merged to form the
Workingman's Party, one of whose slogans was "[T]he Chinese Must Go.
304
296. See supra notes 69, 73-74 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
299. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223; see also A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA:
A SYLLABUS 19-21 (Thomas W. Chinn ed., 1969); WILLIAM HOY, THE CHINESE SIX COMPANIES 1
(1941).
300. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 31-32, 34.
301. The most famous of these schools was one organized by the "Six Companies," separate
groups of merchant and labor contractors officially known as the Chinese Consolidate Benevolent
Association. The school, based on traditional Chinese values and staffed by teachers with degrees from
schools in China, prepared students for examinations required to enter professions in China. See id.
at 36-37.
302. See supra notes 71, 127-128 and accompanying text.
303. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 38.
304. See id. at 38-39. "Republican and Democratic politicians adopted similar stands, and the
new state constitution of 1879 reflected the anti-Chinese crusade." Id. A short time afterward, in 1882,
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 14. 22 Stat. 58, 59, 61 (1882), repealed by
Recision of Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 51-90, 57 Stat. 600 (1943). The slogan, then, was 100
percent successful. See Russell M. Posner, The Lord and the Drayman, in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR
EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 87, at 57, 65.
1562 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1521 (2000)
Anglo sympathizers were pilloried and hung in effigy." 5 Chinese parents
considered the streets too dangerous for their children and kept them home
even from private school.06
This was the setting in which Tape v. Hurley.. was decided. The case
arose when Consul-General Bee protested to San Francisco school superinten-
dent Moulder who, after obtaining advice from Sacramento, correctly replied
that the state's new constitution on its terms declared the Chinese to be
"dangerous to the well-being of the state.""3 Judge James G. Maguire ordered
the San Francisco school board to appear and show cause for the exclusion
because the state education law also provided that California schools be
open to all children. Moreover, because Mamie Tape was an American
citizen, denial of public schooling seemingly violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. When San Francisco failed to make an adequate case, he ordered the
child admitted. State superintendent Welcher described the decision as a terri-
ble disaster and urged the school board to appeal the decision to the California
Supreme Court.3" That court affirmed the trial court decision, agreeing that
state law did allow the exclusion of the "filthy ... those having contagious
and infectious diseases," but exclusion on those bases required individual, not
group, determination.310 Reading the decision carefully, Moulder concluded
that it only required that the Chinese be given access to schools, so he raced
to establish a separate school before Mamie had time to enroll in Spring
Valley."' Sacramento supported him, passing a bill establishing a separate
school for Mongolians." ' Before this could happen, Mamie showed up at
Spring Valley, but was sent away for vaccinations and a medical exam. By the
time she returned, the new Chinese school had opened and she was forced
to go there.313
In 1902, San Francisco's separate but equal policy was challenged a
second time in Wong Him v. Callahan"4 and again upheld by the federal court
305. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 39. For example, Methodist minister Otis Gibson,
who had defended the Chinese, was twice hanged by the Ninth Ward Club, and later by the Tailor's
Protective Union. See id.
306. See id.
307. 66 Cal. 473 (1885); see also WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 40-42.
308. WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 40 (quoting Consul General Frederick A. Bee). The
school board concurred, one member stating that he "'would rather go to jail than allow a Chinese
child to be admitted to the schools."' Id. (quoting the school board member).
309. See id. at 40-41.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 41-42.
312. See id. at 42. The bill passed by a vote of 63 to 1. See id.
313. See id. at 42-43. Anti-Chinese virulence seems to have been strongest in San Francisco.
However, Sacramento established a segregated Chinese school in 1893 and three small communities
in the Sacramento River delta region had "Asiatic schools" for Chinese and Japanese. See id.
314. 119 F. 381 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902).
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relying on Plessy v. Ferguson."5 Gradually, San Francisco schools relaxed their
policy and began to admit individual Chinese children, especially after a
threatened economic boycott by the Chinese community in 1905. To justify
this admission, some school officials adopted the pretext that the children
were really Japanese." 6
After World War II, overt discrimination declined as the Chinese moved
out of Chinatown and into other areas.317 Indeed, the Chinese community
concerns reversed. By 1971, Chinatown protested federally mandated busing
3 s
and in the 1974 Lau v. Nichols case, the community succeeded in securing
special programs for Chinese-speaking students. The Tapes were said to have
visited their daughter's separate Chinese school and were never happy with
320it.
Unlike the Chinese, Japanese numbers in California had been small until
the 1900s; the Japanese government had limited emigration. By the late nine-
teenth century, however, Japan had relaxed its policy, while United States
employers began to complain of a lack of workers because of Chinese exclusion.
The Japanese were seen as the solution. In the early twentieth century, their
numbers grew rapidly.3"' Predictably, they inherited the anti-Chinese senti-
ment, bigots and unions finding a new yellow peril.32' Nativism found an ally
in the courts, which ruled that the Japanese, like the Chinese, were non-1. 321
white and therefore not entitled to naturalize.
In 1900, San Francisco mayor James D. Phelan and Stanford professor
Edward A. Ross spoke at a rally, urging exclusion of the Japanese. Labor
groups fell into line, while a community group formed the Japanese Association
of America to fight back. When Japan turned the tables on the favored Russia
in 1905 and emerged as a world power, matters worsened. The San Francisco
Chronicle launched a torrid war of words on the Japanese, encouraging trade
unions and mass meetings to counter this new threat to American values.
3 24
315. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
316. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 44.
317. See id. at 46. Though middle-class Chinese moved to the Richmond and Sunset areas as
well as some neighborhoods on Russian and Telegraph hills, Chinatown continued to contain poor
Chinese, many of whom arrived after the Immigration Reform Act of 1965. See id.
318. See id. (reporting that many Chinese preferred to keep their children in Chinatown
schools).
319. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
320. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 47.
321. See id. at 49. Only 148 Japanese lived in the United States in 1880. By 1890, they num-
bered 2000, growing to 25,000 by the turn of the century. By 1910, the Japanese population exceeded
72,000. See id.
322. See id. at 49-50.
323. See In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
324. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 50. On February 23, 1905, the San Franciso Chronicle
bore the banner headline "Japanese Invasion the Problem of the Hour," and stated that "[o]nce
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Among the leaders of the Anti-Japanese League were immigrants from
Sweden, Ireland, and Norway. 25 The San Francisco Chronicle editorialized
that Japan was "sending her worst to California."26 But unlike the Chinese,
who viewed themselves as temporary visitors, many of the Japanese planned
to stay and raise families here; moreover, unlike the Chinese, they came
from a rapidly modernizing society, were well educated, and prepared to assert
their rights.2 7 When the San Francisco Board of Education responded to civic
sentiments by confirming its policy of separate schools for the Japanese-
repeating essentially the same arguments made earlier with respect to the
Chinese concerning the need to protect impressionable youth from association
with wicked Mongols-the Japanese community protested. When a 1906
earthquake and fire forced Japanese to move to white areas, sentiment against
them hardened. Japanese-looking people were harassed and assaulted, and
Japanese businesses were vandalized. When Japan sent monetary relief and
scientists to assist with the aftermath of the earthquake, they were stoned.32s
When lack of funding precluded building separate schools for the
Japanese, California cities merely dispatched Japanese and Koreans to existing
Chinese schools. 29 (One can imagine the linguistic bedlam that must have
ensued.) When Japan's Consul K. Uyeno learned of San Francisco's practice,
he complained that "this action of your honorable board constitutes a species
of discrimination which is offensive to the Japanese national spirit."33 Local
Japanese leaders wired Japanese newspapers with stories describing how they
had been humiliated and treated like demons. 31 The American ambassador in
Tokyo informed Washington that a crisis was brewing; later the Japanese
ambassador visited the U.S. State Department for a meeting with Elihu
Root to assert the right to fair treatment for Japanese living in the United
States under the Treaty of 1894.32 San Francisco's Japanese took heart,
the war with Russia is over ... the brown stream of Japanese immigration is likely to become an
inundating torrent." Id. (quoting Japanese Invasion the Problem of the Hour, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23,
1905, at 1).
325. See id. at 51.
326. Japanese Invasion the Problem of the Hour, supra note 324. Most of the immigrants, however,
had been hard-working farmers from the Hiroshima region. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 50.
327. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 50. Many of the Japanese had worked in Hawaii.
before coming to the mainland and were partly accustomed to American ways. See id.
328. See id. at 52-54.
329. See id. at 54. Though most Korean children appeared at the school, all but two of the
Japanese children did not. The secretary of the Japanese Association and two Methodist ministers
asked the board to rescind its decision. See id.
330. Id. at 55.
331. See id. The incident was to have profound effects on future relations between Japan
and the United States. See id. at 56.
332. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 22, 1894, U.S.-Japan, 29 Stat. 848. The
ambassador asserted that the treaty gave Japanese children the right to attend school with everyone
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redoubled their efforts, and displayed some of the vigor their countrymen
had shown in the war with Russia. " On one occasion, more than 1200 Japa-
nese attended a protest and heard speeches by clergy and business leaders.334
Undaunted, the San Francisco Chronicle editor insisted that the only way
to reduce the building tension was "to keep the two races apart."'' The paper
also wrote that while very young Japanese may be uncontaminated, "as they
grow older they acquire the distinctive character, habits and moral standards
of their race, which are abhorrent to our people." '336 Two university presidents,
Benjamin Ide Wheeler of the University of California and David Starr Jordan
of Stanford, criticized San Francisco's hard-line stand,337 and President Theodore
Roosevelt sent a personal emissary to intercede with the San Francisco school
board, in hopes of salvaging relations with a militarily strong ally.33s Local
leaders resisted, considering it a betrayal to change their position; if the United
States had a treaty with Japan, that treaty was wrong and the fault of the
national government.39 Roosevelt continued to pressure San Francisco and
California, condemning their position on the Japanese and ordering U.S.
Attorney General Robert Devilen to assist in Aoki v. Dean.34 Many Californians
saw the issue as one of states' rights, coining a strategy that would be of intense
interest to the South fifty years later.
Aoki arose when a Japanese child applied to the Redding School by
prearrangement, so as to set up a test case."' Predictably denied, he sued in
else, stating that "[a]fter all the years of friendship between the two nations[,]... it seems too bad that
the poor innocent Japanese school children should be subjected to such indignities." WOLLENBERG,
supra note 223, at 56 (quoting CALL, Oct. 26, 1906).
333. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 56.
334. Misuji Miyakawa, the only Japanese lawyer in San Francisco licensed to appear in federal
court, announced that he and a well-known San Francisco attorney, Charles Fickert, had sued the
school board. See id. at 57.
335. Id. at 57 (quoting S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 1906).
336. Id. (quoting S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6,1906).
337. See id. at 58.
338. Though President Theodore Roosevelt took a strong stand, he seemed less interested in
racial justice than in preserving friendly relations with a world ally, as he had not taken any action
for Negroes in the South or for the Chinese. See id. at 58-59.
339. See id. at 59 ("'1 could not betray the State of California and its citizens, even at the request
of the President of the United States."' (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE ASIATIC EXCLUSION LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA 67 (1908) (quoting
Olaf Tveitmoe))); id. at 60 ("'If there is a violation of treaty rights between two governments, the
fault is not ours; it is with the legislature which passed the law."' (quoting S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2,
1906 (quoting school board president Aaron Altmann))).
340. Id. at 60 (discussing this unreported decision).
341. See id. at 62. California law during this period required separate schools for Indian,
Chinese, or children of "Mongolian descent." See David Brudnoy, Race and the San Francisco School
Board Incident, in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA, supra
note 87, at 75.
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state and federal district court.342 His family's argument was not constitutional,
but rather statutory-the California Code only provided for the segregation
of Chinese and Mongolians, whereas the Japanese were neither.' They also
pointed out that the Treaty of 1894 guaranteed Japanese descendents living
in the United States the same privileges as Native Americans. 44 California
argued that the Japanese, according to popular usage, were Mongolians, that
segregation in a separate school did not constitute a deprivation of constitu-
tional liberty, and that the Treaty of 1894 did not specifically mention edu-
cation.34 A Harvard Law Review note argued that U.S. courts had allowed
segregation of nonwhites, so that denying California the ability to segregate
the Japanese would, in effect, grant the Japanese "a greater right ... than
citizens of this country possess."346
Roosevelt next invited school board president Roncoveier to Washington
to discuss the situation. He refused, insisting that the President invite the
entire board. Fearing an international crisis, Roosevelt agreed. On February
15, 1907, the San Francisco delegation agreed to rescind their segregation
policy in return for a "gentlemen's agreement" that Japan stop sending laborers
to this country.347 Theodore Roosevelt acquiesced and issued an executive
order prohibiting further entry of Japanese laborers and exercised his influence
to have the Aoki case dismissed. The San Francisco Chronicle was furious
over the appeasement.4
President Roosevelt had to intervene when California proposed other
measures that would have provoked the Japanese nation.349 Later in 1913,
California Governor Hiram Johnson did nothing to oppose the enactment
342. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 62.
343. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8003 (West 1921) (repealed 1947); WOLLENBERG, supra note
223, at 62.
344. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 63. "[The citizens or subject of each Contracting
Party shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same privileges, liberties and rights, and shall be
subject to no higher imposts or charges in those respects than native citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation." Id.
345. See id. at 63-64.
346. Note, The Rights of the Japanese in California Schools, 20 HARV. L. REV. 337, 338 (1907).
347. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 66, 67. For this "Gentleman's Agreement," see
Memorandum by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING
TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1924, at 339 (1939) (attaching portions of
the Gentlemen's Agreement as an appendix), reprinted in part in BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND
REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850-1990, at 207-12 (1993).
348. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 67 (stating that "the Mayor had surrendered on
the 'great fundamental principle whose establishment is of far more consequence than the presence
or absence of a few Japanese children in our schools ... the right of the Federal Government to
interfere in the management of our schools' (quoting S.F. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1907)).
349. See id. (noting how President Roosevelt prevented the California legislature from passing
anti-Japanese bills).
of the Alien Land Law, which prohibited Japanese from buying farms."'
Despite all this, wives and other family members of Japanese already in
California continued to immigrate, because they were not covered by the
antilabor agreement. 5' As numbers rose, so did strident opposition by such
groups as the American Legion and the Native Sons and Daughters of the
Golden West. 52 Even Saturday schools, conducted in the Japanese language,
attracted criticism as un-American, though many of them taught such harmless
subjects as sewing and emphasized assimilation into American culture. 5 In
1921, the California legislature established qualifications for language teachers
and textbooks to ensure that American values were taught.3"4 That same year,
the California legislature finally amended its education statute to name Japa-
nese as eligible for segregation; until then the statute had named only
Mongols, leaving the Japanese's classification ambiguous. 55 Many school
boards seized on the opportunity and established segregated schools for the
Japanese. 356 When asked why, one parent replied simply, "prejudice." '357 The
same parent explained that the Japanese beat us at baseball and received
too many academic awards.5 8
During internment, even though over 70 percent of the Japanese sent
to camps were from California, Governor Earl Warren refused to spend state
money to operate schools for children in the camps at Manzanar and Tule
Lake. Underfunded camp schools taught progressive ideas and included a
class yearbook showing cheerleaders and young people wearing cardigan
sweaters. Some of the Japanese politely pointed out that this imagery clashed
with the reality of life behind barbed wire.359  At one point, the United
350. See Alien Land Law, Stats. 1921, § 10, 1921 Cal. Stat. lxxxiii, lxxxv (1920), repealed
by Stats. 1956, ch. 316, 1956 Cal. Stat. 767.
351. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 68. The Japanese population increased; the lssei
(first generation) and Nissei (second generation) populations combined grew from 41,000 in 1910
to over 71,000 in 1920. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 68.
352. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 69. These groups and organized labor supported a
new Japanese Exclusion League. With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No.
68-139, 43 Stat. 154 (1924), Japanese immigration came to an end. See WOLLENBERG, supra note
223, at 68.
353. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 69-72. The Japanese, unlike the Chinese, tried
to prepare students and adults alike to assimilate into American culture. See id.
354. See id. at 72.
355. See id. at 72; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8003-8004 (West 1921) (repealed 1947). This law
is discussed in Westminster School District of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 780 (9th Cir.
1947).
356. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 72. In all of these school districts, the Japanese
were a majority of the school population. See id.
357. Id.
358. See id. at 73.
359. See id. at 75-76, 78. In the fall of 1942, when school opened at the camp at Rohner,
Arkansas, the words "Jap Prison" appeared on the tarpaper wall. See id.
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States distributed questionnaires asking whether the internees were loyal;
"renunciants," persons who refused to sign, suffered the ultimate indignity. 36°
Already segregated from society, they were sent to the Tule Lake camp for
troublemakers. 6 ' Some militant parents pulled their children out of the official
cardigan-sweater schools and operated Japanese language schools to prepare stu-
dents to relocate to Japan after the war ended. When it did, 2000 Japanese
internees repatriated to Japan even though that nation was in shambles. The
Manzanar high school yearbook in 1945 showed a photograph of a hand squeez-
ing pliers around barbed wire. One internee, Harry Kitano, now a UCLA pro-
fessor, believes camp schools did the children a favor, allowing them to grow
up free of Anglo prejudice.62
Indian schools, by contrast, seem to have done the Indian children sent
there very little favor. As mentioned earlier, 63 Spanish missions and Mexican
ranchos made Indians into a colonial work force. Stone Age hunters were
Christianized, forcibly settled in villages, and taught to farm and to herd
livestock.364 Indian numbers decreased rapidly because of the ravages of
European diseases.365 When Anglos swarmed into California during the
gold rush, they did not need the Indians for labor as the earlier Spaniards
and Mexicans had, so they displaced and destroyed them with great energy.366
As mentioned earlier, Hubert Howe Bancroft described the period as "one
of the last human hunts in history, and the basest and most brutal of them
all."36 Under federal treaties, most California Indian tribes agreed to move
from the foothills into the Central Valley in return for social services, includ-
ing education. 68 California, however, was of a different mind; the state legisla-
ture vehemently opposed even this shred of kindness, enacting laws depriving
Indians of the right to vote, hold office, testify against whites, and attend
white schools.369 After Ward v. Flood.. in 1874, Indian children could attend
360. See id.
361. The flux of people moving in and out of Tule Lake disrupted *the school program. See id.
362. See id. at 78-79, 80.
363. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
364. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 83.
365. See id. "In 1769 the Indian population of California was between 200,000 and 300,000;
by 1880, not more than 20,000 Indians were left." Id.
366. See id.
367. Id. (citing 7 HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 474-75 (1890)).
368. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 84. The 18 treaties provided for 22 teachers, 45
assistants, and 54 school buildings.
369. See id. at 84-85. The treaties were not ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1853, therefore state
action held sway. See id.
370. 48 Cal. 42 (1874).
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white schools only if their school district did not maintain one for colored
children. Only sixty-three children in the entire state opted to do this.37'
Faced with such intransigence, the federal government considered open-
ing schools at Hoopa Valley and Tule River, but Indian agent George Hoffman
spoke against the idea, writing that the "California Digger" is a degenerate,
cruel, cowardly, thieving, vagabond-"without one redeeming trait"37-and
in any event was bound for extinction. When Indian extinction did not
materialize, federal authorities went ahead and opened schools at Hoopa
and Tule River.373 Stanford University president David Starr Jordan opposed
the Indian school movement and urged the government to open public
schools to Indian children."'
In Piper v. Big Pine School District,3" the Indians won a narrow victory.
An Indian girl, not a member of a tribe, was a California citizen and resided
away from the reservation. 76 As such, she had voluntarily adopted "the
habits of civilized life," and as a U.S. citizen, asserted that she was entitled
to public schooling. 77 The court agreed, although it noted that schooling
could be separate but equal.37 By 1926, San Francisco's Commonwealth
Club, in a study of Indians in public schools, reported a depressing array of
statistics including early dropout and high truancy.379 One northern California
town, forced to accept Indians in school, walled them off with a partition in
special rooms, fenced off a part of the playground, and provided them with a
separate teacher.38
In another town, parents objected that the Indian children might be
diseased. The Indian parents produced medical certificates showing that
their children were in perfect health. Grumblingly, the school admitted
them."' Special government boarding schools for Indians were little better.
According to another report, even the best of them subscribed to an implicit
mission of destroying Indian culture and viewed Indian girls as potential
371. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 85.
372. Id. at 86.
373. See id. By 1872 the schools had an enrollment of 127 students. See id.
374. See id. at 92. Jordan was a member of the San Francisco-based Indian Board of Coop-
eration, a group of leading citizens, whose aim was "to promote the general welfare with regard to public
school privileges." Id.
375. 193 Cal. 664 (1924).
376. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 96-97.
377. Id. at 97.
378. See id. at 98.
379. See id. at 98-99.
380. See id. at 99.
381. See id.
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house servants and boys as farmhands.382 By 1960, 43 percent of Indian
children dropped out by the eighth grade, and less than 2 percent completed
four years of college.383 California Indians had the highest unemployment
rate and lowest per capita income of all groups in the state.384
If the story of Chinese, Japanese, black, and Indian schoolchildren in
California is dismal, that of Mexican Americans is possibly even worse.
Mexican schoolchildren, in many cases, were sons and daughters of migrants
and so could not complete an entire school year in the same school.
385
Moreover, many of them spoke English haltingly at best. California educa-
tional authorities seized on these characteristics to argue for segregated
schools for Mexican American children. Segregating them was in their own
best interest, the argument went, because their educational disadvantages
and language difficulties required a special curriculum. At the same time, it
would be unfair for Anglo children to attend school with children who were
so far behind and who did not share Anglo traits of independence and high
educational aspiration. Educational psychologists added that separation was
necessary to protect Mexican American schoolchildren from the laughter
and derision they might suffer if sent to school with more able Euro-American
children.386
Large numbers of Mexicans arrived between 1910 and 1930, shortly after
the wave of European immigrants had subsided.87 Social workers and settle-
ment house operators who had spent decades studying, teaching, and lecturing
to Irish, Polish, Slovakian, and Italian immigrants in America's large cities
now transferred their attention to the "Mexican problem., 388 Books and
master's theses described Mexicans as dirty, diseased, and in need of training in
personal hygiene.38 Their culture and family structure supposedly emphasized
382. A report by the progressive Institute of Government Research in Washington in 1928
criticized the assimilationist thrust of government schools and advocated preserving Indian culture.
See id. at 99-100.
383. Whites had a 25 percent dropout rate, with 11 percent completing four years of college.
See id. at 102.
384. See id. at 102-03.
385. See id. at 114. Cesar Chavez, son of migrants during the 1930s, remembered attending
at least 31 different schools, but never getting past the sixth grade. See id.; see also RAWLS & BEAN,
supra note 58, at 405 (noting that Chavez attended nearly 40 different California public schools).
386. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 112-15. Educator Grace Stanley described an
"all-Mexican school, where the children's faces 'radiated joy, they had thrown off the repression
that held them down when they were in school with the other [white] children."' Grace Stanley, Special
School for Mexicans, SURVEY, Sept. 15, 1920, at 715.
387. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
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passivity and fatalism; they were at best a source of manual labor.390 California
schools tracked Mexican schoolchildren into vocational training out of the
belief that they had a natural capacity for the manual arts.39' In rural areas,
farmers sat on school boards, many of which saw schools as extensions of
the packing shed and Mexican schoolchildren as future pickers and processors
of produce."' In educational theory, the vocational movement embraced a
philosophy with democratic rhetoric, but managerial overtones.9 The idea
was to educate everyone for their natural places. These ideas had an impact.
A 1914 commission on national aid to vocational education led to a federal
statute that stratified schoolchildren into separate tracks under the guise of
democratic education.3 95
The movement had drastic repercussions for Mexican schoolchildren
in Califomia. Authorities already believed their natural lot in life was to serve
Anglo farmers or factory owners, and high school counselors were already
advising Mexican girls to prepare for careers as domestics, boys to major in
manual arts.396 The post-World War I intelligence testing movement served
as a handmaid to school tracking. 97 Mexican children were widely tested in
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona, where authorities
found remarkably similar results: Most Mexican children fell into the 81-85
I.Q. range."' One psychologist tested migrant children in California with
the Stanford Achievement Test after which he pronounced that "87.6 percent
[of the children] were retarded." '399 Foreshadowing the University of
390. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 20-21.
391. See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA 191-95
(1976); DONATO, supra note 16, at 20-21.
392. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 16-17.
393. See id. at 19 ("mhis literature .... demonstrates that the vocational education movement
became 'a response to the specific job training needs of the rapidly expanding corporate sector than
an accommodation of a previously elite educational institution-the high school-to the changing
needs of reproducing the class structure."' (quoting BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 391, at 194)).
394. See id. at 20.
395. See Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-347, 39 Stat. 929
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 11-28 (1994)); DONATO, supra note 16, at 20-21; William E.
McGorray, The Needs of a Mexican Community, 18 CAL. J. SECONDARY EDUC. 349, 349 (1943)
(urging schools to adjust curriculum and pedagogy to suit the needs of Mexican boys, who have good
manual ability, noting that the "[t]he curriculum is industrial arts in nature ... and many of the
boys spend four hours in school and four hours in industry daily").
396. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 21. Merton Hill, a prominent Americanization
specialist in California, also maintained that since Mexican children demonstrated a "considerable
aptitude for hand work.., courses should be developed that will aid them in becoming skilled
workers with their hands." Id.
397. See id. at 23. Intelligence testing legitimated the tracking that industry had needed all along.
398. See id. at 26.
399. Id. at 28 (citing Wilbur K. Cobb, Retardation in Elementary Schools of Children of
Migratory Laborers in Ventura County, California 1 (1932) (unpublished Master's thesis, University
of Southern California). Stanford was also the academic home of Lewis Terman, developer of the
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California system's Master Plan, which was to come a few decades later,
California's public schools were thoroughly tracked by 1930 with Mexican
American children either in segregated schools or in the bottom tracks of
integrated ones.4' Progressive educator George Sanchez criticized the use of
tests for Chicano schoolchildren, but with little success.4"' Some California
school districts simply segregated Mexican schoolchildren to avoid any sort
of mixing.4 2
During the Depression years, the virulence of California's rhetoric
increased. Writing in a book published by the University of Southern California
press, sociologist Emory Bogardus warned of the perils of continued Mexican
immigration4 3 that resulted in many Mexican families permanently relocating
to the United States.4 Governor C.C. Young's Mexican Fact Finding Com-
mittee warned that Mexican Americans were supplanting other immigrant
races and native-born Americans.0 Even as late as 1966-1967, a California
study showed that the vast majority of school districts lacked programs for
the English deficient. 6 Seventy percent failed to conduct conferences with
the parents and families of Mexican children. Schools conveyed the impres-
sion that educating Mexican schoolchildren was an exercise in futility because
of their low aspiration level, poor home environment, and lack of parental
early intelligence quotient (IQ) test. Terman believed that southern Europeans, Blacks, and Jews were
intellectually subpar. See Father to 1,000 Geniuses, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1995 (Magazine), at 20;
Planned Parenthood Carries on the Eugenics Tradition, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1997, at A12.
400. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 28-30; infra note 483 and accompanying text.
401. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 29 (noting George Sanchez's objection to testing children
in a language and culture they did not understand).
402. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 113-18. Not all Mexican parents passively accepted
segregated schools. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 128, at 670-75 (describing Mendez v. Westminister
Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946) (striking down the local practice of segregating
Mexican American schoolchildren because California law did not expressly provide for it), affd,
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cit. 1947)). The defendant school districts introduced expert academic witnesses
from the state universities to prove that segregation was in the Mexican children's best interest
and done to help them. Moreover, California followed, both formally and informally, the Plessy
rule of separate but equal. Judge Paul 0. McCormick ruled that the California Education Code did not
provide specifically for segregation in the case of Mexican children; that Mexicans were not Indians,
who were subject to legal segregation in school; and that segregation did not help the children
because their counterparts who did attend Anglo schools performed demonstrably better. See
WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 126-28. For a discussion of another earlier chapter of Mexican-
American resistance to school segregation in California (the "Lemon Grove incident"), see Kevin
Johnson & George Martfnez, Crossover Dreams, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1999).
403. See BOGARDUS, supra note 141, at 270; DONATO, supra note 16, at 38-39.
404. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 39.
405. See id. The Depression exacerbated relations between Mexicans and whites. Unemployed
white workers from other parts of the country migrated to California, saturated the labor market,
and made jobs more competitive.
406. See id. at 62; cf. JOHN PLAKOS, CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., ERIC No. ED018281,
MEXICAN-AMERICAN RESEARCH PROJECT, PROGRESS REPORT 1 (July 13, 1967).
support.4"' A California State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights (the Civil Rights Commission) found that many California
schoolteachers subscribed to negative stereotypes and attitudes toward Mexican
children, that school boards assigned the worst teachers to schools with a
high percentage of such pupils, and that teachers resented and resisted assign-
ment to those schools.4"8
Although many teachers did not personally know any Mexican parents,
they developed stereotypes of the uncaring Mexican parent and, as a result,
made no efforts to meet or to enlist them in support of their children's
education.4 9 Oscar Lewis's "deficit theory" of Mexican home life received a
wide and sympathetic reception among California schoolteachers. 4" His 1965
book, Five Families,41' captured and reinforced ideas that California farmers,
school boards, and testing psychologists already embraced.4 2 In one northern
California city, 42 percent of Mexican children dropped out before completing
the eighth grade.4 ' Even those who persisted in school struggled against
marginalization and exclusion from clubs, academic organizations, and extra-
curricular activities. Few ate in the school cafeteria. Others were steered into
work study programs, ostensibly for their own good, because they "needed the
money" and were not expected to be interested in school.414
One educational study showed that teachers devoted more time and
energy to Anglo children and "systematically ignored" Mexican Americans
in the same classrooms because the Euro-Americans were regarded as society's
future leaders, while the Mexican kids "might as well accept being led by
Anglos.,,415 "[H]igh ability classes were almost entirely filled with white
children.4 6 Some districts used federal money intended for minorities for
407. DONATO, supra note 16, at 62.
408. See id. at 63; CALIFORNIA STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ERIC No. ED025355, EDUCATION AND THE MEXICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY: A REPORT OF AN OPEN MEETING 7 (Apr. 1968).
409. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 62.
410. See id. at 66-67.
411. OSCAR LEWIS, FIVE FAMILIES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY
(1959); see also Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, SOCIETY, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 7. Lewis still adheres
to his culture of poverty thesis.
412. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 21-22 (noting the high number of books and masters' theses
written during this period that emphasized the uneducability of Mexican schoolchildren and urging
that they receive training for simple manual labor).
413. See id. at 67. Mexican children made up 22 percent of high school enrollments, but only
13 percent of them graduated. See id.
414. See id. at 67-69.
415. Id. at 70; see also Theodore Parsons, Ethnic Cleavage in a California School 296-97
(1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with authors).
416. DONATO, supra note 16, at 71.
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"tuxedos for high school proms and band uniforms." '417 Mexican American
schoolteachers were few. By 1968, Mexicans comprised 21 percent of
California's schoolchildren, but only 2.2 percent of its teachers.418 By the
mid-sixties, tracking was so obvious that Anglos virtually "had to be retarded"
to be placed in the practical sections.419 In the relatively few schools that
were ethnically integrated, "the social, cultural, and academic climates were
organized around an ideology so obvious that it became an insult to white
students to be placed in classes with Mexican American[s]. '420
In the 1960s, when Mexican parents did begin to assert their rights, to
bilingual schools for example, white parents became incensed and replied that
the Mexicans should either fit in or go back to Mexico. Some educational pro-
fessionals resisted structural reform on the ground that the dissatisfied Mexicans
were foreigners, even though many had resided in the area longer than their
white counterparts. They claimed that, as foreigners, the Mexicans should be
grateful because the schooling opportunities in California were superior to
those they enjoyed in Mexico."' When Lau v. Nichols422 compelled California
schools to offer bilingual education, some white parents resented the new
programs, even though their own children were not in them, and withdrew
their children from the schools. 43 By 1974, Mexican children in California
schools were even more isolated than blacks.424 Schools with a high proportion
of Mexican children suffered from "[i]nadequate resources, poor equipment,
and unfit building construction. Some wealthy communities pursued
deunification so that white children would not have to go to school with
children with last names like Ramirez and Gomez."6 Proposition 1, passed in
1979, amended the California Constitution to limit the use of mandatory
busing.427 The Civil Rights Commission found a high degree of segregation
417. Id. at 72 (citing D.B. Reed & D.E. Mitchell, The Structure of Citizen Participation: Public
Decisions for Public Schools, in PUBLIC TESTIMONY ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS: NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR CITIZENS IN EDUCATION 190 (Commission on Educ. Governance, 1975)).
418. See id. at 74.
419. Id. at 76 (citing DOUGLAS FOLEY, LEARNING CAPITALIST CULTURE: DEEP DOWN IN THE
HEART OFTEJAS 102 (1990)).
420. Id.
421. See id. at 80-81.
422. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
423. See DONATO, supra note 16, at 117-18.
424. See id. at 126.
425. Id. at 126 (citing GILBERT GONZALEZ, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF
SEGREGATION 21-22 (1990)).
426. See id. at 137-39.
427. See id. at 140; see also CAL. CONST. art., I. § 7 (1979) (codifying Proposition 1).
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in California, with one of the state's school districts being named as one of the
nation's most segregated.428
The Civil Rights Commission also found a high degree of isolation of
blacks in California schools. In a survey of enrollment during the 1965-1966
school year, nearly 40 percent of Los Angeles blacks attended schools that
were 99-100 percent black; in San Francisco, 21.1 percent of black students
did. It also found that racial isolation was increasing. In Oakland, almost
half of the black elementary schoolchildren were attending 90-100 percent
black schools in 1965, but five years earlier only 10 percent were doing so.
The Civil Rights Commission found that the causes of racial isolation were
complex, but all had their roots in racial discrimination sanctioned and even
encouraged by the government. As an example, it cited the way California
funded its schools, noting that suburban areas had at their disposition more
resources than city ones, a gap that government funding did not completely
close. 429 The funding gap, the commission found, directly disadvantaged
minority students.43
The report also pointed to site selection decisions as contributing to
California's racial segregation. For example, officials in Oakland opened
Skyline High School creating a "new senior high attendance district that
removed white high school students from a racially mixed to an all-white
school. Skyline High was situated in a white residential area... and it with-
drew white students from four other senior highs. 43 1 In San Francisco during
the 1950s, "capacity for approximately 2,400 elementary children was added
to the predominantly Negro schools in the Hunter's Point area. As a result,
three of the Hunter's Point schools were enlarged .... At the same time a new
elementary school.., was constructed within an adjacent white area., 432 The
new school opened with a nearly all-white student body. In another case,
San Francisco opened an elementary school in a white area eight blocks from
a predominantly black, overcrowded school in a black neighborhood. This
new school was planned to accommodate only 540 students and opened with
a nearly all-white enrollment, while overflow students from the black
school were bused fifteen blocks away to another school.4
428. See id. at 151.
429. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4, 8,
17, 27-29 (1967). Revenues per pupil from state sources increased 33.6 percent in the city and
63.1 percent in the suburbs. See id. at 29.
430. "When children are assigned to schools on the basis of residential proximity, rigid residential
segregation intensifies racial isolation in the schools." Id. at 31.
431. Id. at 45.
432. Id. at 46.
433. See id. at 46-47.
1576 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1521 (2000)
California's Racial History
In Oakland, school officials addressed increases in black enrollment at the
elementary level through the use of portable classrooms instead of by new• 434
construction. More probationary teachers were found in minority schools
than in wealthier white ones.435 Some districts allowed children living in an
"'optional" zone to choose between the school located in their area and one
in a nearby attendance area. School authorities manipulated these zones to
allow white parents to avoid sending their children to schools with too many
minorities.4 ' The Civil Rights Commission warned that racial isolation had
serious consequences for school performance: "[Tihe educational attainment
of an individual student is related both to his own social class and [that] of
his classmates., 437 The commission cited a study of Richmond, California,
in which a professor from the University of California at Berkeley found that
"social class was the single factor most closely related to the academic achieve-
ment of children in the early grades 438 and that the quality of teachers was
"the most important element in the quality of education schools offer." 9
B. The Role of California's Universities
Both public and private universities in California have played roles in
the state's unfolding racial history. In 1874, the state legislature adopted
compulsory education in "an act to enforce the educational rights of children,"
despite parents' objections that it interfered with their rights.44' At first, free
public schooling applied only to public elementary schools. In 1884, by
constitutional amendment, California became the first state to distribute text-
books, produced by the state printing office, for free. During this halcyon
period, California opened the first campus of the University of California sys-
tem in Berkeley.44'
Stanford University was conceived about the same time when the only
child of Leland and Jane L. Stanford died at a young age.42 These wealthy
parents decided to dedicate a university in their child's name for "the children
of California [who] would become the foster children of their love.4 43 The
434. See id. at 50.
435. See id.; Jennifer Kerr, ACLU Sues California Over Schools, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA
(Colo.), May 19, 2000, at 7A (noting a lawsuit alleging "appalling" conditions at schools attended
by minority and poor students).
436. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 429, at 52-54.
437. Id. at 77.
438. Id. at 81.
439. Id. at 93.
440. RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 58, at 239.
441. See id. at 240-42.
442. See id. at 241.
443. Id.
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Stanfords dedicated their large farm in Palo Alto and a substantial portion
of their fortune, which would have become their son's inheritance. Stanford
University opened in 1891 with 559 students, nearly twice the enrollment
of Berkeley.444
A semiofficial history of the University of California, by Verne A.
Stadtman, details the early years, the role of the Morrill Act of 1862, which
offered land grant endowments to the states for agricultural colleges, and
the role of six ex officio regents in setting up the fledgling university system.445
It describes the formation of the academic senate in the 1870s, 4 6 the political
turbulence of the early period,44 and the era of relatively powerless presi-
dents.448 It details the university's slow expansion to include a college of phar-
macy and one of law in San Francisco449 and later one of veterinary science
located in that city as well.450 It reports the role of farmers' institutes,451 estab-
lishment of the university farm in Berkeley,452 later moved to Davis, and the
growth of fraternities, sororities, and student government.453 It describes noodle-
454eating contests and water fights between student groups. It discusses the uni-
versity's steady growth between the world wars,455 the university's emergence
as a research powerhouse during the Cold War 456 and the loyalty oath contro-
versy. It describes the Clark Kerr era as one of "planning,4 58 and the advent
of the liberated students and "the Berkeley rebellion" in the sixties and
the seventies.459 It ends with the university today in a period of "change
and ... evolving purpose. 460
What the book is conspicuously devoid of is any serious discussion of race,
class, or life and death struggles over affirmative action. Although California
colleges and universities have had a long and complicated relationship with
these issues, one could hardly tell by looking at official sources and docu-
ments. Berkeley's world class history department in recent times has only
444. See id.
445. See VERNE A. STADTMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: 1868-1968 (1970).
446. See id. at 52-54.
447. See id. at 54-59, 68-70.
448. See id. at 88-106.
449. See id. at 130-33.
450. See id. at 135-36.
451. See id. at 148-49.
452. See id. at 141-54.
453. See id. at 161-66, 171-73, 185-86.
454. See id. at 163-66, 168-70.
455. See id. at 193-238.
456. See id. at 301-61.
457. See id. at 319-39.
458. See id. at 376-400.
459. See id. at 425-74.
460. Id. at 497-510.
included one historian, Walton Bean, whose primary intellectual interest
was the history of California; after his retirement, his courses in California
history often have been covered by part-time or visiting professors.
6 ' If one
goes, as we did, to the world-famous Bancroft Library and asks for histories
of the university emphasizing minority rights and political struggle, one is
apt to be told that such books do not exist, or at any rate will not be found
in the collection.462 In short, the University of California system, on an
institutional level, appears to pay little attention to the history of its own
interaction with California's minority communities.
But that interaction, though largely unwritten, has indeed taken place.
By piecing together accounts from many different sources, including archival
materials, the following story emerges.
1. The University's Early Years
For the first seventy years of its existence, the University of California
seems to have been nearly all white.4
63 In a memoir of his period in Berkeley
during the 1930s, sociologist Robert Nisbet describes the campus as "99.99
percent white 4 64 and says, "I didn't know or know of a single American-
born black student at Berkeley in the thirties.
4 65 Moreover, Nisbet writes,
Berkeley was satisfied with that situation. If anyone had proposed affirmative
measures to improve minority enrollment, the idea "would have been rejected
at just about every hand, student and faculty irrespective of political or social
ideology, or anything else. 466
Thirty years later in 1964, a decade after Brown v. Board of Education,"'
nine years after the civil disobedience of Rosa Parks, and a year after Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech, Berkeley's Boalt
461. See Interview with James J. Rawls, professor of history and author of a leading text on
California history, in Sonoma, Cal. (Aug. 3, 1999).
462. See Telephone Interview with Archivist, Bancroft Library, University of California at
Berkeley (July 26, 1999). Similarly, we were told the Bancroft collection contains nothing on
Arthur Jensen or the controversy over race-l.Q. research. See id.
463. See Jerome Karabel, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action at the University of California,
1-2, 9 n.23 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Rise and Fall
of Affirmative Action]. For a shortened version without all of the tables, see Jerome Karabel, The
Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action at the University of California, 25 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.
109 (1999).
464. ROBERT NISBET, TEACHERS AND SCHOLARS: A MEMOIR OF BERKELEY IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR 61 (1992).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 64; see also Anthony M. Platt, Confessions of a Model Meritocrat, 25 SOC. J. 129,
134 (1999) (pointing out that this situation prevailed well into the middle years of the century).
467. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Hall School of Law did not graduate a single black student.468 For its part,
UCLA's school of medicine, founded in 1951, graduated its first class in 1955.
Between then and 1968, 764 students graduated as physicians;469 of these, not
a single one was black or Hispanic. 40 Two of the state's premier schools of law
and medicine thus remained effectively segregated as late as 1964, when a short-
lived era of affirmative action began.
Earlier, the University of California at Berkeley's (Cal's) admissions
process appears to have been based almost entirely on grades, recommenda-
tions, and family connections.471 Our review of admissions committee minutes
going back to the 1940s and 1950s shows that the admissions office kept
close track of the performance of graduates of vast numbers of California
high schools, public and private. 2 It did the same with transfer applicants from
other universities such as Stanford or St. Mary's College. These schools were
assigned a correction factor based on the performance of their students once
enrolled at Cal. A positive factor meant that the sending school was rigorous
and that its graduates performed better at Cal than they had done at the
previous school. 3 A negative factor meant that the grades from the sending
school were "soft"-a student with a 3.7 grade point average might only
earn on average 3.0 at Cal. This system greatly disadvantaged Catholic and
inner city schools, whose graduates were predicted to do poorly at Cal, even
if they had near perfect averages at their previous schools.
2. The Advent of Standardized Testing
By the mid-1930s, testing by the College Entrance Examination Board
(College Board) played a large part in determining scholarship recipients at Ivy
League schools.474 In the late nineteenth century, an oral subject exam, as well
as the high school principal's recommendation, had loomed large in a student's
468. See Karabel, Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, supra note 463, at 1 ("Table 1: Racial
Composition of Boalt Hall Entrants Who Subsequently Graduated (1960-1969)").
469. See id.
470. See id. ("Table 2: Graduates of UCLA School of Medicine by Race (1955-1968)").
Karabel's figures do not include Asian Americans or Native Americans.
471. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
MERITOCRACY 171-72 (1999). Until 1963, the University of California operated an accredita-
tion system for California high schools. A student graduating with a B average from a school which
met the standards and requirements of the University of California plan would gain automatic admis-
sion to the university. See id.
472. See 3-10 University of Cal. (Sys.), Academic Senate, Board of Admissions and Relations
with Schools, Minutes 1920 May-1966 March (covering the period Apr. 1939-May 1961)
(University Archives, The Bancroft Library, Collection Number CU-9.01) [hereinafter Minutes].
473. See id.
474. See LEMANN, supra note 471, at 39-41.
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chances for acceptance to the University of California.475 Shortly thereafter,
written exams prepared and graded by the faculty were added.476 By the early
twentieth century, tests administered by the College Board began to be used.
By 1927, only College Board exams were used to determine a student's eligi-
bility for admission."7 By 1933, the principal's recommendation counted for
nearly nothing-only 1 percent of students were admitted on that basis.478
Standardized test scores, however, were apparently not required of all
applicants. According to Nicholas Lemann, they became mandatory only
in 1967.4" 9 The University of California, with its tens of thousand of
freshman admitted every year, was a much coveted plum for the Educational
Testing Services, because it would be the first large public university to use the
test.48 Brown had been decided only a decade earlier,48' so that the
University of California must have had in mind the flood of black and
Hispanic high school graduates that would be coming. Standardized testing, of
course, resonated well with Clark Kerr and the era of managerialism, 4 82 as
well as with the Master Plan,483 under which California sought to provide
475. See, e.g., 6 Minutes 1951 December, § 4: Subject Requirements and Admissions to the
University of California (noting how freshman admitted from accredited high schools to the university
with a recommendation from the principal of the high school).
476. See id. The principal was to verify that the student has passed subject requirements. See id.
477. See id. The principal's power began to wane, having at this time only the right but not
the requirement to recommend a student. See id.
478. See id.
479. See LEMANN, supra note 471, at 171. Ironically, this decision coincided with the firing of
Clark Kerr, a strong proponent of testing and elitism in higher education, after failing, his conser-
vative accusers charged, to control unruly student demonstrations. See id. at 168-7 1.
480. See id. at 104-05. Though the University of California became the first public university
member of the College Board in 1947, the Board bent the rules for the University so that it would
not have to require the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), but could only use it experimentally.
Henry Chauncey, however, had set his sights on the day, were the University of California ever to
require all its applicants to take the SAT, which would make the University of California the
Educational Testing Service's (ETS) biggest single customer and establish ETS as the prime organi-
zation in the fledging testing industry. See id.
On University of California's first discussions of whether to make testing mandatory for all appli-
cants, see Minutes, supra note 472, May 12, 1955, at 15, 19.
481. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
482. See LEMANN, supra note 471, at 131-36. In the decade prior to Kerr's installation as presi-
dent of the University of California, standardized tests had been used primarily for out of state appli-
cants. But'with mandatory testing, the wealthy gained a huge edge, as parents learned to pay for
test and essay writing coaches and crash courses. See id.; see also id. at 27 (noting that SAT scores
correlate about as well with family income as with scholastic performance); Kenneth R. Weiss, More
Rich Kids Get to Take Extra Time on SAT, DENVER POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 2A (noting how wealthy,
suburban test takers documented reading disorders to gain extra time on standardized tests).
483. One of Clark Kerr's greatest achievements, the Master Plan, divided California higher
education into three tiers. See LEMANN, supra note 471, at 121-39; STADTMAN, supra note 445,
at 392-95. The University of California campuses would educate the top eighth of California's
high school graduates; the Cal State system, the top third; and the community college system
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educational opportunities, in a highly stratified system, for every qualified
applicant. Might it be that the University of California's embrace of
mandatory standardized testing, after years of resistance, was partially
designed as a bulwark against too many minorities4S--r that, even earlier,
the Master Plan was designed to provide a safe haven of elite, state-
sponsored schools for California's white leaders and their children?485
3. Affirmative Action Arrives on the Scene
If so, it did not last for long. Increasing public pressure and internal recog-
nition of the need to educate minority leaders quickly led to two periods of
affirmative action. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the University of California
engaged in "soft" affirmative action, primarily through outreach and recruit-
everybody else. In fact, the system ended up distinctively color- and class-coded, with upper-income
whites attending University of California campuses, ethnic whites and some minorities in the Cal State
system, and a few blue collar whites and many minorities at the community colleges. See COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF THE MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUC., THE MASTER PLAN RENEWED: UNITY,
EQUITY, QUALITY, AND EFFICIENCY IN CALIFORNIA POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 12-17 (1987)
[hereinafter MASTER PLAN RENEWED]; LEMANN, supra note 471, at 135-37; STADTMAN, supra note
445, at 395; see also HENDRICK, supra note 280, at 65 (noting how the Master Plan, which featured
differentiation of mission, also differentiated people. In 1968, Mexicans made up only 1.6 percent
of the student body at the University of California campuses, by 1972 only 4.8 percent. Blacks went
from 2.1 to only 5.2 percent; Asians, 5.2 to 8.3 percent; then, the percentage even declined for blacks,
as a result of the Bakke decision); Patrick M. Callan, California's Master Plan for Higher Education, in THE
OECD, THE MASTER PLAN AND THE CALIFORNIA DREAM 79-83 (Sheldon Rothblatt ed., 1992)
(pointing out that the Cal State system's leadership proved unimaginative so that even those less
elite campuses produced few minorities as late as 1970-1980); William Zumeta & Priscilla Wohlstetter,
Higher Education at the Crossroads, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY: A BOOK OF
READINGS 366, 367-69, 372-74 (James J. Rawls ed., 1988) (noting how minorities fared poorly under
the Master Plan and the programs designed to implement it). Relatively few community college students
succeeded in transferring to University of California campuses, see MASTER PLAN RENEWED,
supra, at 12, and the community colleges currently serve minorities more than they serve any
other population. See id. at 12-13 (noting that about 80 percent of California blacks who attend
college in California attend a community college); see also BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 391, at
211 (noting that the community colleges' purpose is to "cool out" students' expectations); Jack
Citrin, The Legacy of the Tax Revolt, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA HISTORY: A BOOK OF
READINGS, supra, at 358, 359-73 (noting how under the Master Plan, few minorities succeeded in
transferring from community colleges to University of California campuses, and how their "college
admissions and graduation rates ... have remained scandalously low").
484. See Letter from H.Y. McCown, Registrar and Dean of Admissions, University of Texas,
to Logan Wilson, President, University of Texas (May 26, 1954) (on file with authors) ("In view
of the recent Supreme Court decision, I think we should take a new look at our admission policy
with reference to Negro students .... If we want to exclude as many Negro undergraduates as
possible, we could require ... [and going on to list some onerous requirements]").
485. See MASTER PLAN RENEWED, supra note 483, at 17 (pointing out, delicately, that the
Master Plan seemingly did not contemplate a place for California's growing ethnic population).
On the very slight predictive value of standardized tests and their devastating impact on minority
admissions, see Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important
Thing, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 993, 993 (1999).
1583
ment. When this did not produce high enough numbers, "hard" affirmative
action, which included the use of race as a plus factor in admissions, began in
1968. Within a year, blacks and Latinos constituted 15 percent of entrants to
the UCLA law school and 8 percent to Boalt Hall law school and the UCLA
medical school.486 According to sociologist Jerome Karabel, the "sharp rise was a
direct product of the adoption-under the pressure of the riots that shook
America's cities in 1967 and 1968-of strong affirmative action policies.
Pointing out that these changes took place well over a decade after the
Montgomery bus boycott, but shortly after the 1967 riots in Newark and Detroit
and the 1968 riots that swept many American cities in the wake of Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s assassination, Karabel hypothesized that it was not so much the
civil rights movement's moral claims as the palpable threat to existing order that
produced the softening of official attitudes at the University of California.48
8
The university's era of affirmative action was to last a scant twenty-seven
years-barely one generation. On July 20, 1995, the University of California
Regents enacted SP-1, banning any consideration of race or ethnicity in
admissions.4 9 Sixteen months later, in a vote sharply divided along racial lines,
Californians approved Proposition 209, codifying the Regents' directive and
extending it to all public employers in California.49°
4. Affirmative Action Ends and Minority Numbers Plummet
Enrollment of blacks and Latinos at Boalt Hall dropped dramatically
from 21 percent in 1995 to 5.6 percent in 1997, the year immediately after
the passage of SP-1 and Proposition 209.49' Not since 1967 had the number
of minority matriculants been so low.492 Proposition 209 and the Regent's
directive succeeded in turning the clock back thirty years. At UCLA School
of Law, the impact was almost as dramatic. Blacks and Latinos had comprised
486. See Karabel, Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, supra note 463, at 1-3 ('Table 1: Racial Com-
poition of Boalt Hall Entrants Who Subsequently Graduated (1960-1969);" "Table 3: Entrants to UCLA
School of Medicine by Race (1965-1980);" "Table 4: Entrants to UCLA Law by Race (1967-1980)").
487. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
488. See id. at 4.
489. See id.
490. See supra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
491. See Karabel, Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, supra note 463, at 5 ("Table 5: Entrants
to Boalt Hall School of Law (1970-1999)") (again, Karabel's figures do not include other groups). Just
a few years earlier, the Republicans led a successful movement to raise tuition at University of California
schools, a measure that dropped minority enrollment almost as sharply, if not quite so publicly. See
also The 1990's: How Racial Conservatives Are Closing the Door on Black Opportunities in Higher Education,
24 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 10, 10-11 (1999) [hereinafter The 1990's].
492. See Karabel, Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, supra note 463, at 1 ("Table 1: Racial
Composition of Boalt Hall Entrants Who Subsequently Graduated (1960-1969)").
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over 18 percent of the entering class in 1995; two years later, their numbers
dropped to slightly over 12 percent, the lowest point since 1968.49' The
impact on blacks and Latinos at the University of California's five medical
schools was similar to that sustained by the law schools.494
At the undergraduate level, the impact of Proposition 209 registered most
dramatically at the system's most selective campuses, Berkeley and UCLA,
where numbers plummeted about 50 percent in a one-year period.495 The less
prestigious campuses either remained about the same or showed increases in
black and Latino enrollment.4 96 As Karabel sums up, "Taken together, the
declines in black and Chicano enrollment at UC's law, medical, and under-
graduate schools in the wake of Proposition 209, while not uniform, in the
aggregate constitute perhaps the sharpest reversal in opportunities for under-
represented minorities in the history of American higher education."'497
Did the University of California's embrace of testing in the early 1960s,
which in turn required an open and public embrace of affirmative action a few
years later to preserve any sort of minority presence, set the stage for this
rapid decline? Before answering this question, it is first necessary to under-
stand the parts played by Clark Kerr, managerialism, and the California Master
Plan-matters covered later. First, however, it is worth taking a brief look at
some of the conditions that prevailed on California campuses during the
relatively short period when affirmative action was in effect.
5. Campus Unrest
During the period when affirmative action prevailed, California's
universities for the first time included significant numbers of students of
493. See id. at 5 ("Table 4: Entrants to UCLA Law by Race (1967-1980);" "Table 6: Entrants
to UCLA Law by Race (1981-1998)").
494. See id. at 6 ("Table 7: Entrants to UC Medical Schools Systemwide by Race (1993-
1997)"). Indeed, low minority numbers at UC Davis Medical School prompted the school to establish
a quota-based affirmative action plan that was struck down in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
495. See id. at 7-8 ("At Berkeley... the number of African-American admits plummeted
from 545 to 236 between 1997 and 1998; for Chicanos, the comparable figures were 1033 and 455.").
Earlier, in September, 1990, the Republicans voted for increases in tuition, which dropped black
enrollment sharply. See The 1990's, supra note 491, at 10-11. And even earlier, in 1973, Boalt Hall
had scaled back minority enrollment from 34 to 25 percent. See ANDREA GUERRERO, THE SILENCE
AT BOALT HALL (forthcoming 2000) (on file with authors).
496. See Karabel, Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, supra note 463, at 8.
497. Id. at 9. On the meaning of this displacement downward ("cascading"), see Adam Cohen,
When the Field is Level, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 30; Carlos Mufioz, The Nonstop Attack on UC's Ethnic
Studies, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 11, 2000, at A21; Harry Pachon, The Real Numbers Offer Nothing to
Cheer About, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2000, at B5; Jeffrey Selingo, U. of California Sees Increase in Minority
Applicants Admitted, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 14,2000) <http://www.chronicle.com/report/weekly>.
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color.498 Their arrival coincided with a sharp increase in the number of hate
crimes and other incidents of racial discrimination that made life difficult
for many minority students and faculty on campus. These incidents included
derogatory theme parties sponsored by Greek organizations, defacement of
property belonging to ethnic student organizations or individuals, racially
biased coverage or content in campus newspapers and radio shows, threats
directed at faculty members and students of color, and discriminatory treat-
ment of ethnic minorities by faculty members and administrators.499
Racial and ethnic tension in the University of California system became
so palpable that in 1989, California Senator Art Torres, chairman of the
California Senate Special Committee on University of California Admissions
(the Committee), convened a hearing on the subject.00 The San Francisco
Chronicle summarized the proceedings in the following terms: "Minority
students ... portrayed the University of California as a minefield of racist
slights, attacks and indifference that leaves them humiliated, frustrated and
never quite sure of their place in the system."' 0' Student leaders also charged
that university administrators were aware of these conditions and did little
to counter them or to make minorities feel welcome,0 ' charges that few uni-
versity officials admitted.5 3
The Committee asked each campus to submit reports detailing each racial
or ethnic incident that it knew about during 1985 to 1988, as well as what
498. See supra notes 486-488 and accompanying text.
499. See Craig Anderson, 600 Students at UC Rally Protest Racism, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7,
1987, at A2 (noting the negative and hostile environment); Bill Billiter, University President Accused
of Evading Meeting on Metzger, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1986, at 1 (noting the racially biased coverage
or content in campus newspapers and radio shows); Larry Gordon, UC Libraries Quit NASA
Databank in Rules Dispute, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1988, at 3 (noting the inappropriate treatment of
ethnic minorities by faculty members and administrators); Debra Levi, Housing Office Occupied-
Blacks Sit In at UC Berkeley, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 1988, at A2 (noting the defacement of property
belonging to ethnic student organizations or individuals); Gary Robbins, Charges of Racism at UCI:
Use of Blackface in Skits Draws Criticism, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 5, 1988, at B1 (noting
derogatory theme parties by Greek houses); Student Editor Sues, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 11,
1988, at A3 (noting racially biased coverage or content in campus newspapers and radio shows); Letta
Taylor, Racial Woes Reportedly Rife on Campus, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 28, 1987, at A3
(noting threats directed at faculty and students of color); Elaine Woo, UCLA to Probe Racial Melee
Over Campus Election, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1988, at 1 (noting inappropriate treatment of ethnic
minorities by faculty members and administrators).
500. See Racial/Ethnic Tensions and Hate Violence on Univ. of Cal. Campuses: Hearings Before
the Senate Special Comm. on Univ. of Cal. Admissions, S. REP. (Cal. 1989) [hereinafter Hearings].
501. Diane Curtis, UC is a Minefield of Racism, Minorities Tell Senate Panel, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
5, 1988, at All.
502. See Larry Gordon, Panel Told of Race, Sex Bias at UC Campuses, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1988,
at 113.
503. See Shana Chandler & Tina Anima, Hearing Examines Racism, UCLA DAILY BRUIN,
Oct. 5, 1988, at 12.
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was done and what procedures were put in place to deal with future incidents."0 4
The Committee's summary spanned forty pages and listed hundreds of inci-
dents at the nine University of California campuses, including insensitive
fraternity theme parties, rampant homophobia, and mock slave auctions.
Dorm residents proudly hung Confederate flags on walls, and campus areas
sprouted graffiti bearing swastikas and Ku Klux Klan emblems. Derogatory
flyers appeared at campus libraries, halls, and eating areas.0 5 The Committee
heard testimony about sexist teaching, jokes about Mexicans in the university
shuttle bus, the beating of a Chicano in a parking lot, a racist letter to a
black food service manager, racial epithets written on dorm windows or
message pads, and refusal to fund an Asian American dance, when other
groups received funding, because a student committee saw it as exclusion-
ary. An anti-Semitic poster advertised a campus concert, and some whites
made a conspicuous show of leaving campus bathrooms when a minority
entered. Twenty-five members of an Aryan youth union inserted a racist
letter in the campus newspaper, while other campus papers printed racially
insensitive cartoons.508
Minority professors with good records were denied tenure, and depart-
ments resisted hiring more."' A kiosk containing copies of Ha'am, a Jewish
student publication, was burned.5 ' An instructor turned away a black student
who showed up the first day of class, alleging that she was unqualified.5 9
Minorities were significantly underrepresented on key student affairs commit-
tees, while at the provost and vice chancellor levels, many campuses had no
Asians or Chicanos.510
In the wake of the Committee's report, the University of California took
few remedial measures; indeed, California's legislature in 1989 greatly increased
university tuition, which sharply reduced minority numbers. In the summer
of 1990, the California Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commission
held a second set of hearings on bigotry and violence on college campuses
in California. Their report, which included campuses other than just those
504. See Hearings, supra note 500, at 53.
505. See Letter from Art Torres, Chairman Special Committee on University of California
Admissions, to Interested Party (May 15, 1989), cited in Hearings, supra note 500, at 2.
506. See Hearings, supra note 500, at 14, 25, 31-33.
507. See id. at 12; see also Professor Roberto P. Haro, Campus Climate: Perceptions and Reality,
in University of California, Berkeley Commission on Responses to a Changing Student Body:
Records of the Commission, 1987-1990, Box 2, Folder 38 (University Archives, The Bancroft
Library, Collection Number CU-156) (pointing out revolving-door syndrome in which the University
of California recruited minority professors and then let them wither for lack of support).
508. See Hearings, supra note 500, at 17.
509. See id. at 4. The instructor later apologized. See id.
510. See id. at 58.
511. See The 1990's, supra note 491, at 10.
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of the University of California system, drew attention to many of the same
patterns of racism and indifference that the Torres committee found, including
that the year 1988 alone witnessed a 60 percent increase in ethnoviolence
on California campuses. The regional director of the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice attributed the rise to the increase in numbers of Hispanics and Asians, gen-
eralized insensitivity on the part of universities to minority concerns, and
low numbers of minority faculty. A rabbi reported increasing numbers of anti-
Semitic incidents, including that of a student leader who had won election
to the student governing council but was not allowed to take his seat because
of his pro-Zionist activities.512 A Berkeley African American representative
testified that students and faculty complained openly about blacks appearing
in curricular materials and also stated that blacks were frequently beaten by
whites after parties ended. When whites and blacks got into fights, only the
blacks were arrested, never the whites."' Another African American student
officer testified that the administration was unresponsive and regarded racism
as tolerable. Insulting minority professors was viewed as no big deal."4
An attorney for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund reported that bulletin boards at Hastings College of the Law featured
white supremacist literature and caricatures5"5 and that Boalt Hall School of
Law had justified its inability to hire minority or female professors on the
ground that it could not find any who "think like lawyers."5 '6 In a bizarre
incident, Berkeley staff, who supposedly had undergone sensitivity training,
placed decorations on cafeteria food during Mardi Gras showing a black
mule driver pulling a white couple. When black students complained, cafeteria
managers replied they could see nothing wrong with the decorations and
warned the students to leave them alone.
512. See CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FAIR
AND OPEN ENVIRONMENT? BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES IN CALIFORNIA,
SUMMARY REPORT 5-7 (1991) [hereinafter BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE] (noting that other incidents
included desecration of religious symbols, graffiti, hate literature, and harassment).
513. See id. at 8 (reporting "many cases of fights breaking out at other fraternity parties that
are held mainly by Caucasian individuals and [that] the response by the police has never been this
way. I think this is directly reflective of how people feel about black students." (statement by
Lance Johnson, African Students Association, University of California at Berkeley)).
514. See id. at 8-9.
515. See id.
516. Id. Other departments cited the "small pool" of minority candidates as an excuse for
inaction-yet ads generated a long list of potential hires on short notice. Still others excused
their poor hiring records by saying that minorities would find the quality of life low in Berkeley, and
so efforts to recruit them would be futile. See The Challenge of Increasing Faculty Diversity at
Berkeley 3-5 (1989), in University of California, Berkeley Commission on Responses to a Changing
Student Body: Records of the Commission, 1987-1990, Box 2, Folder 39 (University Archives,
The Bancroft Library, Collection Number CU-156) (a report of a departmental survey conducted
by the Provost's Academic Affirmative Council).
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The American Indian Student Association representative reported
that alienation and a torrent of negative remarks from professors and students
caused a high proportion of his group to drop out before graduation. He
described a "brilliant Indian doctoral student" who failed an exam for an
M.A.; later, when she compared her answers to those of others who had
passed, she noticed that they were the same. When she pointed this out to
the professor who graded the exam, he told her that he needed to toughen
her to prepare her for the hard times she would face in mainstream society.
Other Indians complained of bogus "box checking" by individuals who exag-
gerated or fabricated their Indian heritage.517
Other groups experienced similar problems. When the University of
California added a rural preference program, Asians complained that their
population was 98 percent urban and thus likely to be almost entirely
excluded."8 The executive director of the Latino Issues Forum, a coalition
of Latino and Mexican American groups, said that the top governance
positions within the University of California were not awarded to Latinos
and blacks" 9 and that in 1987, Chicano-Latino faculty represented only 2.3
percent of the university professoriate and 3 percent of the management
and professional program, a career development track at the University of
California.52 °
6. Campus Responses-Two Examples
In the late 1980s, the Berkeley campus was concerned about women
and minority professors, hired in the heyday of affirmative action, who were
coming up for tenure. Many were being turned down, predictably causing
heartache for the faculty members and unrest among the students. Accord-
ingly, a faculty committee addressed this subject, publishing a booklet of advice
for women and minority faculty. 2' The advice included publishing only in
517. See BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 512, at 9-10, 12. For a discussion of overinclu-
siveness in admissions, see generally John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of Overinclusion
in Affirmative Action Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 49 (1995).
518. See BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE, supra note 512, at 12.
519. See LATINO REPORT CARD ON THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 6 (prepared by Latino
Issues Forum, American G.I. Forum, Mexican American Political Association, League of United
Latin American Citizens, 1988) [hereinafter LATINO REPORT CARD] ("The University rates an F-
for having no Hispanics among its top 100 administrators, who earn an average salary of well over
$100,000 a year.... The Report Card also notes that none of the University's leaders (Vice Presidents,
Vice Chancellors and higher) is Hispanic."); see also infra notes 529-538 and accompanying text
(discussing this report).
520. See id. at 7.
521. Advancement and Promotion at UC Berkeley, Committee on the Status of Women
and Ethnic Minorities (Fall 1987), in University of California, Berkeley Commission on Responses
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the most prestigious journals in one's field, never in activist or community-
oriented publications," shutting the door to one's office, so that students
would not be tempted to disturb one's work,523 and strategic schmoozing, in
which the untenured minority or woman would get to know influential white
male figures in the department, flatter them, and seek their advice.524 The
booklet urged women and faculty of color to avoid the trap of community
service or agreeing to serve on too many university committees.525 It also
warned against coauthoring publications526 and urged that aspiring professors
document every single favorable remark or mention about their work and send
a note to their department chairs. "If someone who is influential gives you
some oral praise, try to get a letter in your file.... If you receive a 'feeler' about
a job, keep a complete record." '27 Young professors were urged to check their
own citation count from time to time.52' The booklet, in short, advised women
and minorities how to behave like self-centered, alienated, calculating
upward climbers.
Published a short time later, the Latino Report Card on the University of
California529 (Report Card), prepared by the Latino Issues Forum, rated the
university "based upon data secured exclusively from University records.5 30
The Report Card relied on the grading standards set forth by University of
California president David Pierpont Gardner in his National Commission
on Excellence in Education report, A Nation at Risk.5"' The Report Card con-
cluded that "the University of California has flunked its own test and has failed
to a Changing Student Body: Records of the Commission, 1987-1990, Box 2, Folder 29 (University








529. See LATINO REPORT CARD, supra note 519, at 6. The Latino Issues Forum was an "activist
California-based think tank whose Board of Directors include[d] the largest Hispanic membership
organizations in California and four of the state's leading Latino scholars." Id. at 4.
530. Id. at 3.
531. See id. This 1983 report stated:
We do not believe that a public commitment to excellence and educational reform must be
made at the expense of a strong public commitment to the equitable treatment of our diverse
population. The twin goals of equity and high-quality schooling have profound and practical
meaning for our economy and society, and we cannot permit one to yield to the other,
either in principle or in practice. To do so would deny young people their chance to learn
to live according to their aspiration and ability. It also would lead to a generalized accom-
modation to mediocrity in our society on the one hand or the creation of an undemocratic
elitism on the other.
Id. at 3-4.
to meet both its general educational obligation as required by the state legislature,
and the legitimate needs and aspirations of California's six million Hispanics,
a population larger than that of many Central American nations." ' After
evaluating the university's hiring record, the Report Card gave the regents a
grade of F minus for including zero Hispanics in a total of 122 staff members
hired over the period reviewed. It also gave the university a grade of F
minus for employment of top administrators-a perfect zero out of one hun-
dred. The faculty received a somewhat better grade of F for including 202
Hispanics out of a total of 8581 teachers.533 Undergraduate and graduate
enrollment rated a C minus and a D, respectively.534 The report also flagged
the University of California's failure to do business with Hispanics, noting
that for a recent fiscal year, while it awarded almost three quarters of a bil-
lion dollars in private purchasing contracts, less than five million dollars went
to Hispanic-owned businesses.535
The report recommended a freeze on the salaries of all persons occupying
positions at or above the level of vice president or vice chancellor "based upon
the well-accepted [maxim] that poor performance should not be rewarded," '536
and also recommended that the University be required to set five year goals
in all the areas found deficient in the report. 37 It also urged enactment of a
"Latino Master Plan for the Twenty-First Century" to ensure that "California's
six million Hispanics receive at least as much support as a few dozen giant
agribusinesses received from the university's agricultural mechanization
research, including its 'Super Tomato' effort.""53
7. Recent Developments
Beginning in the year 2001, the University of California will guarantee
a place for the top 4 percent of graduating students from each of the state's
532. Id. at 4.
533. See id. at 6-7.
534. Undergraduate Hispanic enrollment was 10,244 out of a total number of 117,216 for a
percentage of 8.7; the 2076 Hispanic graduate students made up 5.2 percent of the total number of
40,115. See id.
535. Id. at 8, 15 ("Between July 1, 1986 and July 1, 1987, the University awarded $747,681,906
in purchasing contracts to all suppliers. But Hispanic businesses received only $4,993,861, or .67
percent, of these University contracts."); see also id. at 20 app. B ("Results of Affirmative Action
in Purchasing Universitywide (excluding DOE Laboratories")).
536. See id. at 10. The recommended freeze would apply to about 65 administrators earning
over $100,000. See id.
537. The recommendations were that the student body and the top 336 administrators reflect
the diversity of the state, and that the faculty achieve 40 percent of parity. See id.
538. Id. at 11. On the "super (square) tomato" see infra notes 615, 636 and accompanying text.
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863 public high schools. 39 Patterned after a similar measure adopted by the
Texas legislature in the wake of Hopwood, the plan hopes to increase the
number of minority students admitted, although Berkeley, UCLA, and San
Diego, the three most prestigious campuses in the system, will probably see
little change. 4
Jesus Rios, a student who was in the top 4 percent of his class when he
graduated from high school but was refused admission to Berkeley, filed an
action on behalf of himself and more than 750 Latino, black, and Filipino
students.54' The complaint pointed out that more than half of the applicants
admitted to Berkeley come from only 5 percent of California's high schools.542
These top high schools have primarily white enrollments and offer a number
of advanced placement courses for which Berkeley gives extra credit. Conse-
quently, an applicant who took many such courses could end up with a grade
point average considerably higher than 4.0."' In contrast, over 50 percent
of California's public high schools offer no advanced placement courses,
which are very costly.54  Recent information showed that Berkeley rejected
800 African American and Hispanic students with perfect 4.0 grade point
545averages.
A literature search disclosed that in the last few years numerous female
and minority employees of the University of California, or applicants for
such positions, settled or won substantial awards for various types of discrimi-
natory treatment.546 A campaign to end the Department of Ethnic Studies
539. See Why the "4 Percent Solution" Won't Restore Racial Diversity at Selective California Campuses,
24 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 25 (1999).
540. See id.
541. See Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. CV99-0525 SI (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999);
see also Nat Hentoff, Discrimination by Parental Income, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 13, 1999,
at B-6:1,7,8; B-8:2,3.
542. See Rios, No. CV99-0525 #SI.
543. See Hentoff, supra note 541; Dan Carnevale, ACLU Sues California over Unequal Access
to Advanced Placement Courses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 9f 3 (Aug. 8, 1999) <http://chronicle.com/
weekly/v45/i48/48a03802.html>. The University of California system adds one grade point for an
Advanced Placement (AP) course, so that a high school student who took a large number of AP
courses could earn a grade point average of well above 4.0.
544. See generally Sara Hebel, A.P. Courses are New Target in Struggle Over Access to College
in California, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 26, 1999, at A32.
545. See Ronald Takaki, Letter to the Editor, On Admissions, More Inequality, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1999, at A16.
546. Numerous suits were filed: Taylor v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1993) (describing how a plaintiff brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that
the complaint was filed beyond the statute of limitations); Vaughn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
504 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (describing how eleven present and former employees brought
sex and race discrimination actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Acueia v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 56 Cal. App. 4th 639 (1997) (describing how an unsuccessful applicant for tenured
position sued for alleged violations based on race, ethnicity, and age); Carrillo v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., No. B105848, 1997 WL 913107 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1997) (describing how a former
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at the Berkeley campus stalled when students went on a hunger strike and
forced the administration to provide that department with a guarantee of its
continuation and several new faculty positions.547 But faculty opposition con-
tinues, and Regent Ward Connerly has declared his adamant opposition to
ethnic studies, which he considers an inferior area of academic inquiry and
a refuge for student radicals.548
C. Official Elitism: The University of California System's Role
in the Creation of a Caste-Based Structure of Knowledge
In addition to displaying indifference or outright hostility to minorities
at various points in its history, the University of California and state intel-
lectuals generally contributed to the development of a paradigm, or architec-
ture, of knowledge.549  This paradigm-virtually an intellectual Master
Plan-firmly excluded minorities as agents and interpreters of official knowl-
edge. It rationalized and justified a caste-based society. It also excused and
apologized for mistreatment of minorities by the white establishment.
Development of this paradigm included at least the following components:
(1) inattention to California history, especially vis- -vis minorities and the
University of California's role in advancing or impeding their educational
employee filed several FEHA claims); Ibarbia v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 191 Cal. App. 3d
1318 (1987) (describing how an unsuccessful applicant brought an employment discrimination
action based on national origin); Roberto Rodriguez, Clash of '95: After Three Year Delay, UC and
Chicano Professor Finally Get Trial Date, BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., July 27, 1995, at 27 (noting
how a Chicana professor filed charges of employment discrimination alleging that she was not
reappointed as chair of the Chicano studies department because of her outspoken support of another
Chicano professor's lawsuit against the university); Michelle Jeffers, Man Claims Discrimination at
Lab, VALLEY TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A4 (noting how a former employee sued for alleged race
discrimination); Daniel Yi, Regents Sued Over Race-Bias Claims, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1998, at B2
(noting how a white professor sued for breach of contract and wrongful termination alleging he was
fired for reporting an administrator's racially discriminatory remarks); see also RODOLFO F. ACUi&A,
SOMETIMES THERE IS NO OTHER SIDE: CHICANOS AND THE MYTH OF EQUALITY 211-12 (1998);
Roberto Rodriguez, UC Professor Wins Gender Discrimination Suit, BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., June
12, 1997, at 7; Clash of '95: After Three-Year Delay, UC and Chicano Professor Finally Get Trial Date,
12 BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., July 26, 1995, at 11.
547. See Elizabeth Martinez, Who's Cleansing Ethnic Studies? Z MAG., June 1999, at 31, 32-34.
548. See id. at 32; see also Carl C. Jorgensen, Ward Connerly: Guilty as Charged, 15 BLACK
ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 20, 1998, at 50.
549. See supra notes 461-462 and accompanying text; see also ACU&qA, supra note 51, at 71,
79-80, 90, 100-01, 121; Ralph Guzman, The Function of Anglo American Racism in the Political
Development of Chicanos, in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: RACE AND RACISM IN CALIFORNIA,
supra note 87, at 101, 104-08 (noting the role of University of California professors in stereotyp-
ing Chicanos as lazy); Wollenberg, Ethnic Experiences, supra note 87, at 5 (noting how a professor
supported segregation of Japanese and dismissed the treaty rights argument).
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aspirations;50 (2) testimony by academics and educators on the capabilities
of minority school children, the necessity of tracking, and the permissibility
of school segregation;" ' (3) exoneration of elite whites for moral missteps
affecting minorities; (4) an assault on ethnic studies as a legitimate aca-
demic discipline; 52 (5) a program of agricultural research that favored large
farms at the expense of small farm owners and Mexican migrant workers
and that emphasized heavy use of energy-consuming machinery, pesticides,
and genetically engineered plants and livestock;53 (6) an all-out attack on farm
unionization;151 (7) toleration, if not encouragement, of race-I.Q. research;
55
and (8) development of a language and vocabulary for discourse about minori-
ties that predisposed California society to see them as problem groups rather
than potential contributors to California culture and wealth.
556
At the same time, California universities forfeited minority social interests
in various tangible ways that contributed to the same paradigm of knowledge:
(1) by building campuses, especially elite ones, in white communities rather
than in areas with large minority populations;57 (2) by contributing as drafters
or supporters of various antiminority propositions and referenda; 558 (3) by
emphasizing liaisons with corporations and industry in ways that distorted
the research and teaching functions of the University of California, so as to
favor technology and the hard sciences over human and social develop-
ment;5 59 and (4) by acting in concert with towns earmarked for a new University
550. See supra notes 455-457 and accompanying text; see also Lustig, supra note 252, at 134
("Professors do not get hired or promoted for knowing about California .... ").
551. See supra notes 409-428 and accompanying text; see also GUERRERO, supra note 495, at 77
(noting how several Boalt Hall professors submitted a brief urging affirmance of Proposition 209 and
that none wrote in opposition to the proposition).
552. See, e.g., supra notes 546-548 and accompanying text; see also ACURaA, supra note 51,
at 49-70. In earlier periods, California textbook writers ignored problems of minorities, especially
discrimination by the majority culture, see HENDRICK, supra note 280, at 75.
553. See infra notes 636-645 and accompanying text.
554. See infra notes 624-625 and accompanying text.
555. See infra notes 576-594 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 387-428 and accompanying text; see also HENDRICK, supra note 280, at
30 (describing the initiative, backed by two University of California law professors, that would have
put California education on a voucher plan that would have decimated public education);
LEMANN, supra note 471, at 208-09 (noting that Clark Kerr, in Bakke, arranged for the Carnegie
Foundation to supply a paper defending standardized testing, a key means by which the University
of California enforced class and color lines).
557. See infra notes 564-565 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text.
559. See, e.g., DEAN C. JOHNSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: HISTORY AND ACHIEVE-
MENTS 1-2 (1996) (touting the University's partnership with industry); Sheila Slaughter, Federal
Policy and Supply-Side Institutional Resource Allocation at Public Research Universities, 21 REV. HIGHER
EDUC. 209 (1998) (describing this movement in general); Robert Berring, Is Berkeley Off Course?
CAL. MONTHLY, Feb. 1999, at 18-20.
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of California campus to clear out low-income minorities and pave the way
for the development of the surrounding community.
560
A number of these themes have been already covered in this Article.
For example, Part V describes how educators and education researchers
depicted Mexican Americans as a problem group, slow to learn, passive, and
uninterested in education, economic advance, higher culture, or vigorous
participation in American life.56 Part V also describes how a university regent,
abetted by his staff and hostile to university professors, launched a vitriolic
attack on ethnic studies, a discipline that both attracts many minorities and
seeks to understand and improve the condition of their communities.5 2 Part
IV describes the role of California academics in drafting and campaigning
for Proposition 209, which portrayed students and workers as undeserving
individuals clamoring for special treatment.63
Finally, both the University of California and the California State
University systems seem instinctively to grace attractive upper-class communi-
ties with new campuses when they decide to expand. University of California
at Berkeley, for example, is located in an attractive town, perched on a hill
overlooking San Francisco Bay,564 not the flats of that city, much less
downtown Oakland. The University of California campuses located at Santa
Barbara, Santa Cruz, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Davis are also located in
idyllic settings with very small minority populations. The simple location
of a campus sends a message to the world about whom the campus values
and sees itself as serving. California State University, Los Angeles is located
on a hill on one side of a freeway in a white middle-class neighborhood. If
it had been located on just the other side of the highway, it would have
been in the middle of a Chicano and mixed minority neighborhood. 65
560. See supra Part V.D.3.c.
561. See supra Part V.A.
562. See supra notes 546-548 and accompanying text.
563. See supra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
564. An early piece of Berkeley boosterism, A DESCRIPTION OF THE TOWN OF BERKELEY: WITH
A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESENTING THE NATURAL AND ACQUIRED ADVANTAGES OF
A MOST ATTRACTIVE PLACE OF RESIDENCE 5 (Albert Sutliffe comp., 1881), praises that campus
town in extravagant terms. The university had come to the town just a few years earlier, yet:
"The population .... is select and homogeneous, characteristics which it will hereafter always
maintain .... The learned professor lives in a trellised cottage .... The air of refinement and
good keeping.., evinces a local pride that animates the entire population." Id. The prediction was
right: Berkeley was characterized by residential and school segregation well into the mid-twentieth
century. See GABRIELLE S. MORRIS, HEAD OF THE CLASS: AN ORAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND BEYOND 166 (1995). The campus hired
its first black professor in 1954. See id. Early in its history, UCLA was located on blue-collar
Vermont Avenue; it soon moved to more upscale Westwood when a Regent visited the region
and admired the "ocean view." See STADTMAN, supra note 445, at 228.
565. See Telephone Interview with R.A. (Nov. 17, 1999).
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Most of this has been treated in earlier parts of this Article. But it seemed
advisable to summarize all these strands in one place to enable the reader to
get a sense of the panoply of means by which California's paid intelligentsia
contributed to a paradigm of knowledge in which minority misery and exclu-
sion came to seem natural and inevitable. The following paragraphs, and the
final section about University of California at Davis, fill in a few more pieces
of the puzzle.
1. Exoneration of White Elites for Serious Moral Missteps
Although state actors in California have often played despicable-or at
least seriously compromised-roles in the state's unfolding racial drama, the
state's professoriate and intelligentsia have been slow to condemn them.
Regarding them as their own, and perhaps reasoning, "there but for the grace
of God go I," opinion makers grant members of their group "moral passes"
in a way that conceals official wrongdoing, assures that moral insight does
not generalize, and makes the next mistakes just as easy.
Consider the case of the civil rights-civil liberties icon Earl Warren,
who as U.S. Supreme Court justice presided over decisions outlawing segre-
gation in public schools, invalidating Jim Crow laws that prevented blacks
from voting, and declaring miscegenation laws unconstitutional.66 Despite
this brilliant judicial record, one aspect of Warren's career looms large in
California history, a chapter that predates his tenure on the Supreme Court.
As Attorney General of California and, later, candidate for Governor in the
1942 elections, Warren made common cause with California's "native sons
and daughters" in a campaign against Asians, culminating in the 1942 intern-
ment of over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, two-thirds of them American
citizens.567
As Professor Sumi Cho has shown, Warren's official biographers con-
stituted a "fraternity of admirers," who downplayed his role in the Japanese
internment. 568 Warren's admirers included a committee of University of
California scholars led by historian Jacobus tenBroek, which concluded that
Warren should not be held accountable because the Supreme Court could
have stopped internment but did not.569 Others acknowledged Warren's
leadership in whipping up hysteria against Japanese Americans, conceding
566. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and
a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 73-75 (1998).
567. See id. at 75, 86-104. For a discussion of Warren's close identification with the Native Sons
of the Golden West, a virulently anti-Asian organization, see CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE EDUCATION
OF CAREY MCWILLIAMS 107 (1978).
568. Cho, supra note 566, at 77-86.
569. See id. at 84.
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that Warren "engineered one of the most conspicuously racist and repressive
governmental acts in American history,""57 but nevertheless suggested that
the exigencies of wartime excused what he did. Even Carey McWilliams
defended his long-time friend, reminding his readers that before his exposure
to the civil rights movement, Warren, like many Americans, held bigoted
and prejudiced views against people of color. Yet, through the crucible of
his early experiences, including participation in the internment of the Japa-
nese, Warren grew as a person and surmounted his early prejudices."'1
One university interview is illustrative. In the archives of the Bancroft
Library we came across a transcript of an interview conducted by a university
biographer of California's illustrious son.572 After a period, the interview
turned to the issues surrounding the internment of the Japanese. At one
point, Warren volunteered that a key issue in justifying internment, namely
Japanese ownership of much land near strategic installations, might have
remained unproved. This was a quite damaging admission, because Warren
had based much of his campaign on a dramatic map of California with red
pins marking Japanese-owned property. Instead of pursuing the matter, the
interviewer laughed and changed the subject.7 Although Cho does not men-
tion this episode, it exemplifies the mechanism (ready exoneration) that she
highlights.
Another example is the retrospective canonization of Clark Kerr as a
visionary leader, although close analysis reveals that his main virtues were
pragmatic, and included logrolling and appearing to offer something for574
everyone. President Kerr, as we pointed out earlier, was a prime force in
establishing the California Master Plan and standardized testing, two measures
that had severe consequences for social equity in the state.75
Other examples include solicitous treatment of race-I.Q. researchers
such as Arthur Jensen, William Shockley, and Vincent Sarich.76  These
three researchers played major roles in winning social acceptance for the
idea that intelligence is genetic, an idea that rendered palatable cutbacks in
funds for Head Start, welfare, aid to schools, and a host of other measures
570. Id. at 79.
571. See id. at 78-82, 83.
572. See Regional Oral History Project, Staff Interview of Earl Warren, in Bancroft Library,
University of California at Berkeley; see also James J. Rawls, The Earl Warren Oral History Project:
An Appraisal, 67 PAC. HIST. REV. 87, 96 (1998).
573. See supra note 572.
574. See LEMANN, supra note 471, at 121, 136, 171-72, 208-09; see also supra note 458 and
accompanying text.
575. See supra notes 482-485 and accompanying text.
576. See generally WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH
(1994); John Battelle, The Gospel According to Sarich, EXPRESS, Jan. 18, 1991, at 3.
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necessary for the social advancement of minorities. 77 Jensen and Sarich taught
at Berkeley; Shockley at Stanford. Although students and members of the
public reacted to their pronouncements with outrage, only a few of their
colleagues did. Some academics remained quiet, perhaps out of the belief that
the three controversial speakers might be right. Others hid behind the
guise of academic freedom. Prompted by Jensen's research, the University
of California's academic freedom committee considered a measure that would
have declared investigation into racial components of intelligence to be
inappropriate.57 A law school professor, who was also a psychiatrist, pointed
out that such research could easily harm an entire community, such as blacks,
and that human subjects research guidelines should be interpreted to prohibit
it unless the entire African American community approved.579 The measure
was defeated,"' and Jensen has been advocating his position until very recently.
Indeed, his findings were prominently cited in Richard Hermstein and Charles
Murray's The Bell Curve and are an integral part of the current neonativist
revival.5 8'
Early I.Q. researcher Lewis Terman, who taught at Stanford, believed
several ethnic groups were dull and should not be encouraged to reproduce.5 2
Race-I.Q. research played a significant role in this country even before the
Bell Curve controversy broke out. In the mid-1950s, liberals across the United
States had been aflame with the ideal of school desegregation championed
by Brown. 83 Indeed, the Supreme Court had relied on a number of academic
studies to conclude that segregation harmed black schoolchildren.5" By the
late 1960s, however, some academic social scientists were questioning the
link between segregation and harm.85 Conservative social scientists criticized
577. See, e.g., WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 166-67; see also supra note 399 and accompany-
ing text (describing the work of Stanford I.Q. researcher Lewis Terman).
578. See Battelle, supra note 576; Carl Irving, Showdown on Human Studies Nears at UC, S.F.
EXAMINER, Aug. 19,1973, at Al.
579. See Irving, supra note 578.
580. See id.
581. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 9-10, 13, 283-84, 302-04, 308 (1994); see also
Native Sons of the Golden West (flyer, n.d.) (on file with authors) (featuring an endorsement by
University of California History Professor Herbert E. Bolton of a virulently nativist and anti-Japanese
organization devoted to "hold[ing] California for the white race").
582. See Father to 1,000 Geniuses, supra note 399, at 20; Planned Parenthood Carries on Eugenics
Tradition, supra note 399; see also supra note 399 and accompanying text.
583. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For the argument that Brown played a
legitimizing role, allowing social elites to continue business as usual, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstruc-
tive Paradox, WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1995).
584. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.ll, 494-95.
585. See JOHN P. JACKSON, TRANSFORMING SOCIAL SCIENCE INTO MODERN AUTHORITY
IN BROWN, 1945-1955 (forthcoming 2000) (on file with authors).
the empirical basis of Brown.586 Arthur Jensen maintained that I.Q. was
genetic, and therefore relatively fixed, and that the white and black races
differed greatly in their average level of intellectual endowment.587 Writing
in 1972, Christopher Jencks and David J. Armour echoed his findings.88
When federal courts ordered busing in California cities, many whites simply
left for the suburbs or forced recall elections for school boards that enforced
federal decrees;589 other cities proposed open enrollment and voluntarism as
strategies to defeat segregation.590 Around that time, David J. Armour of the
Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, published a study professing to show
that integration did not close the racial gap in test scores and asked federal
judge Manuel Real to suspend his order desegregating Pasadena schools. 91
The judge refused, and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare fined the city $1.68 million for violating Judge Real's order.592 Even-
tually, the federal courts bowed to reality and either softened or ended desegre-
gation decrees,"9 in some cases because not enough whites were left to promote
any measurable degree of integration.94
D. Agribusiness and the University: The Case of the University
of California at Davis
One final area requiring discussion concerns both types of impact men-
tioned earlier: The University's relation to farming, farm unionization, mecha-
nization, and agricultural research has contributed both to direct oppression
of segments of the California population and to an architecture of knowledge
that deems certain issues valid and important and others not. University of
California at Davis figures centrally into each of these areas.
586. See id.
587. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 165.
588. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1972); WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 166, 172; David J.
Armour, The Evidence on Busing, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 115.
589. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 180-86.
590. See supra notes 431-439 and accompanying text.
591. See WOLLENBERG, supra note 223, at 172.
592. See id.
593. See, e.g., James B. Meadow, "I'll Probably Ride My Bike to School:" End to Forced Busing
Prompts Children on School Bus No. 2231 to Look Back and Ahead, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Colo.),
June 6, 1996, at F6a.
594. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413
U.S. 189 (1973); David J. Armour & Gary Orfield, Should the Courts Reduce Their Role in School
Desegregation? 6 CQ RESEARCHER 929 (Oct. 18, 1996); Craig Horst, U.S. Judge Ends Kansas City's
School Desegregation Battle, 145 CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 18, 1999, at 1.
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1. California Agriculture
a. Labor Supply and Demand
By the late nineteenth century, California agriculture already represented
a major sector of the state's economy.5 95 After the initial attraction of the
gold rush wore off, Anglos needed to find another means of supporting
themselves. 96 Many fraudulently or violently displaced the original landowners
to gain land for farming.597 By 1889, California was the second largest wheat pro-
ducer in the country.598 Unlike the Jeffersonian vision of a classless agricultural
society, California "bonanza wheat farming" relied on class division. 99
Since its inception, California's agriculture depended on cheap labor.
Thus, early farmers pushed for the "establishment of a full-blown plantation
economy ... complete with a black slave labor force imported from the
South."6" This proposal failed when California decided not to become a slave
state."' Still, Californians were convinced from the beginning that farm labor
was "not suitable for whites."6 2 At the same time, California growers saw
farm labor as a factor of production, like water or hours of sunshine. As such,
they were prepared to manipulate it in search of profit. 3  Indians were
initially forced into farm labor through discriminatory vagrancy laws," as
were the Chinese, who were driven out of the mining camps by whites asserting
their racial prerogative to sudden wealth.6 5 The Chinese and succeeding
groups of nonwhite farm workers were the "practical equivalent of slaves,"
much like post-Civil War freedmen, who were stuck in a single occupational
status in which others controlled the structure of their lives.6
By 1890, the agricultural colleges of the University of California had
established a strong relationship to large-scale farmers. Earlier, Edward Wickson
of the College of Agriculture had advised farmers to abandon traditional
ways and emulate commercial and manufacturing industries."' He argued
595. See, e.g., CLITUS E. DANIEL, BITTER HARVEST: A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA FARM-
WORKERS 1870-1941, at 21-22 (1981).
596. See id. at 20-21.
597. See id.
598. See id.
599. See id. at 23.
600. Id. at 24.
601. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
602. See DANIEL, supra note 595, at 26.
603. See id. at 25.
604. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also DANIEL, supra note 595, at 24.
605. See DANIEL, supra note 595, at 24.
606. Id. at 27-28.
607. See id. at 41.
that the success of California agriculture depended on eliminating the "historic
distinction between the businessman and the farmer" and on "embracing
scientific methods.""6 8 The source and training ground for these scientific
methods would, of course, be the faculty of the agricultural schools of the
University of California. By the late 1800s, spurred by the university, large
growers developed organizations and means dedicated to the continuation of a
cheap labor force. Over time, the identity of this force shifted; with the
exclusion of the Chinese in 1882, growers urgently needed a new source.
Before the 1920s, California farmers had resisted hiring Mexicans, believing
them to be less tractable than the Chinese, but these fears quickly subsided
as farmers realized that the federal government's liberalized immigration
policy toward Mexico provided a ready source of peon labor. As they had
with the Chinese, farm owners continued to see Mexican laborers as an
element of production, rather than as equal human participants in a common
venture. With farm mechanization, the laborers' position only worsened.0 9
b. The University Enters the Scene
The modem land grant college rests on three major pieces of legislation:
the Morrill Acts of 1862, 1883, and 1890, the Hatch Act of 1887, and the
Smith-Lever Act of 1914. These acts provide the basis for federal support
for agricultural colleges, agricultural experiment stations, and the agricultural
extension system, which was an arm of all of these.6"' Although the original
purpose of this cooperative system was to help the average farmer, California's
land grant college system quickly evolved as a research wing providing tax-
free aid, machines, and consultation to large-scale farming and the wealthiest
class of farmers.61
The University of California is an integral member of the land grant
complex and research factory. Through its agricultural schools and experiment
stations in Berkeley, Davis, and Riverside, it has provided pathfinding research
608. Id.
609. See id. at 42, 46, 66-67, 69-71; see also infra Part V.D.2. (describing farm mechanization
issues and litigation).
610. See Smith-Lever Act of 1914, ch. 79, § 1, 38 Stat. 372 (1914) (codified at 7 U. S. C.
§§ 341-348 (1994)); Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, § 4, 26 Stat. 419 (1890) (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 321-326, 328 (1994)); Hatch Act of 1887, ch. 314, §§ 1, 2, 24 Stat. 440 (1887) (codified
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a, 362, 363, 365, 368, 377-379 (1994)); Morrill Act of 1883, ch. 130, § 4, 12
Stat. 504 (1883) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 304 (1994)); Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 130, §1, 12 Star.
503 (1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, 307, 308 (1994)); see also JIM HIGHTOWER, HARD
TOMATOES, HARD TIMES: A REPORT OF THE AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT ON
THE FAILURE OF AMERICA'S LAND GRANT COLLEGE COMPLEX 8 (1973).
611. See HIGHTOWER, supra note 610, at 1-5.
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into crops such as tomatoes, grapes, and prunes, and also into livestock.6 '2 It
has provided laboratories for the chemical industry to research pesticides.613
It has also served as a principal proving ground for farm mechanization
research-the development of large, expensive machines capable of "planting,
thinning, weeding, and harvesting" without any human workers other than
a single driver.614 The University of California has also sponsored research
to create a tomato that is hard enough and shaped in such a manner as to
be picked, handled, and sorted by a machine.615
(1) The Farm Bureau and the Extension System
Almost since its inception, the American Farm Bureau Federation (the
Farm Bureau), the "largest, most powerful, most affluent farm organization
' 16
in the country, has opposed social reforms related to small farms or farm
labor. The self-proclaimed spokesman for the American farmer, its true inter-
ests lie in the improvement of farming as a business. Created by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Farm Bureau was quickly adopted and supported
by the government-sponsored Extension Service in the 1920s. The Farm
Bureau maintains an extensive system of county agents and products for
farmers, including insurance, oil and fertilizer, and a travel agency. Its politics
are decidedly conservative; at conventions and youth gatherings, the Farm
Bureau has been known to bring in individuals to give antiregulation, anti-
Communist, and anti-civil rights speeches.6"7 It also opposes federal legislation
that targets poverty, including fair housing and minimum wage laws.6"'
The Farm Bureau also committed extensive resources to defeating
Cesar Chavez and the national boycotts, originating in California, of table
grapes and lettuce, by distributing tens of thousands of pamphlets promoting
612. See California Agrarian Action Project, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 1245, 1249 (1989).
613. See HIGHTOWER, supra note 610, at 98. The contribution prompted a professor of the
entomology department to comment in a confidential memorandum to the head of the department
in 1971: "There seems to be a trend developing that I don't think should continue. Men that retire
from jobs with chemical corporations take jobs in universities if for no other reason than to give their
ideas credence by using a university letterhead." Id. (quoting D.L. Dalsten, Confidential Memorandum
to Dr. R.F. Smith, Head of Entomology, University of California at Berkeley).
614. See infra notes 636, 639-640 and accompanying text; see also ANN FOLEY SCHEURING,
TILLERS: AN ORAL HISTORY OF FAMILY FARMS IN CALIFORNIA 182 (1983).
615. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 182.
616. SAMUEL R. BERGER, DOLLAR HARVEST: THE STORY OF THE FARM BUREAU 2 (1971).
617. See id. at 3, 5. A large majority of the members of the American Farm Bureau Federation
(the Farm Bureau) have nothing to do with farming; it sponsors events under the "banner of 'American
citizenship' programs." Id. at 4.
618. See id. at 3. The Farm Bureau also opposed "Medicare, federal aid to education, anti-poverty
legislation, housing bills, land] minimum wage laws." Id.
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nonunion table grapes and depicting the union as a den of malcontents and
troublemakers. It coordinated the growers' resistance, distributing newsletters
and sponsoring educational programs on how to cope with labor problems
and unionization. Farm workers are barred from joining the organization
except as nonvoting members.6"9
The Farm Bureau is related to the University of California through the
Cooperative Extension System, which plays a major role in all land grant
universities.620 The Smith-Lever Act, which established the Extension System,
specifically allowed "contributions from private sources" as part of state-
matching funds.62' Over time, the Farm Bureau gained influence by contributing
to the extension offices to such an extent that some county bureaus considered
the county extension agent an employee."' The Farm Bureau lobbied Congress
to expand extension services and resisted efforts to separate the two.623
In California, university extension agents, sometimes called farm advisors,
were hired by the university and the federal government. These agents trav-
eled the farm circuit lecturing on such topics as how to handle crews; it appears
they never addressed farm workers on how to handle their foremen. According
to Anne and Hal Draper, in the 1930s, the Farm Bureau and its child, the
Associated Farmers, organized vigilantism, cross burning, and espionage, breaking
strike after strike. Farm Bureau secretaries, appointed by the University,
served as the leadership of the Associated Farmers. When the University of
California at Berkeley College of Agriculture organized a three-day
conference in 1938 on how to oppose unionization, this proved too much
even for the Alameda County Congress of Industrial Organizations, which
charged that the University of California was emerging as an antiunion
partisan. Carey McWilliams complained that the Associated Farmers were
using the University's extension system to sabotage labor.624 When he contin-
ued raising his voice, Earl Warren terminated him from his state position as
watchdog for the migrant population.625
The Drapers report how university professor R.L. Adams, in a text entitled
Farm Management, provided guidelines for California farm employers. Negroes,
619. See id. at 160, 162.
620. See WAYNE D. RASMUSSEN, TAKING THE UNIVERSITY TO THE PEOPLE: SEVENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF COOPERATIVE EXTENSION 77 (1989).
621. Smith-Lever Act of 1914, ch. 79, § 3, 38 Stat. 373 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 343 (1994)).
622. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 620, at 77-78.
623. See HIGHTOWER, supra note 610, at 132. In 1921, a memorandum of separation signed
by the president of the Farm Bureau and the head of the State Relations Board revealed the longtime
relationship between the organizations. See id.
624. See ANNE DRAPER & HAL DRAPER, THE DIRT ON CALIFORNIA: AGRIBUSINESS AND
THE UNIVERSITY 2, 3 (1968).
625. See Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lustig, Sacramento State University (Mar. 13, 2000);
see also MCWILLIAMS, supra note 567, at 107.
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he wrote, are "prevaricators and robbers;" Japanese, "tricky;" Mexicans "childish"
and ungrateful.626 The professor warned farmers that migrant workers are an
unappreciative lot and cautioned them against allowing radical talk. The
Drapers also highlight the way the University of California's Division of
Agricultural Science, Agricultural Extension, and the Experiment Stations
have worked hand in glove and how, alone among other major industries, agri-
business has its research done for free.627 Agricultural extension services helped
the Chamber of Commerce publish a San Francisco Business feature favorable
to farmers exactly at a time when supermarket grape boycotts were hitting the
Bay Area.
The Drapers also point out how the University of California's Division
of Agricultural Sciences, working in cooperation with the State Agricultural
Extension Service with hundreds of farm advisors, wields great influence in
university politics and governance. Until recently, the Regents of the
University of California included, ex officio, the president of the State Board
of Agriculture. Appointments to the position of regent have included a heavy
representation of agricultural interests such as a president of Hunt Foods
and a president of the California Farm Bureau Federation, who was a leading
opponent of Cesar Chavez, and who boasted that his workers came to the
back door of his home on his two thousand acre ranch to talk over problems
with him. He also told a church audience that he would consider that he
had failed his Christian duty if his workers were to say that they wanted a
union."'
University of California agricultural experts appeared at hearings on
California farm labor problems, in which one testified that very small increases
in farm worker wages were all that should be expected based on increases in
productivity. This expert and his colleagues presented volumes of research
showing that farm workers, then paid about one dollar per hour, were not
mistreated; their thousands of words of testimony included no mention of
widespread exploitation of women and children in the fields and orchards.
The committee voted for no significant reforms: no state minimum wage for
farm workers, no unemployment insurance, and no collective bargaining.
Economists from the Agricultural Extension also defended the Bracero
Program, then under attack nationally, explaining that the state had experi-
enced no educational or family health problems with the Mexican workers.
626. See DRAPER & DRAPER, supra note 624, at 4 (quoting R.L. Adams).
627. See id. at 5; see also DANIEL, supra note 595, at 4 (reporting a study showing that the state
research apparatus devoted 6000 "man years" to projects benefiting agribusiness).
628. See DRAPER & DRAPER, supra note 624, at 9-11.
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After Congress ended the official program, California agricultural experts urged
the creation of an informal one to subsequent Congresses.629
University of California experts long opposed unionization and the insti-
tution of the minimum wage for farm workers, and when the tide seemed to
turn against them, encouraged the development of harvesting machines for
fruit, tomatoes, and lettuce. Growers had not been receptive to the idea until
panicked by Congress's termination of the Bracero Program. When the univer-
sity developed an artificial grape picker, it awarded the mayor of Berkeley a
contract to manufacture it. When farm worker sympathizers questioned
whether University of California chancellors should serve on the boards of
large food companies, one replied "I don't see any conflict.""63
When some liberal legislators charged the university-sponsored 4-H pro-
gram with ignoring farm workers and catering to fresh-faced sons and daughters
of large farm owners, the University of California buried the issue.63' Later,
when the Cooperative Extension Service faced widespread charges of discrimi-
nation and had made little progress in hiring blacks and Hispanics, President
David Saxon appointed a task force in 1979 to inquire into the allegations.
It recommended the appointment of a full-time officer and increased partici-
pation of minorities in all phases of program development.632
2. Matters Come to a Head: Chemical Poisoning and the Farm
Mechanization Suit
In an intriguing story covered in greater detail in the final section of this
Article, " the sleepy farm town of Davis was selected in 1906 as the site of a
major University of California agricultural experiment station.63 4 The station
soon revealed its attitude toward labor. A 1918 report commented on the
great distinctions among farm laborers and the "great variation ... among
Mexicans and Hindus" and stated that flimsy quarters for "peon, coolie, or
oriental labor are generally not suited" for the more demanding American
standard of living.
629. See id. at 11-14,16.
630. See id. at 22-23, 26, 27-30.
631. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 225.
632. See id. at 226; see also Interview with Anonymous, in Davis, Cal. (Aug. 15, 1999) (reporting
that growers successfully opposed the appointment of an eminent Mexican American professor
because he was "inappropriate for Davis" because of his history of employment with California
Rural Legal Assistance, an organization that works on behalf of farmworkers).
633. See infra Part V.3.c.
634. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 66-68.
635. Id. at 142.
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Years later, after President Lyndon B. Johnson ended the Bracero Program
and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee threatened to increase
the cost of tomato and grape harvesting, California agribusiness faced a discon-
certing prospect: rumors that the entire processing industry might move
to Mexico, where a plentiful supply of laborers awaited. Sacramento, however,
saved the day, appropriating one hundred fifty million dollars to develop a
mechanized picker and hybridization to produce a square tomato. Soon, eighty
other mechanization projects joined these two.636
After Rachel Carson published Silent Spring,"7 the ensuing public outcry
prompted University of California scientists to study pesticides in food and fer-
tilizers in ground water. Until the early 1960s, Davis obligingly field-tested a
veritable menu of new chemical compounds at the request of pesticide and
insecticide producers. Reaction to chemical hazards by consumers and sym-
pathy for farm workers displaced by the university's mechanization research
prompted University of California's president Charles J. Hitch to call for a
638study of rural poverty.
Against this background, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA)
filed suit on behalf of the California Agrarian Action Project against six
regents, three administrators, and unnamed faculty researchers and employees
at Davis. 639 The suit alleged improprieties stemming from conflicts of interest
and maintenance of mechanization research that had a harsh impact on small
farming, including the undermining of collective bargaining, the destruction
of small farming as a way of life, the production of inferior produce, and the
charging of higher prices. The complaint charged that the defendants used
public monies to confer a private benefit on large farmers and agribusiness
in violation of the California Constitution, the Political Reform Act, and
the very statutes setting up land grant colleges mentioned in the early
paragraphs of this part.6"
Plaintiffs called witnesses who testified about the improper influence
of corporate money on research priorities and the great desirability of a
remedy termed a "social impact statement."' After narrowing the scope of the
case, the trial court ruled that the university was required to install procedures
to monitor social impact and that this requirement did not infringe on aca-
demic liberty.642 The university appealed and the Court of Appeals in San
636. See id. at 182
637. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); see also SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 186-87.
638. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 186-87, 192.
639. See California Agrarian Action Project, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 210 Cal.
App. 3d 1245 (1989).
640. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 192.
641. See id.
642. See California Agrarian Action Project, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1248-49.
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Francisco reversed, finding that nothing in the Hatch Act or the mandate of
the experiment station required evaluating, much less minimizing, the impact
of the university's research on small family farming. When the California
Supreme Court refused review, all issues appeared decided in the university's
favor. Earlier, a 1979 Academic Senate report had advised the regents that
social-impact review was undesirable. Because no one could foresee the results
of their research, scientists were ill equipped to make social-impact predictions.
They might err on the side of caution with the result that valuable research
would remain undone.643
Although the plaintiffs lost, CRLA believed that the University of
California's victory was pyrrhic. Publicity generated by the suit, coming on
top of pressures from environmental and consumer groups, prompted both the
university and the California legislature to modify Davis's practices, including
studies of overgrazing, dairy waste management, and urban gardening.
4
Some of the reforms went beyond ecological issues to include affirmative action
and attention to allegations of discrimination in the cooperative extension
service.
645
3. The Town of Davis
Early in its history, Davis was a sleepy agricultural town located in rural
Yolo County, about twenty-five miles from Sacramento. Like the surrounding
towns of Winters, Woodland, Dixon, and Sacramento, which contained,
then as they do now, well-delineated Mexican barrios, Davis had a modest
Mexican settlement that may have included a restaurant, a cantina, and a row
or two of modest houses.646 Today, Davis is a clean, upscale college town with
shops, bookstores, community gardens, and environmentally conscious high-
priced housing developments. Mexican people, much less a Mexican neighbor-
hood, are nowhere to be found, and the number of African American families
is also very low.
What happened in between? The prevailing culture of Davis today is
liberal. The town boasts of its recycling programs, endless miles of bicycle
643. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 192.
644. See id. at 216-18; see also Court Won't Force UCD to Aid Farms, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept.
7, 1989, at F1 (noting that the company refocused its research away from mechanization and toward
nonchemical alternatives to pesticides and fertilizers).
645. See SCHEURING, supra note 614, at 216-18. Evidently, pesticide exposure was not com-
pletely rectified. See Martha Mendoza, Exposure to Pesticides Torments Farmworkers, BOULDER DAILY
CAMERA (Colo.), June 24, 1999, at 2C (noting how California's tough regulations often are not
enforced and that farm counties reported hundreds of cases of poisoned workers with ailments ranging
from rashes to blisters to cancer).
646. See Interview with Anonymous, former law student at Davis.
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paths, and solar homes. Both it and the campus profess to wish that they could
attract more minority students and residents, but believe that their location
far from a large urban center, the relatively high price of housing, and the
lack of a critical mass of people of color make doing so difficult. In short,
impersonal forces such as location and the economics of the housing market
account for the town's nearly exclusive white and Asian makeup.
Oral history, however, and a few tantalizing strands of physical evidence
suggest a less benign explanation. Nearly fifty years ago, the University of
California Regents and the California legislature gave the go-ahead for Davis
to expand from a small, bucolic agricultural school to a broad-based general-
purpose campus.647 The town fathers immediately realized that Davis would
be transformed and that a great deal of money stood to be made. Tens of
thousands of new students and faculty would need housing, stores, and services.
Like a host of California towns that abruptly removed minority settlements
when they were inconvenient or in the way,648 Davis may have undertaken
a coordinated, but scarcely visible, effort to drive the Mexicans out of town.
According to oral reports, longtime residents of Yolo County recall a time
when, just before the university's expansion, the town of Davis turned even
meaner than usual. 649 The police began hassling Mexican-looking people,
650
merchants stopped extending credit,65' and local inspectors closed down the
barrio's commercial establishments for zoning and health violations.
652 Earlier
in its history, Davis had done the same to a tiny Chinatown during the time
in which the Chinese were suffering one of their intermittent periods of
unpopularity.6 According to suggestive evidence, university authorities were
aware of the town's anti-Mexican purge and either welcomed it or did nothing
to stop it.
654
Previous parts of this Article review the prominent role of Davis's agri-
cultural research machine and the University of California's ties to agribusiness
in declaring war on farm unionization, farm labor rights, consumer protection
from unsafe pesticides, and small farming as a way of life.655 We have also seen
how geographic choice and decisions to locate new campuses in predominantly
647. See UC Davis FACTS, Historical Milestones (visited June 21, 1999) <http://facts.ucdavis.edu/
timeline.html> [hereinafter UC Davis FACTS].
648. See Letter from T.R., Professor of Law, to authors (July 15, 1999) (on file with authors).
649. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 646.
650. See id.; see also infra notes 709-713 and accompanying text (regarding automobile "sticker"
program).
651. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 646.
652. See id.
653. See Telephone Interview with J.L., former professor, Davis, Cal. (July 21, 1999).
654. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 646.
655. See supra notes 628-632, 636-645 and accompanying text.
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white communities helped ensure that the University of California and the
California State University system came to be regarded as serving those
constituencies and a few highly selected minorities."' In the case of Davis,
the University of California appears to have picked a site favorable for agri-
culture (because of its abundant sunlight, water, and inexpensive land) and
turned it into an all-white community by means that anyone today would
regard as despicable.
a. Early Davis History
In the early twentieth century, the tiny agricultural town of Davisville
was extremely anxious to be selected as the site of a University of California
state farm. It organized a chamber of commerce and a women's improvement
club to boost the town's chances and to raise money for the purchase of
farm land to be offered to the University of California if Davisville were
selected. Aware that it was competing against its rival, the neighboring city
of Woodland, the town set out energetically to demonstrate to university
officials its own superiority and its wholehearted support of the planned experi-
mental station.657 It even took subscriptions for the purchase of land of dubious
title.
The Davis archives contain evidence of an impressive display of booster-
ism and town pride. The journal of one almond farmer named George W.
Pierce contains entries showing how he raised contributions from eighty-four
of his neighbors ranging from 25 to 500 dollars.69 His neighbors appear to
have been as good as their word; a later entry shows that all but seven paid
up.660 He also seems to have been something of a double agent, speaking at
public events in Woodland.661 One April day in 1906, his diary reports:
"Had terrible accident today. Hand mangled in sorting machine. Went to
doc who amputated part of my finger. 6 2 The next day's entry reads matter
of factly: "Ran to Woodland and back. Heard of fearful earthquake this
morning at 5 a.m. San Francisco reported to be in ruins. 663
656. See supra notes 564-565 and accompanying text.
657. See JOANN L. LARKEY & SHIPLEY WALTERS, YOLO COUNTY: LAND OF CHANGING
PATTERNS 58-60 (1987).
658. See Journal of George W. Pierce, Letters and Other Documents Relating to George W.
Pierce, at 1-2, Box 81, in Shields Library, Special Collections, University of California at Davis.
659. See id.
660. See id.
661. See id. at 2.
662. Id.
663. Id. at 2-3.
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His finger presumably healed, he negotiated for the best possible price on
Davis area farms and wrote to Governor George Pardee and the state attorney
general, arguing Davis's case. 664 An August 10, 1906 entry reads: "Found
lost deeds" ;66 another describes Woodland's "competing fee, 66 while still
another records an imploring letter to the state governor to "put it here where
the best people are. '67 Another entry describes an effort to acquire a certain
Pefia property and mentions "this cloud is more serious.
668
A standard history of Yolo County likewise reports that Davisville was
highly anxious to promote itself as a site for the state farm, and reports that
the decisive purchase of a 778-acre site known as the Jerome C. Davis farm
occurred in 1906, with the university farm opening two years later.
669 The town
celebrated the day of decision by flying flags and shooting off firecrackers.
On January 5, 1909, the university farm school opened with eighteen students.
Enrollment remained under 350 until World War I; but by the 1920s, the farm
had become a four-year agricultural school, and the town considered itselfi" /671
transformed. It dropped the "ville" in its name in 1917 and adopted the
slogan "We Are Growing." 67' In 1951, the university added a College of Letters
and Science to the agricultural school; in 1959, the Regents designated Davis a
comprehensive campus.672 In short order, it added a college of engineering, a
law school, a school of medicine, a division of biological sciences, and a graduate
671
school of management.
In 1932, seasonal workers from Mexico came to Yolo County in substan-
tial numbers. Many more arrived during World War II, when they were
actively recruited.674 Others came during the Bracero Program that started
during the war years and continued until 1964. By 1979, Yolo County was
11 percent Mexican American. 67' Despite the growth in numbers of Mexicans
and blacks, for much of its early history the town appears to have been not
at all hospitable to its small minority settlements. The first realtor who sold






669. See UC Davis FACTS, supra note 647.
670. See LARKEY & WALTERS, supra note 657, at 58, 60.
671. See id.
672. See id. at 94; UC Davis FACTS, supra note 647.
673. See LARKEY & WALTERS, supra note 657, at 94-95; UC Davis FACTS, supra note 647.
674. See LARKEY & WALTERS, supra note 657, at 83, 86.
675. See id. at 90, 92.
676. See Interview with Anonymous, supra note 646.
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covenants, and a local historian described the town newspaper as "racist." '677
Until Woodland relaxed its attitude toward Mexicans in the 1940s and 1950s,
Mexican people could not get a haircut anywhere in Yolo County, enter a bar
or restaurant, and "had to go to Sacramento" for most services." A walnut
grower described Mexican labor as "a water spigot you turn it on when you
need it and turn it off when you don't.., we don't pay any social attention
to them ... that is almost slavery." '679
As they did elsewhere in California during this period, local educators
wrote that Mexicans have low I.Q.s and are not capable of much improvement
by schooling."' Anglo schoolchildren seem to have caught a whiff of these
attitudes. One Mexican American girl from an influential family in Davis
reported that "[t]hey would be invited to birthday parties and I was not, and
I always felt it was because we did not have the money and I was Mexican.""6 '
Another recalled "there were three girls Mexican all brilliant in grammar
school ... but not one of them ever won an award or a scholarship." '682
Braceros avoided Davis because the city had a reputation as unfriendly
toward Mexicans and because the police would harass them.683 Davis police
reportedly would even ticket Asians, believing them up to no good.684 The
town tolerated unspeakable conditions in migrant camps in the 195 0s, and
when, in the wake of Proposition 13, the town did not have enough money
to operate school buses for all, it discontinued providing bus service for the
sons and daughters of migrants living in a camp several miles outside of town.
Liberals protested that without busing, the children would not be able to attend
school at all because their parents needed the family car to get to and from
their jobs in the fields. The school board replied that it could not play
favorites, otherwise it would have to provide bus service for students living
in the wealthy all-white suburb of El Macero, which was also located outside
of town.685
A local resident remembers only one black man in town during the 1940s
and 1950s, Mr. Powell the postman. She remembers him during World
War II because he would deliver the telegrams informing people about the
677. See id.
678. HENRY T. TRUEBA ET AL., HEALING MULTICULTURAL AMERICA: MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS
RISE TO POWER IN RURAL CALIFORNIA 81(1993).
679. Id.
680. See id. at 82.
681. Id. at 83.
682. Interview with D.M., in private Davis archives, compiled by a Davis professor (copy on
file with authors).
683. See Interview with S.D.L.T., in private Davis archives, supra note 682.
684. See Telephone Interview with I.F. (Aug. 2, 1999).
685. See Telephone Interview with D.V. (Nov. 1, 1999).
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686
deaths of soldiers. She does not remember whether he had a family or not.
In 1959, the first professor of color at Davis, an Asian American, was unable
to buy a house anywhere in the town until Chancellor Emil Mrak intervened
personally. 7 By then, two black families lived in Davis in "awful housing," one
at the dump. 688 Both would have liked to have moved into town, but no one
would sell to them. Later, three university administrators helped one family,
the Rogers, buy a home in central Davis. In 1960, a cross was placed in their
yard. In 1963, one of the sympathetic administrators, Dean Minnis, sold his
home to Steve Need, an African American. The next day, his neighbor put
up a for sale sign and made nasty comments to Need. As late as 1963, the
owner of a popular Davis restaurant refused to serve braceros.
69 When Latin
American students at Davis declared that they were "ready to march" against
this restaurant, two university officials, including Minnis, went to talk with
the owner. He backed down.69
One builder was said literally to hide when minority homeseekers
came to his office. The town treated braceros as "dirty" and refused to allow
African Americans to swim in the public pool, so many learned how to
swim in Minnis's backyard.69' An early African American professor at the
campus committed the sin of driving a flashy sports car, for which he paid
the price of frequent stops by the police.
692 Teachers would call students
"dirty Mexicans" and favor professors' children, most of whom were white.
693
One Mexican American businessman, the descendent of braceros, told
us that he was one of the "few brown faces" in Davis.
694 Nevertheless, he
succeeded in joining the chamber of commerce-"how I survived was a
miracle. I never felt at home here., 69' His fellow Mexicans shopped elsewhere
because Davis merchants were cold and would not cash checks.
696 They
were not even welcome inside the Catholic church, which instead held a
special mass for them in the basement.
697 Although the Mexican American
businessman is a long-term resident and operator of a successful business, he
describes Davis as "a miserable place," whose
698 police chief was a "mean son
686. See Telephone Interview with E.P. (Feb. 1, 2000).





692. See Interview with D.M., supra note 682.
693. See Interview with R.N. (Nov. 2, 1999).
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of a bitch." He considered himself nearly totally isolated.699 Asked about
the role of the university in racial politics, another respondent described it
as "very conservative. It stayed out of most issues. '
b. The Hunt Tomato Processing Plant Controversy
In the mid-1950s, the Hunt Corporation proposed to establish a proc-
essing plant and cannery in Davis.01 The town exploded in controversy when
citizens learned that the plant would employ large numbers of Mexican workers
to handle and process the tomatoes. In blazing letters, a newspaper ad blared,
"Wake Up! Before it's too late" and warned that the cannery, if annexed to
the city, would cause "large numbers of cannery workers to camp around
Davis and pack our already over- . . . crowded schools!"702 It described the
proposed cannery as a threat causing higher taxes, lower property values,
and "a public health menace and an all-around headache for all of us!"7 3
The flyer urged citizens to "get the true facts about the Hunt cannery before
it's too late" and to write to the mayor and city councilmen. 4
A sociologist, probably from the University of California at Davis, wrote
a letter to the local newspaper describing migrants as "not necessarily riffraff,"
but nonetheless a source of serious problems for the community, including
nutritional deficiencies and communicable diseases such as tuberculosis,
syphilis, gonorrhea, and malaria." 5 Many other letters fulminated to the same
effect. According to one respondent, Davis resisted the tomato processing
plant as long as possible, then bowed to the inevitable, moving the city's
boundary so that it would not owe services to the plant or its workers. 6
c. Evidence of a Purge
In addition to maintaining a generally unfriendly attitude toward its resi-
dent minorities throughout the first half of the century-something it had
in common with many California towns of the period-Davis may have carried
699. Id.
700. Telephone Interview with C.B. (Jan. 22, 2000); Interview with J.L., supra note 653.
701. See, e.g., Letter from Anonymous, to authors (July 17, 1999) (on file with authors).
702. DAVIS ENTERPRISE, Oct. 11, 1956, at 16 (on file with authors) ("(Otherwise, where is
the large labor force for the cannery going to come from?)". It's up to all of us ... to safeguard
our clean city and make Davis a BETTER place to live.").
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. E.M.L., Letter to the Editor, DAVIS ENTERPRISE, Oct. 18, 1956, at 7.
706. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Professor of Law (July 20, 1999). Even uni-
versity authorities opposed the processing plant because it would supply jobs for "the wrong sort of
people." Telephone Interview with J.L. (Aug. 6, 1999).
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out, consciously or unconsciously, a concerted effort to remove Mexican resi-
dents from the small neighborhood in which they were concentrated to pave
the way for development when the university expanded."7 Mexican people
recall an increase in racism during this period; a few recall harassment by civil
authorities such as housing and restaurant inspectors.7"' Many recall a despised
"4sticker" program in which local police would stop any driver of a dilapidated
vehicle lacking a U.C. Davis sticker, especially if he or she looked dark or
foreign."w An Anglo activist reported that the chamber of commerce and the
association of realtors maintained a blatant agenda of keeping Davis upwardly
mobile."' Newspapers and civic announcements exhorted the town to stamp
out "blight."7 ' Aerial photographs of the town show inexpensive "flat top
housing" disappearing from one year to the next.72 Records of eighth grade
graduation from Davis elementary schools show decreasing numbers of children
with Mexican surnames between 1946 and 1952.'
If Davis did, indeed, expel and harass minority residents to render the
town nearly all-white and suitable for university development, and especially
if it did so with the tacit consent of even a portion of the university admini-
stration, this chapter would constitute a type of "original sin" tainting the
subsequent history of that campus and adding to the overall moral claim of
minority communities for recompense.
CONCLUSION
In the words of the common refrain, those who do not learn the lessons of
history are doomed to repeat them. Studying the history of a region or college
system may bring to light evidence of serious mistreatment and inequities
continuing into the present. On acquainting themselves with this history,
fair-minded readers may conclude that their society owes a duty of redress to
minority populations whose children have been denied the opportunity for
upward educational mobility. Moreover, documented evidence may bolster
both the beleaguered diversity rationale for race-conscious decision making
in higher education, by showing how different from the mainstream are the
stories that minorities have to tell, and the remedial rationale, which will be the
707. See supra note 646 and accompanying text; see also Interview with S.D.L.T., supra note 683.
708. See Interview with S.D.L.T., supra note 683.
709. See Interview with P.G., in private Davis archives, supra note 682.
710. See Telephone Interview with S.S. (Dec. 3, 1999).
711. See Interview with P.G., in private Davis archives, supra note 682; Memorandum from
D.A. (Mar. 18, 1998) (on file with authors).
712. Aerial photographs of town of Davis, California (on file with authors).
713. See Letter from P.D. and accompanying graduation lists (Feb. 1, 2000) (on file with authors).
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only one left if the Supreme Court jettisons diversity, as it may in the months
and years ahead.
For all of these reasons, the racial history of California commends itself
to all who are concerned with a fair and just society. This Article is only a
beginning.
